Bernard Manin has argued that every transformation of democracy is accompanied by diagnoses of crisis (Manin, 1997: 193–4). The contemporary diagnoses of a crisis of liberal democracy are also, and perhaps primarily, diagnoses of a crisis of representation. Those concerned about political alienation and non-participation tend to blame misfunctions of representative institutions and their removed, secluded and increasingly technocratic character for citizens’ loss of interest in politics (e.g. Crouch, 2002; Hay, 2007; Mair, 2013). The literature on responsiveness contents that citizens’ unequal influence on political decisions and the frequent divergence of decisions from majority positions constitutes a failure of representatives to adequately represent all societal interests and preferences (e.g. Gilens, 2005; Bartels, 2008; Elsässer et al., 2018). The rise of populist parties and candidates, which is commonly regarded as the biggest threat to liberalism and democracy, is often explained as a response to the failures of representation: Mainstream parties are said to have betrayed the interests of low-income and low-education citizens and to have left a representational gap where preferences for a combination of redistributive with culturally conservative or even authoritarian policies are concerned. Accordingly, it is not surprising that many populist movements and parties challenge not only the policies produced by mainstream parties, but also the representative polity in which these are produced, and demand different, and in particular, more direct forms of democracy.