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2 results

  • Chapter 10 - Perception and Propositional Knowledge

  • Frode Kjosavik, Norwegian University of Life Sciences
  • Book:
    Kant and the Power of Perception
    Published online:
    27 November 2025
    Print publication:
    11 December 2025, pp 299-326

  • Summary

    It is discussed in more detail how perceptions relate to propositional knowledge. In doing so, “myths” of the perceptual Given are evaluated. One myth is that a mere perception can itself justify propositions, or ground assertoric judgments, and that it can therefore be a foundational justifier. This is the Myth of the Given in Sellars and McDowell. Kant would deny that intuitions can justify propositions independently of conceptual content, be it infallibly or fallibly. After all, he makes the well-known complementarity claim about cognition “in the proper sense,” according to which intuitions without concepts are blind. However, as argued in the preceding chapters, their blindness does not entail that they do not have epistemic power in their own right.