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In the presence of a default option, the optimal search rule for an agent with a reference-dependent utility and a search cost predicts: (i) the default increases the reservation utility due to the reference effect, leading to a better choice, and (ii) those with higher reservation utility will self-select into search and are more likely to find a superior option. Our experiments document the presence of both effects. Those who reject the default are likely to find higher-ranked options in their active search, supporting the self-selection effect. Even when the self-selection channel is shut down, the reference effect remains.
Expectations-based reference dependence has been shown to be important across a variety of contexts in Psychology and Economics. Do expectations play a role in moral judgment? The higher our beliefs are relative to an outcome, do we punish more harshly? This paper reports a series of experiments investigating the hypothesis that expectations as reference points per se affect punishment. The experimental design varies the expectation the Punisher holds just before she learns what actually occurred. In tandem with the manipulation, expectations are shown to vary significantly and substantially. However, punishment does not respond to these exogenous changes in expectations. After 17 sessions, 295 Punishers, and six experimental setups, expectations are shown not to affect punishment in any systematic way.
Chapter 2 relaxes two features of EU: linear probability weighting and utility defined over final wealth levels. Our main focus is on prospect theory (PT). The salient features of PT are reference dependence (utilities are derived from changes in wealth relative to a reference point), loss aversion (losses bite more than equivalent gains), and inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions that replace the “linearity of probabilities” in EU. Under PT, attitudes to risk are determined “jointly” by the shapes of the utility function and the probability weighting function, giving rise to a four-fold pattern of risk attitudes. We also give an exposition of rank dependent utility. We consider several applications of prospect theory. These include, exchange disparities; optimal contracts; tax evasion puzzles; backward bending labor supply curves; attitudes towards low probability events, and loss aversion among professional golf players. Close primate relatives also exhibit loss aversion; thus, loss aversion precedes the evolutionary separation of humans from close primate relatives. We also apply PT to the Ellsberg paradox.
This paper studies how behavioral biases affect the optimal unemployment insurance. I revisit the optimal UI of Landais et al. (2018) and show how the optimal UI formula is modified and leads to novel economic insights. The optimal UI replacement rate is the conventional Baily-Chetty replacement rate, which solves the trade-off between liquidity and job-search incentives, plus a market tightness correction term which shows how welfare is affected by UI through tightness, and plus a behavioral bias correction term, which shows how welfare is affected by UI through job search effort.
This study employs a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) in the health-care sector to test the loss aversion theory that is derived from reference-dependent preferences: The absolute subjective value of a deviation from a reference point is generally greater when the deviation represents a loss than when the same-sized change is perceived as a gain. As far as is known, this paper is the first to use a DCE to test the loss aversion theory. A DCE is a highly suitable tool for such testing because it estimates the marginal valuations of attributes, based on deviations from a reference point (a constant scenario). Moreover, loss aversion can be examined for each attribute separately. Another advantage of a DCE is that is can be applied to non-traded goods with non-tangible attributes. A health-care event is used for empirical illustration: The loss aversion theory is tested within the context of preference structures for maternity-ward attributes, estimated using data gathered from 3850 observations made by a sample of 542 women who had recently given birth. Seven hypotheses are presented and tested. Overall, significant support for behavioral loss aversion theories was found.
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) values and willingness-to-accept (WTA) values have received considerable attention, but the role of reference-dependence effects is more diverse. Policies involving cost and risk may have reference point effects with respect to both cost and risk, leading to four potential valuation measures. Experimental evidence for water quality policies suggests that the cost reference effects are particularly influential in that context. There is, however, no evidence of significant reference effects for labor market estimates of the value of a statistical life. Sound application of benefit values other than WTP measures requires pertinent empirical evidence and an assessment of the underlying rationality of the determinants of the reference-dependence effects.
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