This Chapter will provide a detailed examination of IHL’s threshold of termination and is comprised of five substantive sections. The first section explores the temporal architecture of Common Article 3 (CA3) and Additional Protocol II (APII) to determine what, if anything, conventional IHL has to say about is threshold of termination during NIAC. The second section unpacks and critically examines four doctrinal approaches for determining the temporal scope of IHL during NIAC: the ‘peaceful settlement’ approach, the ‘lasting pacification’ approach, the ‘two-way ratchet’ theory, and the ‘human rights law’ approach. While each of these approaches possess certain advantages and limitations, it is argued that none produce entirely satisfactory results. For this reason, the third section revisits the logic that underpins and informs the theory and practice of IHL’s temporal scope during NIAC. Following from this analysis, the fourth  section proposes an alternative ‘functional approach for determining IHL’s threshold of termination during NIAC, and demonstrates the utility of the ‘functional approach’ over existing approaches by exploring its practical application to specific examples from the hostilities regime and the protections regime during NIAC.

This chapter crosses the bridge from music industry practice to the analysis of the legal regimes deemed most relevant in securing a fair(er) balance in music contracts in the streaming age. Particular focus lies with the effect of the law on contracts entered into between musicians and record companies and/or music publishers as to individually managed exclusive rights. First, the chapter analyses the role of the legal framework in achieving this book’s policy objective of moving towards a fair(er) balance in the streaming age, fleshing out both the substantive and procedural dimensions of what may be perceived as ‘fair’ in this particular context. It then goes on to provide a typology of the relevant legal regimes, categorising these limitations to parties’ freedom of contract in terms of substantive, geographical and temporal scope and analysing the interplay between them. Finally, the chapter sets out to establish the appropriate level(s) and method(s) of further potential policy initiatives aimed at contributing to the elusive fair balance that this book advocates.

Chapter 6 accounts for the material, personal, territorial, and temporal scope of the right to an effective remedy in Article 13.

Concerns about what is characterised today as dumping are not new.1 Initial responses to dumping are found in the Brussels Sugar Convention of 19022 and Canada’s first national anti-dumping law in 1904.3 Other common law countries soon followed.4 The issue of dumping was discussed both at the League of Nations and during the 1933 World Economic Conference.5 During the 1946 post-war negotiations of the ITO Charter, the United States proposed an anti-dumping provision modelled on its own Anti-Dumping Act of 1921. There was general agreement among the negotiating parties on the need to address anti-dumping in the ITO Charter. Already at that time, the focus was on developing disciplines governing the use of anti-dumping laws instead of prohibiting dumping.

This chapter seeks to identify the particularities of the AFSJ relevant to delineating the scope of the Charter. It outlines the regime governing the application of the Charter pursuant to Article 51(1) and describes how this regime plays out in the AFSJ. It also clarifies the role of other criteria traditionally used to determine scope, such as territorial, personal and temporal considerations. The chapter focuses on some of the particularities affecting the determination of the scope of the Charter in the AFSJ. It is suggested that, more than merely an interesting field to test the general limits of EU fundamental rights, the AFSJ represents a specific area of law that has moved the Charter into a more central position in EU case law, thereby consolidating the role and identity of the CJEU as a fundamental rights court.