Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-kl2l2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-08-07T14:08:38.624Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

On the survival of humanity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Johann Frick Open the ORCID record for Johann Frick [Opens in a new window]
Johann Frick*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Center for Human Values, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
*
Email: jdfrick@princeton.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

What moral reasons, if any, do we have to ensure the long-term survival of humanity? This article contrastively explores two answers to this question: according to the first, we should ensure the survival of humanity because we have reason to maximize the number of happy lives that are ever lived, all else equal. According to the second, seeking to sustain humanity into the future is the appropriate response to the final value of humanity itself. Along the way, the article discusses various issues in population axiology, particularly the so-called Intuition of Neutrality and John Broome’s ‘greediness objection’ to this intuition.

Keywords

Population ethicsaxiologysurvival of humanityintuition of neutralityJohn Broome

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 2-3: Special issue: Ethics and Future Generations , 2017 , pp. 344 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Bostrom, N. 2008. “Why I Want to Be a Posthuman When I Grow Up.” In Medical Enhancement and Posthumanity, edited by Gordijn, B. and Chadwick, R., 107–137. Springer. https://books.google.com/books?id=fdMlZol7W2YC&pg=PA95&lpg=PA95&dq=Medical+Enhancement+and+Posthumanity,+eds.+Bert+Gordijn+and+Ruth+Chadwick&source=bl&ots=eWG0pRDBJQ&sig=fQNqTQQX4H25X_JTVSKdPYmu9XA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj7iNC6hsvSAhUC5oMKHXsJD9IQ6AEIITAB#v=onepage&q=Medical%20Enhancement%20and%20Posthumanity%2C%20eds.%20Bert%20Gordijn%20and%20Ruth%20Chadwick&f=false.Google Scholar
Bradley, B. 2001. “The Value of Endangered Species.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 35: 43–58. 10.1023/A:1010383322591CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2004. Weighing Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/019924376X.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2005. “Should We Value Population?” Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (4): 399–413. 10.1111/jopp.2005.13.issue-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2012. Climate Matters: Ethics for a Warming World. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Chang, R. 2002, July. “The Possibility of Parity.” Ethics 112: 659–688.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, G. A. 2004. “A Truth in Conservatism: Rescuing Conservatism from the Conservatives.” Accessed February 20, 2017. https://sites.google.com/site/politicaltheoryworkshop/GACohenConservatism.pdf?attredirects=0Google Scholar
Frick, J. 2014. “‘Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People’: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics.” PhD diss., Harvard University.Google Scholar
Glover, J. 1977. Causing Death and Saving Lives. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Kavka, G. 1978. “The Futurity Problem.” In Obligations to Future Generations, edited by Sikora, R. I. and Barry, B., 186–203. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Google Scholar
Korsgaard, C. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9781139174503CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lenman, J. 2002. “On Becoming Extinct.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83: 253–269. 10.1111/papq.2002.83.issue-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McMahan, J. 1981. “Problems of Population Theory Obligations to Future Generations. R. I. Sikora , Brian Barry.” Ethics 92 (1): 96–127. 10.1086/292301CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Narveson, J. 1967. “Utilitarianism and New Generations.” Mind 76: 62–72. 10.1093/mind/LXXVI.301.62CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rabinowicz, W. 2009. “Broome and The Intuition of Neutrality.” Philosophical Issues 19: 389–411. 10.1111/phis.2009.19.issue-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rolston, H. 1985. “Duties to Endangered Species”, BioScience, 35 (11). 718–726. The Biological Diversity Crisis. 10.2307/1310053CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe To Each Other. Cambridge: Belknap Press.Google Scholar
Scheffler, S. 2007. “Immigration and the Significance of Culture.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 35 (2): 93–125. 10.1111/papa.2007.35.issue-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scheffler, S. 2013. Death and the Afterlife. New York: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199982509.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, H. 1997. “A Paradox of Promising.” The Philosophical Review 106 (2): 153–196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar