Introduction

Clientelism in Iceland is in some respects a rather surprising phenomenon. Scandinavian politics are assumed to be, for the most part, free from clientelism. European clientelism is usually studied in its “Latin” or Mediterranean settings, indicating a cultural boundary which has existed at least since the time the Protestant churches rebelled against corruption in the Catholic Church. Icelandic clientelism, however, is solidly Protestant and North European. Clientelism, moreover, is supposed to thrive on asymmetric power relations, where clients seek the protection of powerful patrons (Blok 1969). Icelandic clientelism, instead, takes place in a cultural context characterized by egalitarianism and the absence of social deference or great inequalities of wealth. The Icelandic constitutional, legal, and administrative structures rest on Scandinavian foundations, imported in large measure from the mother state of Denmark. Yet, unlike their Scandinavian cousins, the Icelanders are richly experienced in clientelism (Kristinsson 1996).

The Icelandic experience provides a unique opportunity for studying the development of clientelism outside the cultural context with which it is more commonly associated. The present chapter seeks to do this using Martin Shefter's (1994) theory as its point of departure. The great advantage of Shefter's theory in this context is its attempt to explain the emergence of clientelism without relying too much on cultural variables. Institutional factors such as the state bureaucracy and party organizations, instead, take center stage. It emerges that, while Shefter's thesis offers a convincing interpretation of the rise of Icelandic clientelism in the twentieth century, it does not do quite so well in accounting for its subsequent decline.