¹ This strategy has been in use since the early years of the 20th century. See Castronovo, Valerio, “L'internazionalizzazione dell'industria italiana. Una nuova prospettiva di ricerca” and Giuseppe Volpato, “L'internazionalizzazione dell'industria automobilistica italiana,” L'industria italiana nel mercato mondiale dalla fine dell'800 alla metà del ′900. Atti del seminario 1992, ed. Fiat, Archivio Storico (Torino, 1993), 157–216.Google Scholar

² On Italy's tariffs during the 1950s see Fauri, Francesca, “La fine dell'autarchia: inegoziati commerciali dell'Italia dal 1947 al 1953,” in Rivista di Storia Economica 3 (1995): 331–66.Google Scholar

³ In 1907–1908 the company suffered a serious financial crisis tied to losses in the stock market. The losses involved Agnelli himself. On Fiat's beginnings see Mori, Giorgio, “La Fiat dalle origini al 1918,” in Il capitalismo industriale (Roma, 1977)Google Scholar, and Fiat, Progetto Archivio Storico, Storia e documenti 1899–1930, vol. I–II (Fabbri, 1991).Google Scholar

⁴ Castronovo, Valerio, Giovanni Agnelli (Torino, 1971), 28.Google Scholar

⁵ Fiat was able to draw up a reconversion plan after the war; an exception among Italian car companies. Alfa Romeo, for instance, wasted energy on a range of unrelated products while prewar production methods were barely modified. See Bigazzi, Duccio, “Management Strategies in the Italian Car Industry, 1906–45: Fiat and Alfa Romeo,” in Between Fordism and Flexibility, ed. Tolliday, Steven and Zeitlin, Jonathan (New York, 1992), 81–82.Google Scholar

⁶ Agnelli is quoted in Castonovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 159.

⁷ Volpato, “L'internazionalizzazione dell'industria automobilistica italiana,” 192.

⁸ Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 34–39.

⁹ Bigazzi, Duccio, “Un'impresa italiana sul mercato mondiale: l'attività multinazionale della Fiat fino al 1940,” in Annali di storia dell'impresa 2 (1986): 209–211.Google Scholar

¹⁰ On this issue see Fassio, Mario, L'organizzazione commerciale delle aziende e dei loro mercati all'interno e all'estero (Torino, 1929).Google Scholar

¹¹ Michael Sedgwick, “Fiat in America,” The Veteran and the Vintage Magazine, 80, Archivio Storico Fiat, Torino (hereafter ASF). On Italy's investments in the United States see Buckley, Peter J. and Roberts, Brian R., European Direct Investment in the USA before World War I (New York, 1982), 103–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 555–557.

¹³ Valletta's testimony is quoted in “Dichiarazioni di Vittorio Valletta,” in Rapporti della Commissione Economica presentata all'Assemblea Costituente, vol. I, Industria (Roma, 1945), 350.

¹⁴ Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 108.

¹⁵ Bigazzi, Duccio “Esportazione e investimenti esteri: la Fiat sul mercato mondiale fino al 1940,” in AAVV, Fiat 1899–1930: Storia e documenti, (Milano, 1991), 95.Google Scholar

¹⁶ In 1928 the Amo plant was completely reorganized in order to start construction of new models licenced by American Autocar, see “The Amo Automobile Factory,” in The Automobile Engineer (July 1931): 245.

¹⁷ The advantage was that payment for trucks was constantly delayed. The fewer trucks that were shipped, the lesser were the negative financial consequences of delayed payment. See Bigazzi, “Esportazione e investimenti esteri,” 95. On the influence of Fiat on the development of Italo-Russian business relations in these years see Gorrini, J., La Russie moderne et les rapports italo-russes (Torino, 1980), 299 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Togliattigrad, the new town set up to house the complex, was named after the Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti. See Laux, James M., The European Automobile Industry (New York, 1992), 207Google Scholar; Volpato, Giuseppe, L'industria automobilistica internazionale. Espansione, crisi e riorganizzazione (Padova, 1983), 371.Google Scholar

¹⁹ On Simca see Bigazzi, “Un'impresa italiana sul mercato mondiale,” 222; and Rousseau, J., Simca, un appetit d'oiseau (Paris, 1984).Google Scholar

²⁰ See A. Chetelain, “Un groupe industriel de construction automobile de la region parisenne: Simca,” in Bulletin de la Societé d'étude historiques, géographiques et scientifiques de la région parisienne (Oct.–Dec. 1955).

²¹ Fridenson, Patrick, Histoire des usines Renault, 10: Naissance de la grande entreprise, 1898–1939 (Paris, 1972), 199–200.Google Scholar

²² Data collected in Archivio Storico Fiat.

²³ Wilkins, Mira and Hill, Frank Ernest, Ford on Six Continents (Detroit, 1964), 395–397.Google Scholar

²⁴ Maxcy, George, The Multinational Motor Industry (London, 1981), 103.Google Scholar

²⁵ In 1932 Fiat sold part of NSU shares to Dresdner, but kept control over the NSU Automobil. Bigazzi, “Esportazione e investimenti esteri,” 117 ff.

²⁶ Bigazzi, “Esportazione e investimenti esteri,” 118–119; see also Overy, R. J., “Cars, Roads and Economic Recovery in Germany, 1932–1938,” in Economic History Review 28 (1975): 466–83.Google Scholar

²⁷ Maxcy, The Multinational Motor Industry, 103.

²⁸ Citroen bought the sports and racing car firm Maserati of Modena in 1968. Laux, The European Automobile Industry, 196. On Italian duties on imported cars see Wells, Louis T. Jr, “Automobiles,” in Big Business and the State: Changing Refotions in Western Europe, ed. Vernon, Raymond (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 232.Google Scholar

²⁹ Agnelli pressuring Mussolini to stop foreign companies is extensively documentateci in Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS). See, for example, ACS, Presidenza Consiglio Ministri (PCM), Gabinetto, Atti, 1931–1932, rubrica 2.

³⁰ As Quoted in Wilkins and Hill, Ford on Six Continents, 229–230; Italy, according to the authors, became Ford's “major disappointment” in Europe.

³¹ Reich stresses the influence of fascist state policy on Italy's postwar economic structure, with particular emphasis on the long-lasting effects on the auto industry. See Reich, Simon, The Fruits of Fascism: Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective (Ithaca, NY, 1989), 291.Google Scholar

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³³ Pallotta, Gino, Gli Agnelli una dinastia italiana (Roma, 1987), 98–108Google Scholar; Friedman, A., Tutto in famiglia (Milano, 1990), 23.Google Scholar

³⁴ Rochat, G., Militari e politici nella preparazione della campagna d'Etiopia: Studio e decumenti. 1931–1936 (Milano, 1971), 239 ff.Google Scholar

³⁵ Fiat, , Produzioni e organizzazioni della SA Fiat (Torino, 1937)Google Scholar; Jacoboni, Attilio, L'industria meccanica italiana (Roma, 1947), 48 ff.Google Scholar

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³⁷ Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 661, 679.

³⁸ Friedman, Tutto in famiglia, 26.

³⁹ Gobbi, Romolo, “Note sulla Commissione d'epurazione del CNL regionale piemontese e sul caso Valletta,” in Il Movimento di Liberazione in Italia 89 (1967): 57–63Google Scholar; Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 670, 688.

⁴⁰ IFI controlled thirty companies and various chemical and mineral-working factories in the Piedmont, as well as numerous interests in other big Italian and foreign companies. Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 446.

⁴¹ In 1946 the credit provided by the Bank of America and Banca d'America e d'Italia was decisive in fostering Fiat's first increase in fully paid-up capital from 400 million to 4 billion lire. Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 692–693.

⁴² For a detailed reconstruction of industrial relations in Fiat from the 1950s to 1980 see Giovanni Contini, “The Rise and Fall of Shop-Floor Bargaining at Fiat, 1945–1980,” in Tolliday, Between Fordism and Flexibility, 144–167, and also by Contini, , “Enterprise Management and Employer Organization in Italy: Fiat, Public Enterprise and Confindustria, 1922–1990,” in The Power to Manage? ed. Tolliday, Steven and Zeitlin, Jonathan (New York, 1991).Google Scholar

⁴³ Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 696.

⁴⁴ The effects of the allied bombing on Turin in November–December 1942 are the turning point in the change of Agnelli and Fiat management's attitude towards Mussolini. Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, 609.

⁴⁵ Fiat, Relazioni del Consiglio di Ammistrazione e dei Sindaci (hereafter Relazioni), (Torino, 1947), 8.

⁴⁶ Fiat, Relazioni (1947), 13–14.

⁴⁷ In the beginning, very few Italian firms took advantage of the opportunity offered by American funds to renew their plants, considering it a risky business and preferring to concentrate instead on raw material orders. Archivio Storico Confindustria (ASC), Giunta Esecutiva, Verabale della seduta del 27 maggio 1949, b. 1. On this issue see also Giuseppe Maione, who is of the opinion that the delays in the requests for machinery imports were attributable to the “industrialists' inability to produce far-reaching programs” in Tecnocrati e mercanti: L'industria italiana fra dirigismo e concorrenza internazionale (Milano, 1986), 250.

⁴⁸ Barrati, Piero, Vittorio Valletta (Torino, 1983), 213–217.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Fiat, Relazioni (1948), 14.

⁵⁰ Fiat, Relazioni (1950), 9.

⁵¹ Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul N., “Technical Progress and Postwar Rate of Growth in Italy,” in AAVV, Il progresso tecnologico e la società italiana (Milano, 1963), 163.Google Scholar

⁵² Fiat, Relazioni (1951), 9.

⁵³ Fiat, Relazioni (1949), 10.

⁵⁴ OCDE, Long Term Perspectives of the World Car Industries (Paris, 1978).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Fiat, Relazioni (1947), 13.

⁵⁶ Fiat, Relazioni (1949), 8. Fiat calculated that government taxes accounted for 35 percent of the final price. Since in 1957 many European Economic Community (EEC) countries put aside this percentage as sales tax, Fiat urged the government to comply with this procedure in order to increase standardization among EEC countries of the fiscal charges levied on the production; Fiat, Relazioni (1958), 6. See also Forte, Francesco, Alcuni calcoli del carico fiscale sull'automobilismo in Italia (Milano, 1955).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Under a Ministerial Decree of 26 December 1952 (No. 8387), which was applied retroactively as of 1 March 1952, the sales tax was refunded on exports to dollar territories of the following articles: warships (4 percent of sales price), ammunitions (1.5–2.5 percent), radar-equipment (4 percent), accordions (4 percent), hats and straw products (3.5 percent of sale price), cement products (90 lire per 100 kgs.), tractors and motor vehicles (5 percent).

⁵⁸ ACS, Gabinetto 1953, b. 14.

⁵⁹ ASC, Giunta Esecutiva, Verbale della Riunione del 6 novembre 1951, b. 1. 5/15.

⁶⁰ Bigazzi, “Esportazione e investimenti esteri,” 161.

⁶¹ After the 1929 crisis, Alfa Romeo's finances grew worse and in 1933 the government brought it under the control of its Agency for Industrial Recovery (IRI), a public body that managed bankrupt enterprises. Alfa profited from rearmament for the Ethiopian war and the Spanish Civil War. The machinery was updated and augmented and various plants were totally reorganized to render the work cycles fairly consecutive. See Duccio Bigazzi, “Management strategies in the Italian car industry 1906–45: Fiat and Alfa Romeo,” in Tolliday and Zeitlin, Between Fordism and Flexibility, 84.

⁶² Similarly, in Germany Daimler-Benz and Volkswagen (which had suffered limited damage during the war) supported by both government and large German banks, were the two pivotal firms in a merger strategy that guaranteed their corporate independence from foreign economic interests and their economic supremacy over foreign subsidiaries at home. See Reich, The Fruits of Fascism, 253–254.

⁶³ As to the other minor Italian automobile producers, Isotta Fraschini's planned renaissance after the war fizzled ignominiously and the new speciahst makers, such as Ferrari and Maserati, manufactured in extremely small numbers until the 1960s.

⁶⁴ Evidently one of the main beneficiaries of the agreement was Renault, which was able to sell the Dauphine on the Italian market at 890,000 Ure while the imported price, due to the high tariff, was 950,000 lire. On this issue, see Quattroruote 3 (1961). The data are taken from Automobile Club d'Italia (ACI), Statistiche Automobilistiche, 1960 (Roma, 1961), 28.Google Scholar On Alfa Romeo see Angelo Tito Anselmi (a cura di), Alfa: immagini e percorsi 1919–1985 (Milano, 1986), and Bigazzi, Duccio, Il Portello. Operai, tecnici e imprenditori all'Alfa Romeo 1906–1926 (Milano, 1988).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ “The distribution system was organized through ‘filiali’ and ‘succursali’ directly under the control of the company and through free agents spread around the country,” according to Volpato, L'industria automobilistica internazionale, 202. In the following years Fiat gained total control of Autobianchi, Lancia (1969), and Alfa Romeo and Ferrari at the end of the 1980s. See Istituto per gli Studi di Economia (ISE), L'economia degli anni '50 in Italia, vol. II (Milano, 1964), 426.Google Scholar On the history of Lancia see Franco Amatori, Per una storia economica della Lancia 1906–1969, Progetto Archivio Storico FIAT. Le carte scoperte. Documenti raccolti e ordinati per un archivio della Lancia (Milano, 1990).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Fiat, Relazioni (1951), 11.

⁶⁷ Sedgwick, Michael, Fiat (New York, 1974), 244.Google Scholar From 1954, when the 600 entered the scene, to 1958 the percentage of cars under 650cc of total Italian production increased from 33.3 to 58 percent. In 1957 new small car models such as the Bianchina were produced. See F. F., , “L'industria automobilistica,” in Bancaria 2 (1959): 241.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ “The 600 costs 93,500 lire less than the 500/C and 157,000 lire less than the 500 Belvedere,” see Fiat, Relazioni (1954), 15.

⁶⁹ Barbiroli, Giancarlo, Aspetti tecnici ed economici della produzione e del mercato delle automobili in Italia (Bologna, 1967), 13.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ “In 1958, 58 percent of Italian cars were in the 650cc range. In France the first range (up to 852cc) absorbed 56.2 percent of production, while in Germany the cars produced below the 1000cc range had a share of only 18.2 percent … This compulsory Fiat specialization in small cars had long lasting negative resules: Less opportunities to sell in foreign markets (where small cars covered only a fraction of the market) and less opportunities to research and develop sophisticated technological innovations in the projecting of a vehicle.” See Volpato, “L'industrializzazione dell'industria automobilistica italiana,” 193 ff.

⁷¹ One-fifth of these funds came from ERP loans as late as 1952. See Fiat, Relazioni (1953), 14.

⁷² Fiat, Relazioni (1956), 9.

⁷³ Fiat, Relazioni (1960), 29.

⁷⁴ Bairati, Vittorio Valletta, 281.

⁷⁵ Fiat, Relazioni (1954), 27.

⁷⁶ Fiat, Relazioni (1955), 31.

⁷⁷ Volpato, L'industria automobilistica internazionale, 373.

⁷⁸ Calculated from Fiat, Divisione Bilanci, Partecipazioni al 31 Dicembre 1961 e raffronto con il Dicembre 1960.

⁷⁹ For an historical reconstruction up to the present days of the vicissitudes of Fiatimpresit see Vigo, G., Da banca a impresa, Fiatimpresit 1929–1989 (Bologna, 1991).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Fiat, Rehzioni (1956), 11.

⁸¹ In 1907, in order to participate in a car race for cars completely made in Italy, Giovanni Agnelli founded the RIV, for the production of ball-bearings. In 1939 production had reached 20 million ball-bearings manufactured. See Rossi, A., “A Bail-Bearing for Eternity,” in Successo (Giugno, 1970), 132.Google Scholar

⁸² The working tariff, or the tariff in use, applied by Italy from the early 1950s was the result of a set of administrative measures that had significantly reduced the incidence of the legal tariff (the tariff set by the 1950 law, also called bargaining tariff since it was used in international—for instance GATT—rounds on tariff reduction). On this issue see Fauri, “La fine dell'autarchia,” 347–57.

⁸³ “Fiat's propensity for diversification did not allow it to choose the right priorities … a higher degree of standardization would have helped Fiat's international competitive position,” in Volpato, L'industria automobilistica internazionale, 354–355.

⁸⁴ Zanetti, Giovanni and Filippi, Enrico, Finanza e sviluppo della grande industria in Italia (Torino, 1967), 255.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Author's calculations. For the numbers see Fiat, Relazioni del consiglio d'amministrazione e dei sindaci: Bilancio e conto perdite e profitti (1955 and 1961), Annexes.

⁸⁶ Bairati, Vittorio Valletta, 281. On Fiat's overall strategy see also Pavan, Robert J., Struttura e strategie delle imprese italiane (Bologna, 1976), 148 ff.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Bigazzi, “Un'impresa italiana sul mercato mondiale,” 230–237.

⁸⁸ Between June 1951 and April 1957 different bilateral agreements with Germany increased the quota from 187 to 1,400 million lire. See Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Bollettino di legislazione doganale e commerciale, issues from 1950 to 1957.

⁸⁹ Milward, Alan S., The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Berkeley, Calif., 1992), 412.Google Scholar

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⁹¹ During the 1920s car exports to the North American market represented an average of 0.3 percent of Italy's car exports.

⁹² See Bairati, Vittorio Valletta, 286 ff.

⁹³ “The Big Three mutually contemplating a small car could only see lost profits from reduced sales of large cars.” See White, Lawrence J., The Automobile Industry Since 1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 177–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹⁴ Wilkins, Mira, “Automobiles and International Markets,” in Development of Mass Marketing. The Automobile and Retailing Industries, ed. Okochi, Akio and Shimokawa, Koichi (Tokyo, 1981), 202.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Brems, Hans, “Le piccole vetture nella prospettiva del mercato americano,” in Automobilismo Industriale 35 (1958): 14.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Fiat, Relazioni (1957), 14.

⁹⁷ Volpato, L'industria automobilistica internazionale, 190–196.

⁹⁸ From 1959 to 1960 the number of new registrations of imported cars in the United States decreased from 610,000 to 500,000. The only country registering an increase was West Germany, from 202,000 to 220,000. See United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe 1959–1960 (Geneva, 1961), 19.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ “Italy's industrial development has been supported by the public sector to a degree that has few equals among the nations that operate on the basis of a market economy” quoted in Romano Prodi, “Italy,” Big Business and the State, 45.

¹⁰⁰ Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana (CGII), Annuario 1950, 440–442.

¹⁰¹ ISE, Annuario della congiuntura economica italiana (Milano, 1952–1953), 576–577.Google Scholar For an overview of the long term effects of liberalization and the role of Minister La Malfa, “Europe's number one liberalizer,” see Alessandrini, Pietro, “L'economia italiana dalla ricostruzione allo SME,” in Rassegna Economica 1 (1983): 69–89.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Curzon, Gerard, Multilateral Commercial Diphmacy (New York, 1966), 158–159Google Scholar, and Frank, Isaiah, The European Common Market: An Analysis of Commercial Policy (New York, 1961), 62.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ The exempted goods were listed in the “Circolare del ministero del commercio estero,” 31 ottobre 1951, n. 225565, “Regime provvisorio d'importazione dall'area dell'Unione Europea dei Pagamenti (Paesi dell'OECE e dell'area della sterlina),” in Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero, Bollettino di legislazione commerciale e doganale (1951), 892.

¹⁰⁴ On this issue see Rosa, Carmelo La, “Disciplina degli scambi con l'estero,” in AAVV Lezioni sul commercio con l'estero tenute al corso di aggiornamento per i funzionari delle Camere di Commercio, Industria e Agricoltura dal 9 al 20 novembre 1953 a Roma (Roma, 1953), 201.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ ASC, Fondo Giunta Esecutiva 1.5/14, Verbale Riunione 6 novembre 1951.

¹⁰⁶ The formula for the determination of the new but lower tariff duties was, therefore: Duty to be levied = (Duty set in general tariff -ll)/2. See Holbik, Karel, Italy in International Cooperation (Padova, 1959), 88Google Scholar; Decreto Presidenziale (DPR), 8 July 1950, n. 453 in Supplemento alla Gazzetta Ufficiale (GU), 13 July 1958, n. 158. “The basic idea was that from 1947 onwards the general average of the specific duties under the 1921 tariff should amount to no more than 1 percent ad valorem; and this, added to the 10 percent licence fee, made a total of 11 percent.” See Zacchia, Carlo, “Features of the Present Italian Customs Tariff,” in Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 26 (1953): 166.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Calderoni, Ugo, I cento anni della politica doganale italiana (Padova, 1961), 199.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ DPR n. 1125 in GU, 253 (3 Nov. 1951).

¹⁰⁹ Among exempted goods were furs, precious stones and metals, watches, coffee, tea, some chemical products, spices, beverages, cattle, milk and cream, butter and cheese, seeds and vegetable oils, some cotton textiles and finally some engineering products, including printing machines and cars. See Cavalcanti, Maria Luisa, La politica commerciale italiana 1945–1952: Uomini e fatti (Napoli, 1984), 198–199.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Calculated from Ministero delle Finanze, Direzione generale delle dogane e delle imposte indirette, Tariffa dei dazi doganali di importazione della repubblica italiana, Testo approvato con DPR 26 Dee. 1958, n. 1105, Roma 1958.

¹¹¹ Italy's import quota had maintained imports around 1.6 percent of prodution over those years. It is also interesting to note that already in 1926 Italy was importing a larger number of cars than in 1957: 5,804 against 5,125, for which the main suppliers were the United States. See ISTAT, Annuario di statistica, 1927.

¹¹² The tariff on extra-EEC car imports ranged around 29 percent, while quantitative restrictions were maintained by Italy, France and Benelux at 3 percent of national production in 1959, and at 4 percent and 5 percent in the two following years. See Demaria, Giovanni, “Alcune leggi quasi naturali per l'industria automobilistica in fase di allargamento spaziale dei suoi mercati,” in Automobilismo industriale 34 (1958): 12–14.Google Scholar Perhaps a parallel could be drawn with Japan, which reduced the level of car imports to 1 percent of new vehicles sales by 1960 and remained at this level for more than twenty years. See Cusumano, Michael A., The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Among non–European car producers, the case of Japan is interesting since the difficulties registered in the second half of the 1950s in stipulating any land of commercial agreement with Italy were reflected in the almost non-existent car trade. After the commercial agreement of December 1952, Japan and Italy were unable to renew the agreement in the following years until 1962. In the meanwhile, trade reverted to balanced purchases in dollars and no Japanese vehicle was able to enter the Italian market. See Bollettino di kgislazione doganale e commerciale, issues 1952–1962.

¹¹³ Reported in Costa, Angelo, Scritti e discorsi, vol. IV (Milano, 1981), 61.Google Scholar

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¹¹⁵ “I had to give up some positions in this important battle.” Quoted in Malfa, Ugo La, “La politica degli scambi con l'estero e i monopoli,” in Scalfari, Eugenio, La lotta contro imonopoli (Bari, 1955), 193.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ In 1953 Valletta wrote to De Gasperi “it was thanks to ‘your’ reconstruction policy that all industries in Italy were able to address their productive development towards the essential aim of increasing Italy's living standard.” PCM to Segreteria De Gasperi, 9 April 1953, b. 16, fase. FIAT, (ACS).

¹¹⁷ PCM to Segreteria De Gasperi, 9 April 1953.

¹¹⁸ Carli, Guido, Cinquant'anni di vita italiana (Bari, 1993), 164–165.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Cito, Vittorio, “Le restrizioni quantitative al commercio nel Trattato per la Comunità Economica Europea,” in Bancaria 6 (1958): 659–67.Google ScholarJones, Daniel T., Maturity and Crisis in the European Car Industry. Structural Change and Public Policy (Sussex, 1981), 51–52.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ “In 1964, regulations were changed so that automobile importers had to pay foreign exchange within 30 days of importing rather than 360 days, as previously allowed. In 1965, foreign firms complained that they could not buy advertising time on governmentowned television,” in Wells, “Automobiles,” 242–243.

¹²¹ “As a matter of fact, American exports were not competitive. If American companies wanted to reach world markets, they had to produce abroad.” American companies in fact expanded their European factories and spread to Australia and then to less developed countries (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico). See Wilkins, “Automobiles and International Markets,” 202.

¹²² Associazione nazionale fra le industrie automobilistiche (ANFIA), L'automobile in cifre, (Torino, 1959).

¹²³ The first five companies were General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Volkswagen, and British Motor Corporation. Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, Monthly Statistics Review (London, 1961).

¹²⁴ See the interesting chapter “La concentrazione in Europa,” in Volpato, L'industria automobilistica internazionale, 189–205.

¹²⁵ Communauté Economique Européene (CEE), “L'industrie de la Construction Automobile dans les Pays de la CEE,” Serie Industrielle n. 2 (Bruxelles, 1962).

¹²⁶ Fiat, Relazioni (1960), Annexes.

¹²⁷ Ciocca, Pierluigi, Filosa, Renato and Ray, Guido M., “Integrazione e sviluppo dell'economia italiana nell'ultimo ventennio: un riesame critico,” in Contributi alia ricerca economica 3 (1973): 58–135.Google Scholar

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