^{page 16 note 1} See A Companion to Homer, ed. Wace, A. J. B. and Stubbings, F. H. (London, 1962), p. 71.Google Scholar

^{page 16 note 2} For a recent discussion of this traditional problem with strong arguments in favour of Hesiod's priority, see Hesiod, Theogony, ed. West, M. L. (Oxford, 1966), pp. 40–8Google Scholar. Even if the view that some of the Cyclic poems, especially the Aethiopis, are older than the Iliad is in fact correct, we would not have enough evidence to undertake a useful comparison. On the value of such attempts, see the review of Schoeck, G.'s Ilias und Aithiopis (Zurich, 1961Google Scholar) by D. L. Page in C.R. n.s. xiii (1963), 21–4.

^{page 16 note 3} 'Mythological Paradeigma in the Iliad', CQ. N.s. xiv (1964), 141–54Google Scholar. The first draft of the present paper was written some years ago, in fact before the appearance of Will-cock's article. His recognition and study of another type of mythological innovation has encouraged me to publish my original observations, which will, I believe, further strengthen his main argument. I should like here to express my thanks to Professor G. P. Goold for reading the first version of this article and for encouraging me to publish it as well as to Dr. M. L. West and Dr. R. M. Ogilvie, from whose criticism this later version has much benefited.

^{page 17 note 1} Namely . 259–74, 4. 370–400, 5. 382–404, 7. 124–60, 9. 524–605. To these additional examples of paradeigmatic reasoning in the Iliad could be added others, e.g. 7. 109–15.

^{page 17 note 2} See, e.g., Beckmann, J. T., Das Gebet bei Homer. Diss. Wiirzburg (Wurzburg, 1932), 46Google Scholar. However, the older view of early Greek religion which equated sacrifice with gift Nilsson, M. P., Geschichte der griechischen Religion, i, 3rd ed. (Munich, 1967), pp. 45–6Google Scholar.

^{page 17 note 3} Or, as Hesiod said, δώρα θεούς πείθειδώρ αιδοιους βασιλήας fr. 361 Merkelbach and West.

^{page 17 note 4} For an excellent account of the mechanism of gift–exchange and the underlying notions of reciprocal obligation, see Finley, M. I., The World of Odysseus, rev. ed. (London, 1956), especially pp. 68–76Google Scholar.

^{page 18 note 1} Hesiod, Theogony 713–21, makes Briareus along with the two other Hundredhanders the key allies of Zeus and the younger gods in their battle against the Titans.

^{page 19 note 1} Suggestion by C. J. Carter in Willcock, loc. cit. 144 and n. 1. Willcock has treated this passage (Il. 1. 393–407) as an example of paradeigmatic reasoning (loc. cit. 143–4). There is obviously a paradeigmatic element in any example of what I have called 'a demand for compensation'. The petitioner points to a paradeigma, namely his own past services, when he asks for a favour by way of compensation. However, this kind of argument is different from that in the example which Willcock uses as his model, namely Achilles' exhortation to Priam to eat in Il. 24. 599–620. I should prefer to restrict the term 'mythological paradeigma' to that sort of argumentation, that is, one in which a mythical example is proposed as a model of action for someone else. A demand for compensation differs in that it contains a new element not present in a simple mythological paradeigma, namely the claim on another because of a past favour. It is this that makes Thetis' request to Zeus an example of the latter and not simply a mythological paradeigma. The poet thus gives Zeus a stronger motive for acting than a mere example would have done.

^{page 19 note 2} Willcock, loc. cit. 143, suggests that the argument for mythological invention in Il. I. 393–407, 'is to some extent supported by the fact that Thetis does not think it worth repeating the story when she actually makes her appeal to Zeus later in the book'. I am not sure we are justified in using this fact to support an argument for mythological innovation. Repetitions, it is true, are characteristic of Homeric epic, but they do not always occur where we might expect them. Thetis does in fact imply some past service to Zeus when she says (1. 503–5):

This is a more general form of the demand for compensation made by Chryses to Apollo (i. 39–42):

The pattern is the same: addressee (dactyl or spondee) εί ποτε (past service), τòδε μοɩ (service requested). The reason Thetis does not use the specific form, that is, repeat the story, is not necessarily the poet's desire to avoid drawing attention to his mythological innovation. More likely he regarded a general reference as sufficient, since the audience would still have Achilles' speech in mind. In any case, the myth is tacitly assumed in Zeus' granting of the request.

We might note that Aristotle alludes to this problem in the E.N. 4. 8 (1124^b15–16). He remarks that the μεγαλòøυχος does not wish to be reminded of past services done to him by others and, characteristically interpreting earlier evidence in terms of his own doctrine, suggests that 'this, it seems, is why Thetis did not mention to Zeus the services she had done him'.

^{page 21 note 1} Willcock, loc. cit. 146–7, has included 18. 394–405 among the examples of mythological paradeigmata, but since the principle of do ut des is paramount here as in 1. 393–412, it too should be considered as an example of a demand for compensation (compare p. 19, n. 1 above).

^{page 21 note 2} Although Thetis' rescuing of Dionysus in book 6 may have been the model for her rescue of Hephaestus in book 18, we may legitimately wonder whether Thetis originally had anything to do with the story of Dionysus. The phrase Θέτɩζ κòλπω could be simply a formula to express the idea that someone entered the sea. In book 6 it appears to be such since there is no elaboration of what Thetis actually did as there is in the case of Hephaestus in book 18. The formula would have come first, and the poet would then have developed it to suit his purposes in book 18.

Against this negative argument there is external evidence that may be taken to indicate that Homer has alluded to an independent myth in book 6 and adapted it to another purpose in book 18. The Scholia Ven. A. on Il. 6. 131, report that along with many others the early Corinthian poet Eumelus treated the story of Lycurgus' pursuit of the infant Dionysus in his Europia. One detail about Dionysus is particularly interesting: Εύρυνòμης (Eumelus fr. 10 Kinkel.)

Why is Eurynome mentioned here? Two explanations are possible. First, we could argue that Eumelus (or whichever poet it was from whom this detail was taken) or, possibly, the writer of the scholion has been influenced by Il. 18. 405 (where Thetis and Eurynome save Hephaestus). Secondly, we could argue that, in an early myth followed by the author of the Europia or some other such work, Thetis and her sister Nereid (or Oceanid) cared for Dionysus. In book 6 Homer has alluded to it, omitting Eurynome, while both have been mentioned in the adaptation of the motif to Hephaestus in book 18. Taken by themselves both explanations seem possible, but when we recognize the function that the story of Thetis' service to Hephaestus plays in book 18, we must surely conclude that the original story linked Thetis and doubtless Eurynome with Dionysus. Huxley, G. L., Greek Epic Poetry from Eumelos to Panyassis (London, 1969), p. 76Google Scholar, thinks 'since the Eumelian fragment adds the detail that Dionysos took refuge with Thetis and Eurynome, it cannot come solely from the Iliad'. This overlooks the possible influence of the Hephaestus passage in book 18.

^{page 22 note 1} M. L. West has pointed out to me that the parallel is further strengthened by Hephaestus having a Grace as wife, and by the interview with Sleep taking place on Lemnos (14. 230).

^{page 22 note 2} The possible consequences of not accepting the offer are set out in the story of Meleager, the most elaborate mythological paradeigma in the Iliad. See Willcock, loc. cit. 147–53.

^{page 22 note 3} Compare Hes. fr. 204. 87–9, in Merkel-bach and West; Find. Nem. 3. 43–53, Pyth. 6. 21–3; Paus. 3. 18. 12. On the Χείρωνος ύποθήκαι, the Precepts of Chiron to Achilles, traditionally ascribed to Hesiod, see the testimonia and fragments (nos. 283–5) in Merkelbach and West, pp. 143–5. We should remember too that Chiron was in fact Achilles' great-grandfather: his daughter Endeϊs was the wife of Aeacus and the mother of Peleus; compare Sch. Pind. Nem. 5, 7. The assumption that Phoenix cared for Achilles as an infant and Chiron educated him later, especially in medicine, is a piece of modern rationalism quite out of place in Homer. Compare the article by Geisau, H. von on Chiron in Der kleine Pauly, i (Stuttgart, 1964)Google Scholar, col. 1149: 'Gegen die alte Tradition, daB Ch. nach der Trennung der Thetis von Peleus die Erziehung Achills übernommen habe (Hes. frg. 96, 49) führt Horn. II. 11, 830 Phoinix als Erzieher ein und belaBt Ch. nur die arztliche Belehrung,' and also the article of Ernst Wtist on Phoenix in Pauly– Wissowa, R.E., 39. Halbband (Stuttgart, 1941), col. 407, who most improbably suggests the reverse order: 'Vor allem aber iibergab er [Peleus] ihm [Phoinix] seinen jungen Sohn Achilleus, den bisher Cheiron erzogen hatte, zur weiteren Ausbildung.' It is doubtful whether the poet or his audience would have been aware of any inconsistency in the two passages. Certainly they are unlikely to have attempted a reconciliation. Older Analysts, e.g. Leaf and Bayfield in their edition of Iliad, i, p. 468, naturally interpreted the inconsistency in terms of separate authorship of the books. Rather, I should say we have a further example of how the do ut des principle leads to mythological innovation and, as often, a resultant inconsistency.

^{page 23 note 1} That Phoenix was an afterthought in the Embassy is further indicated by the consistent use of duals to refer to three envoys.

^{page 23 note 2} The story is found in Aesch. P. V. 907–27 and Pind. Isth. 8. 26–47; compare also Aesch. fr. 321b Mette. Philodemus reports that the author of the Cypria says that Thetis avoided Zeus to please Hera, see Hes. fr. 210 in Merkelbach and West. Willcock, loc. cit. 144, is probably right in suggesting that the detail in Il/. 1. 404 of the Hundred-hander, Briareus–Aegaeon, being stronger than his father is an intrusion from the story connecting Thetis with Zeus.

^{page 23 note 3} Compare Cypria, fr. 2 Kinkel (fr. 3 Bethe, Homer ii [1922], p. 155; fr. 3 Allen) (from Schol. Ven. A. on IL. 16. 140); Pind. Pyth. 3. 86–96, Mem. 4. 65–8, 5. 22–39, Isth. 8. 46–7, and the Francois Vase. For more on the monumental evidence, see Mayer, M., 'Thetis', in Pauly-Wissowa, R.-E., 2. Reihe, 11. Halbband (Stuttgart, 1936), coll. 206–42Google Scholar. Compare also Lesky, A., 'Peleus und Thetis imfriihen Epos', S.I.F.C. 27/8 (1956), 216–26Google Scholar (= Gesammelte Schriften [Bern, 1966], pp. 401–9).

^{page 23 note 4} Apoll. Rh. 4. 790–4, is clearly an allusion to this passage in Homer. Compare also Apollod. 3. 168–70.

^{page 23 note 5} Hera's speech is interesting as an illustration of an aspect of Greek religion seen, as it were, from a divine point of view, which is most familiar to us from a human point of view in certain types of prayers. The god is considered obliged to help a person not because that person has necessarily performed or promises to perform a service for the god but because the god has given aid in the past. This attitude is well reflected in Sappho's prayer to Aphrodite, fr. 1. 5–8 Lobel and Page, on which compare Page, D., Sappho and Alcaeus (Oxford, 1955), p. 17Google Scholar along with n. 3, and also Schwenn, F., Gebet und Opfer (Heidelberg, 1927), pp. 57–60Google Scholar. Thus we see that persuasive as the do ut des mentality may have been it does not explain every form of obligation between man and god.

^{page 25 note 1} I am indebted to M. L. West for having first made me aware of this fact.

^{page 25 note 2} For a sane account of the roles of divine and human will in Homer, see Lesky, A., 'Gotdiche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos', S.H.A.W., 1961, 4, pp. 1–52Google Scholar. Lesky, however, does not consider the more general problem of causal reasoning in Homer.

^{page 25 note 3} See his Les Origines de la science grecque chez Homerè: Vhomme et I'univers physique, Études et commentaires, xlvi (Paris, 1963), P 153Google Scholar.

^{page 26 note 1} Compare Bovvra, op. cit., p. 49: 'What counts is that the poet concentrates on the moment and gives everything to it', and p. 50: 'Each point is made emphatically in its own place because it is relevant to the context, and though we may complain that insufficient notice is taken of what is said elsewhere, there is in fact no real contradiction.'