¹ See A. McGrew, ‘Conceptualizing Global Politics’, in A. McGrew et al., Global Politics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992.

² See A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, ch. 2.

³ See D. Held, A. McGrew, J. Perraton and D. Goldblatt, Global Transformations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, chs 1, 2 and 8.

⁴ Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S., ‘Globalization: What's New? What's Not (and So What?)’, Foreign Policy, 118 (2000), pp. 104–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ J. Rosenau, ‘Governance in a New Global Order’, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), Governing Globalization, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002.

⁶ M. Moore, A World Without Walls, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

⁷ See Ruggie, J., ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, International Organization, 47: 1 (1993), pp. 139–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ See B. Deacon, ‘Global Social Governance Reform’, in B. Deacon et al. (eds), Global Social Governance, Helsinki, Hakapaino Oy, 2003.

⁹ Moore, A World without Walls, op. cit., pp. 220, 223.

¹⁰ See P. Conceição, ‘Assessing the Provision Status of Global Public Goods’, in I. Kaul et al. (eds), Providing Global Public Goods, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.

¹¹ See I. Kaul et al., ‘How to Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods’, in ibid., p. 30.

¹² Ibid., p. 31.

¹³ See A. Buira, ‘The Governance of the International Monetary Fund’; P. Chasek and L. Rajamani, ‘Steps towards Enhanced Party Parity’; and R. V. Mendoza, ‘The Multilateral Trade Regime’– all in ibid.

¹⁴ There were interesting signs at the September 2003 trade discussion at Cancún that leading developing countries are beginning to learn from these problems and combine expertise and negotiating resources.

¹⁵ Rosenau, ‘Governance in a New Global Order’, op. cit.

¹⁶ Moore, A World without Walls, op. cit., p. 218.

¹⁷ See D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995.

¹⁸ Kaul et al., ‘How to Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods’, op. cit., pp. 27–8.

¹⁹ I. Kaul et al., ‘Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today?’, in Kaul et al., Providing Global Public Goods, op. cit., pp. 5–6.

²⁰ Kaul et al., ‘How to Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods’, op. cit., p. 28.

²¹ See D. Held, Models of Democracy, 2nd edn, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, part 3.

²² See M. Saward, ‘A Critique of Held’, in B. Holden (ed.), Global Democracy, London, Routledge, 2002.

²³ Other examples include the decision to go to war. However, war raises a number of exceptional questions which I will not address in this article.

²⁴ R. O. Keohane, ‘Global Governance and Democratic Accountability’, in D. Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Taming Globalization, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003, p. 141.

²⁵ Cf. L. Doyal and I. Gough, A Theory of Human Need, London, Macmillan, 1991; and Held, Democracy and the Global Order, op. cit., part 2.

²⁶ T. Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, in C. Brown (ed.), Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 106–9.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 109.

²⁸ Held, Democracy and the Global Order, op. cit., ch. 10.

²⁹ See Hirst, P. and Thompson, G., ‘The Future of Globalization’, Cooperation and Conflict, 37: 3 (2002), pp. 252–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Kaul et al., ‘How to Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods’, op. cit., p. 35.

³² See J. F. Rischard, High Noon, New York, Basic Books, 2002, part 3.

³³ Ibid., p. 171.

³⁴ It is interesting to note that the EU is exploring similar policy instruments through its ‘Open Method of Coordination’. In utilizing this method, member states agree to formulate national action plans in particular areas by drawing upon their distinctive and common experiences; subjecting proposals to test by a panel of expert officials drawn from a broad spectrum of member states; reviewing performance against relevant targets; and considering various incentives, and sanctions if necessary, to ensure policy success. See J. Cohen and C. F. Sabel, ‘Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US’, in J. Zeitlin and D. Trubek (eds), Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.

³⁵ See R. Falk, On Humane Governance, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995.

³⁶ The following points are adapted from Held, D., ‘Cosmopolitanism: Globalization Tamed?’, Review of International Studies, 29 (2003), pp. 465–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁷ Agreement on the terms of reference of a global assembly would be difficult to say the least, although there is no shortage of plausible schemes and models. Ultimately, its terms of reference and operating rules would need to command widespread agreement and, hence, ought to be generated in a stakeholder process of consensus-building – a global constitutional convention – involving states, IGOs, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), citizen groups and social movements. A global process of consultation and deliberation, organized at diverse levels, represents the best hope of creating a legitimate framework for accountable and sustainable global governance. Three core issues would need to be addressed: Who is to be represented, governments or citizens? What is to be the principle of representation, one state, one vote, proportional representation, or a mixture of both? What are the proper scope and limits of action of a global assembly? These are demanding questions which admit of a number of sound theoretical answers. The case for each would have to be considered and weighed in the context of the diversity of interests which would be brought to a global constitutional convention, for example the inevitable differences that would emerge between the developed and developing countries on whether population size or economic strength, or a mixture of both, should count in the determination of the basis of representation. While the legitimacy and credibility of a new global assembly would depend on it being firmly grounded on the principle of consent and electoral inclusiveness, it is likely that any assembly in the foreseeable future would be constituted by compromises between theoretical ideas and practical constraints. Accordingly, rather than set out blueprints for the nature and form of a global assembly, it seems better to stress the importance of a legitimate process of consensus-building in and through which these issues might be deliberated upon and settled.

³⁸ See M. Edwards and S. Zadek, ‘Governing the Provision of Global Public Goods: the Role and Legitimacy of Nonstate Actors’, in Kaul et al., Providing Global Public Goods, op. cit.

³⁹ Cf. Doyle, M., ‘A More Perfect Union?’, Review of International Studies, 26 (2000), pp. 81–94.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, op. cit., ch. 12.

⁴¹ J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 514–15.

⁴² See D. Heater, World Citizenship, London, Continuum, 2002.

⁴³ See Held, D., ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples’, Legal Theory, 8: 1 (2002), pp. 1–44,CrossRefGoogle Scholar from which I have adapted the following four paragraphs.

⁴⁴ Eleftheriadis, P., ‘The European Constitution and Cosmopolitan Ideals’, Columbia Journal of European Law, 7: 1 (2002), pp. 21–39.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Held, ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples’, op. cit., for an elaboration of the first seven principles.

⁴⁶ Ackerman, B., ‘Political Liberalism’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 91 (1994), pp. 382–3.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ It is frequently alleged that democracy itself is a western imposition on many developing countries. Yet, as George Monbiot has pointed out, ‘the majority of those who live in parliamentary democracies, flawed as some of them may be, live in the poor world’ (The Age of Consent, London, Flamingo, 2003, p. 109).