¹ This article was written during a research visit (March-April 2003) to the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). A Dutch version of this contribution has been published in SEW, Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht, Dec 2003, 406–16. An abbreviated version was presented at the conference ‘La libre circulation des personnes 10 ans après “1993”: Derniers développements et dernières frontières’, held in Liège 5–6 Dec 2003.Google Scholar

² Between 1990 and 1992 Argentina privatized its economy. The twenty State enterprises that were sold generated 4 per cent of GNP and 21 per cent of fiscal revenues.Google Scholar

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⁹ This probably also explains why relatively little has been written in the US concerning Mercosur. For a further explanation of the free trade agreements and their impact on US law, see JH, JacksonThe World Trading System: Law and Policy oflnternatonal Economic Relations (MIT Cambridge—London 2002). See alsoGoogle ScholarH, Milner ‘Regional Economic Co-operation, Global Markets and Domestic Politics: A Comparison of NAFTA and the Maastricht Treaty’ [1995] Journal of European Public Policy, 337–60.Google Scholar

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¹⁵ Here, too, history appears to repeat itself. Free trade within NAFTA is heavily complained about in Mexico at the moment, especially as regards the lack of compensating measures comparable to, eg, the structural funds in the EC, in order to lessen the structural differences among the participants and thereby guarantee loyal competition.Google Scholar

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¹⁷ ALADI in Spanish. LAIA/ALADI currently has its headquarters in Montevideo.Google Scholar

¹⁸ With Peru, negotiations on this are ongoing. Venezuela has indicated that it wishes to open negotiations.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See CMC 14/96 concerning their participation in the working groups. Many decisions between the Mercosur States parties are separately declared binding upon the associated members, not only in the field of economic integration, but also with respect to justice and security (see below).Google Scholar

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²² CMC 02/93.Google Scholar

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