¹ Brownlie, IPrinciples of Public International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 162Google Scholar.

² On Ceuta and Melilla see generally Gold, PEurope or Africa? A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Liverpool University Press 2000)Google ScholarPubMed and O'Reilly, G ‘Ceuta and the Spanish sovereign territories: Spanish and Moroccan claims’ in Boundary and Research Briefings vol I, no 2, International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham 1994Google Scholar. From an international legal perspective, see Khan, D-E ‘Ceuta and Melilla’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International LawGoogle Scholar <www.mpepil.com > .

³ Autonomy Statute of Ceuta 1995 <http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/estatutos/e_80_espa.pdf > .

⁴ See (n 2).

⁵ Article 5, Autonomy Statute of Melilla <http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/estatutos/e_81_espa.pdf > . Article 5 of Ceuta's Autonomy Statute (see n 3) refers to cultural, but not linguistic, plurality.

⁶ MW Lewis ‘The World's Shortest Border’, 30 August 2010, online at <http://geocurrents.info/geopolitics/the-worlds-shortest-border > .

⁷ O'Reilly (n 2) para 2.5.

⁸ ibid.

⁹ See N Barbour ‘North West Africa from the 15th to 19th Centuries’ in HJ Kissing et al (eds) The Last Great Muslim Empires: History of the Muslim World (Markus Wiener Publishers 1996) 98, 103 and 117.

¹⁰ See O'Reilly (n 2) para 2.5, who states that the cession was ‘on condition that Spain prevent the Turks from occupying strongholds on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco’.

¹¹ ibid, para 2.5.

¹² Statement of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, SpanYIL vol VIII (2001–2002) 99.

¹³ Gonzalez Campos, JD ‘Las pretensions de Marruecos sobre los territories españoles en el Norte de Africa (1956–2002)’ (2004) Real Instituto Elcano, Documento de Trabajo No 15/2004, 1Google Scholar.

¹⁴ ibid 14. According to the Tribunal in Eritrea/Yemen ‘there is a strong presumption that islands within the twelve-mile coastal belt will belong to the coastal state’ unless the case to the contrary is ‘fully established’ (which is open to doubt in the case of Perejil): Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Phase One: Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute) (1998) 114 ILR 1, 125.

¹⁵ See Tams, CJ ‘A Sprig of Parsley that Leaves a Bitter Taste – Comments on the Spanish-Moroccan Dispute About Perejil/Leila’ 45 GYIL (2002) 269Google Scholar and I Martinez ‘Spain's “Splendid Little War” with Morocco’ 37 IntlLaw 871 (2003). On the specifics of the Secretary of State's intervention, see Rodriguez Carrion, AJ and Torres Cazorla, MI ‘Una readaptación de los medios de arreglo pacífico de controversias: el caso de Isla Perejil y los medios utilizados para la solución de este conflicto’ LIV Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (2002) 717Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See G Tremlett ‘Morocco draws new territories into Parsley row’ (The Guardian 22 July 2002).

¹⁷ Khan (n 2) para 11.

¹⁸ Declaration by the Governments of Spain and Morocco on the Independence of Morocco (and Protocol) 7 April 1956 Royal Institute of International Affairs Documents on International Affairs (Oxford University Press 1956) 694.

¹⁹ Statement of Mohammed V, 3 April 1956, cited in Gonzalez Campos (n 13) 3.

²⁰ See Franck, TMNation Against Nation (Oxford University Press, 1985) 76–82Google Scholar.

²¹ For more discussion see (n 40) and accompanying text.

²² The Indian delegate in the UN Security Council justified his country's annexation of Goa on the grounds that the Portuguese presence there amounted to an illegal colonial occupation dating back to the 1500s. The Indian position regarding its territorial unity was clearly stated: ‘India is one; Goa is an integral part of India’ (SCOR 16th Year 987th Meeting 18 Dec 1961 paras 46–47, 60).

²³ Western Sahara Advisory Opinion [1975] ICJ Rep. International support for the ‘territorial unity’ claims of Guatemala to British Honduras, Indonesia in relation to East Timor, and Morocco to Western Sahara, appeared to decline after the 1960s. In the former two cases, international recognition of Belize and East Timor, although not easily achieved (especially in the latter case) testifies to this fact.

²⁴ Gold (n 2) 24–7.

²⁵ ibid 19.

²⁶ See Gonzalez Campos (n 13) 7.

²⁷ UN Doc A/C4/SR1005, paras 34–35. It has been suggested that there was a tacit agreement between Morocco and the fascist regime in Spain, under which Franco's 75,000 foreign legionnaires stationed in Ceuta and Melilla would have intervened should the need have arisen to prevent a communist coup in Morocco: see ‘Morocco: Spanish Foreign Legion Outposts’ ITN Report, 3 Aug 1966 <http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist/BHC_ITN/1966/08/03/X03086601/ > .

²⁸ Tratado por el que el Estado Español retrocede al Reino de Marruecos el territorio de Ifni (Fez, 4 January 1969) Repertorio Cronológico de Legislación (Pamplona: Aranzadi 1969) 1008.

²⁹ UN Doc A/AC109/475.

³⁰ O'Reilly (n 2) para 7.2.

³¹ ‘Memoria sobre los puertos e islas de la costa Norte de Marruecos aún bajo dominación colonial, llamados “Presidios”’ 7 March 1975, in Gonzalez Campos (n 13) 10.

³² Rigo-Sureda, AThe Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice (AW Sijthoff 1973) 176–7Google Scholar. The notion that contiguity can be a basis for title to territory does not enjoy widespread acceptance: RY Jennings puts the contrary view when he states that ‘the proposition that contiguity is not an independent root of title is self-evident, for it is by definition relative and immediately raises the question, contiguous to what? A claim based on contiguity cannot in fact be other than an assertion concerning the definition or extent of a sovereignty the existence of which is accepted ex hypothesi’ The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester University Press 1963) 74.

³³ Crawford, JThe Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 647Google Scholar.

³⁴ ibid, 637.

³⁵ ibid.

³⁶ Crawford, JThe Creation of States in International Law (1st edn, Oxford University Press 1979) 377Google Scholar, fns 109, 110. Also Duursma, JFragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 80–8Google Scholar.

³⁷ The inappropriateness of placing offshore islands in the ‘colonial enclaves’ category is discussed by Rigo-Sureda (n 33) 176, and Higgins (n 59) 393. However, Argentina regularly refers to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands as a ‘colonial enclave’: see eg ‘Falkland Islands “Not Colonial Enclave” Says UK’, (Mercopress South Atlantic News Agency, 30 Sep 2008). <http://en.mercopress.com/2008/09/30/falkland-islands-not-colonial-enclave-says-uk > .

³⁸ GA Res 2072 (XX), 16 December 1965; GA Res 2229 (XXI), 20 December 1966; 2354, GA Res 2354 (XXII), 19 Dec 1967.

³⁹ DW Greig argues that it is senseless to draw a factual distinction between Goa and East Timor on the basis that the former is a ‘colonial enclave’ and the latter is not: see ‘Reflections on the Role of Consent’ (1988–89) 12 AustYBIL 157.

⁴⁰ The Chilean delegate to the Security Council, in support of a draft resolution ‘deploring’ the Indian action in Goa (which resolution had the support of the majority within the Security Council but not the veto-wielding USSR), stated as follows: ‘Neither historical possession [by Portugal] nor violent possession [by India] should prevail, but the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants of the disputed territories’ (SCOR 16th Year 988th Meeting 18 Dec 1961 para 30).

⁴¹ GA Res 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.

⁴² JES Fawcett notes that the word ‘attempt’ in this context ‘can hardly be apposite to describe an already existing and indeed long-established situation’: ‘Gibraltar: The Legal Issues’ (1967) 43 International Affairs 249. Rigo-Sureda (n 33) argues (at 185) that the word ‘attempt’ in para 6 ‘clearly refers to future cases’.

⁴³ This particular interpretation of paragraph 6 has been advanced by, eg, India in support of its claim to Goa, Indonesia over East Timor, Guatemala over British Honduras (now Belize) and Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. It was championed by Indonesia and Guatemala when resolution 1514 (XV) was in its preparatory phase, but it was a minority view: see Clark, RS ‘East Timor’ 7 YaleJWorldPubOrd 29 (1980–1981) 28–31Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ GA Res 2353 (XXII), 19 Dec 1967.

⁴⁵ UN Doc A/AC4/SR1671.

⁴⁶ UN Doc A/AC-109/475.

⁴⁷ Gonzalez Campos (n 13) 13.

⁴⁸ ibid 16. The King referred to the fact that Gibraltar is in Europe, is controlled by a major European power, and is allied to Spain through the EC and NATO.

⁴⁹ UN Doc A/AC-109/477. This claim seems unusual in light of the ethnic diversity that exists in Ceuta and Melilla; indeed, the latter may soon become the first Spanish city since the so-called ‘Reconquista’ to have a majority Muslim population.

⁵⁰ O'Reilly (n 2) para 7.2.

⁵¹ ibid.

⁵² See the 1995 Autonomy Statutes of Ceuta and Melilla (n 3 and n 5 respectively) and the statement of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17 September 2002 (UN Doc A/57/PV.12)).

⁵³ See Cassese, ASelf-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 207–8Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ See UN GAOR 19th Sess, Annex 8 Agenda Item 21 ch X 296.

⁵⁵ In relation to Spain's claim to Gibraltar there is a further layer of argumentation based on the reversionary clause contained in the treaty of cession (Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht 1713), which gives Spain the right of first refusal should Britain ever ‘alienate’ the territory. The UK considers that a grant of independence would constitute ‘alienation’ under the treaty and has ruled out this option ostensibly for this reason (see UN Doc A/AC-109/PV 543). Spain considers that any exercise of self-determination by the Gibraltarians not leading to integration with Spain would constitute an ‘alienation’ of the territory by the UK (Spanish Red Book on Gibraltar (Sucesores de Rivadeneyra 1965) 65).

⁵⁶ Rigo-Sureda (n 33) 219.

⁵⁷ This view was articulated in the Spanish pleadings before the ICJ in the Western Sahara advisory proceedings: Western Sahara vol I [1974] ICJ Pleadings 207, para 359.

⁵⁸ Higgins, R ‘Judge Dillard and the Right to Self-Determination’ (1983) 23 VaJIntlL 393Google Scholar. An Australian representative in a debate of the UN Decolonization Committee commented that if the Spanish interpretation of para 6 of Resolution 1514 (XV) is correct it would mean that ‘nearly every European country, such being Europe's history, could lay claim to some part of another European country on the basis of some earlier conquest or some earlier transfer of land’: UN Doc A/AC-109/PV 546 (1967) 66.

⁵⁹ Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipidan (Indonesia v Malaysia), Application by the Philippines to Intervene, Separate Opinion by Judge ad hoc Franck [2001] ICJ Rep 652, 657, para 15.

⁶⁰ See (n 40).

⁶¹ In the words of a Sudanese delegate to the General Assembly: UN Doc A/C4/SR1754 (1967) 553, para 19.

⁶² Each year the General Assembly passes a ‘consensus’ decision urging the UK and Spain to negotiate over the future of the territory. The decision now refers to the need to listen to the ‘interests and aspirations’ of the Gibraltarians: ‘UN Modifies Gibraltar Statement’ (Gibraltar Chronicle 15 Oct 2004). For the latest decision see GA decision 66/522, 9 December 2011.

⁶³ O'Reilly (n 2) para 7.2, documents the support for the Moroccan position from the OAU, the Non-Aligned States, and the Arab League, the latter proclaiming in 1975 its ‘support for Morocco in its current fight for the liberation of its territories occupied by the Spanish, including Sebta [(Ceuta)] and Melilla as well as the other islands off the Moroccan coast’. The African Union has classified Ceuta and Melilla as African territories under ‘foreign occupation’ (see ‘Le Plan Stratégique de la Commission de l'Union Africaine’ vol 1 (2004) 44 <http://www.africa-union.org/au%20summit%202004/volume%203%20final%20-%20french%20-%204%20june%202004%20fr.pdf > .

⁶⁴ Gold (n 2) 164.

⁶⁵ While the sovereignty disputes remain deadlocked, domestic developments in the territories under discussion have increased their levels of self-governance: Gibraltar's 2006 constitution, created by a UK Order in Council, bestows virtually full self-government on the territory and contains a preamble stating that the UK will ‘never enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes’ (see <www.gibraltarlaws.gov.gi/constitution/Gibraltar_Constitution_Order_2006.pdf>) and since 1995 Ceuta and Melilla have been ‘autonomous cities’ under the Spanish constitution, seamlessly integrated within the EU (see (n 3), (n 5) and (n 53)).

⁶⁶ In this regard we might consider cases like Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, the transfer of which from the UK to Australia (effected in 1947 and confirmed by exchange of letters in 1950) did not engage the interest of the UN, at least as far as Chapter XI of the Charter was concerned. The UK was also concerned to evade the scrutiny of the Decolonization Committee when it covered up the existence of a permanent population on the Chagos Islands, before excising the archipelago from Mauritius, leasing Diego Garcia to the USA, and covertly banishing the Chagossians to the slums of the Mauritian capital, Port St Louis: see R (on the application of Bancoult) (Respondent) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Appellant) [2008] UKHL 61, at paras 10, 55 and 169.

⁶⁷ GA Res 1542 (XV), 15 December 1960.

⁶⁸ Shaw, MTitle to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (Clarendon Press, 1986) 329Google Scholar, fn 309.

⁶⁹ Brownlie (n 1) 162.

⁷⁰ Right of Passage over Indian Territory [1960] ICJ Rep 6.

⁷¹ GA Res 1541 (XV), 15 December 1960.

⁷² See Anderson, CA ‘Portuguese Africa: A Brief History of United Nations Involvement’ 4 DenvJIntlL& Pol 133 (1974)Google Scholar.

⁷³ The Ghanaian Ambassador to the UN put the point in a somewhat circular fashion: ‘The very fact that … all African countries are behind the nationalists … means a threat to international peace and security’: UN Doc S/PV1042, 24 July 1963, 33–5.

⁷⁴ See (n 68). Para 3 of the Preamble recognizes that ‘the desire for independence is the rightful aspiration of peoples under colonial subjugation’.

⁷⁵ Crawford 1979 (n 37) 377.

⁷⁶ Greig (n 40) 154–7. See also Irving, J ‘Self-determination and colonial enclaves: the success of Singapore and the failure of theory’ (2008) 12 SYBIL 97–112Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ See García Figueras, TLa acción Africana de España en torno al 98, 1860–1912 vol 1 (Instituto de Estudios Africanos 1966) 292Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Moran, FUna politica exterior para España (Barcelona, 1990) 82Google Scholar, cited in Gonzalez Campos (n 13) 13.