Author's note: Robert Jervis, Charles Larsen, and Melvyn Leffler provided suggestions that substantially improved earlier drafts of this essay. Cristi Leibenson masterfully processed the final drafts.

¹ See in particular Kolko, Gabriel, The Politics of War (New York, 1968), pp. 309–11;Google ScholarGardner, Lloyd, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, Wis., 1964), ch. 11;Google Scholaridem, Architects of Illusion (Chicago, 1970), pp. 210–15; Doenecke, Justus D., “Revisionists, Oil and Cold War Diplomacy,” Iranian Studies, 3, 1 (Winter 1970), 23–33;CrossRefGoogle Scholaridem, “Iran's Role in Cold War Revisionism,” Iranian Studies, 5, 2–3 (Spring–Summer 1972), 96–111.

² Representative studies include Hess, Gary R., “The Iranian Crisis of 1945–1946 and the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly, 89, 1 (03 1974), 117–46;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPfau, Richard, “Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift to an Active Policy,” Diplomatic History, 1, 4 (Fall 1977), 359–72;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMcFarland, Stephen L., “A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941–1947,” Diplomatic History, 4, 4 (Fall 1980), 333–51;CrossRefGoogle ScholarKuniholm, Bruce R., The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton, 1980);CrossRefGoogle ScholarHarbutt, Fraser J., The Iron Curtain (New York, 1987), chs. 8–9;Google ScholarLytle, Mark H., The Origins of the Iranian–American Alliance 1941–1953 (New York, 1987), chs. 5–9.Google Scholar The term “post-revisionist” comes from Gaddis, John Lewis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, 7, 3 (Summer 1983), 171–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a stimulating reinterpretation of U.S. relations with Turkey that complements many of the points addressed here, see Leffler, Melvyn P., “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945–1952,” Journal of American History, 71, 4 (03 1985), 807–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁴ Hess, “The Iranian Crisis,” 129.

⁵ Rosenberg, David A., “The U.S. Navy and the Problem of Oil in a Future War,” Naval War College Review, 29, 1 (Summer 1976), 54–55.Google Scholar

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⁷ See Kirk, George, The Middle East in the War (London, 1952), pp. 480–81.Google Scholar

⁸ Hess, “The Iranian Crisis,” 125.

⁹ On domestic circumstances that may have led Stalin to moderate Soviet foreign policy at this time, see McCagg, William O. Jr, Stalin Embattled 1943–1948 (Detroit, 1978);Google ScholarTaubman, William, Stalin's American Policy (New York, 1982), p. 116.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis,” 180.

¹¹ Miller, Aaron David, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1949 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980), pp. 62–63.Google Scholar

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¹⁴ Miller, Search for Security, ch. 3.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 105.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944 (Washington, 1965), 5:661. This source will be abbreviated FRUS followed by the appropriate year, volume number, and page.Google Scholar

¹⁷ FRUS 1944, V:663.

¹⁸ FRUS 1944, V:665–66.

¹⁹ FRUS 1944, V:666–67.

²⁰ Gormly, James L., “Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia: The United States and the Dhahran Airfield, 1945–1946,” Diplomatic History, 4, 2 (Spring 1980), 194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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²² Gormly, “Keeping the Door Open,” 201.

²³ Ibid., 202.

²⁴ Zahlan, “Anglo–American Rivalry,” passim.

²⁵ Tarbush, Mohammad A., The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941 (London, 1982).Google Scholar

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³¹ Ibid., 11:17.

³² Ibid., 1:8–10.

³³ Miller, Search for Security, p. 118.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 120–21.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 136.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 137.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 139.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Zabih, Sepehr, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley, 1966), p. 76;Google ScholarAbrahamian, Ervand, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982), ch. 6.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Zabih, Communist Movement, p. 94.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 98.

⁴² Pfau, Richard, “The United States and Iran, 1941–1947: Origins of Partnership,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1975, pp. 203–4, 231;Google ScholarLadjevardi, Habib, “The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 15,2 (05 1983), 228.Google Scholar

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⁴⁴ Zabih, Communist Movement, p. 105.

⁴⁵ Pfau, “The United States and Iran,” pp. 236, 244–45. See in particular the crucial observations contained in footnote 37 on p. 245 of this thesis.Google Scholar

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⁵³ Mark, “Allied Relations in Iran,” 56; Pfau, “The United States and Iran,” p. 186.

⁵⁴ Taubman, Stalin's American Policy, p. 121.

⁵⁵ Mark, “Allied Relations in Iran,” 57.

⁵⁶ Ulam, Adam B., Expansion and Coexistence (New York, 1974), p. 407;Google Scholar Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, pp. 285–86.

⁵⁷ Sherry, Michael S., Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941–45 (New Haven, 1977), pp. 108–19.Google Scholar

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⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 200.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 200–201.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 202.

⁶² Ibid., p. 205.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 213.

⁶⁴ Lefller, , “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War,” 814.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Ibid., 813.

⁶⁶ See Davis, Lynn Etheridge, The Cold War Begins: Soviet—American Conflict over Eastern Europe (Princeton, 1974);Google ScholarMark, , “American Policy toward Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1946: An Alternative Interpretation,” Journal of American History, 68, 2 (09 1981), 313–36;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLeffler, , “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48,” American Historical Review, 89, 2 (04 1984), 346–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁷ Robert Jervis calls this view of international interaction “the deterrence model,” since it assumes that one party—the aggressor—can only be dissuaded from carrying out its foreign policy program if defenders of the status quo take firm countermeasures to resist it; Miles Kahler would call such a model “the 1939 analogy.” See Jervis, , Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976), ch. 3;Google ScholarKahler, , “Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy,” Foreign Affairs, 58, 2 (Winter 1979–1980), 374–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁸ Jervis calls this view of international interaction “the spiral model,” on the grounds that it represents a situation in which two basically nonaggressive states try to carry out incompatible and mutually threatening foreign policy programs that produce the unintended consequence of provoking increasingly hostile countermeasures that soon “spiral” into direct conflict; Kahler refers to such a dynamic as “the 1914 analogy.”

⁶⁹ See George, Alexander L. and Smoke, Richard, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1974);Google ScholarHuth, Paul and Russett, Bruce, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics, 36, 4 (07 1984), 496–526;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBetts, Richard K., “Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence,” World Politics, 37, 2 (01 1985), 153–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁰ Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 103.

⁷¹ Snyder, Glenn S. and Diesing, Paul D., Conflict among Nations (Princeton, 1977), p. 498.Google Scholar

⁷² This is, of course, a bit of an overstatement, as the dispute over the oasis at Buraimi a decade later indicates. See Kelly, J. B., Eastern Arabian Frontiers (London, 1964), ch. 5.Google Scholar

⁷³ Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, pp. 216–18.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 216–17.

⁷⁵ Jervis, , The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), pp. 165–67.Google Scholar