1 Stephen V. Ward, ‘Transnational planners in a postcolonial world’, in Crossing borders: International exchange and planning practices, ed. Patsy Healy and Robert Upton (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 47.

2 Hashim Sarkis, ‘Dances with Margaret Mead: Planning Beirut since 1958’, in Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the construction and reconstruction of a modern city, ed. Peter G. Rowe and Hashim Sarkis (Munich: Prestel, 1998), pp. 87–201; Ray Bromley, ‘Towards global human settlements: Constantinos Doxiadis as entrepreneur, coalition-builder and visionary’, in Urbanism — imported or exported: Native aspirations and foreign plans, ed. Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait (Chichester: Wiley, 2003), pp. 316–40.

3 Jurgen Dinkel, The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, organization and politics (1927–1992) (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

4 An example of this thinking in Burmese–Israeli relations can be seen in the statement made by David Ben-Gurion during his trip to Burma in 1961: ‘I have often asked myself what is this thing so special about our relationship with Burma (…) I believe that the main line of reply would refer to the intrinsic character of Burma–Israel relations; these have been centred from the first moment of their inception not on the ordinary field of politics and international affairs but on the fruitful fields of social, economic, cultural development to the betterment of man's lot. The quality that has always struck me as the strongest tie between your leadership and our country is the common refusal to take nature as it is, to accept poverty and ignorance and disease as given and ordained and unchangeable, this resolve that it is man's duty on earth to build and to develop and to change this country into a better one, richer one, one more enlightened, to eradicate poverty and unhappiness’. ‘Israel premier feted’, The Nation (Burma), 7 Dec. 1961, p. 1.

5 See, for example, ‘President Sukarno of Indonesia: Speech at the opening of the Bandung Conference’, 18 Apr. 1955; available at https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1955sukarno-bandong.asp (last accessed 12 Jan. 2020).

6 Frenkel, Michal and Shenhav, Yehouda, ‘From Americanization to colonization: The diffusion of productivity models revisited’, Organization Studies, 24, 9 (2003): 1537–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Kipping, Matthias, Engwall, Lars and Üsdiken, Behlül, ‘The transfer of management knowledge to peripheral countries’, International Studies of Management & Organization, 38, 4 (2008/2009): 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Aung San Suu Kyi, ‘Intellectual life in India and Burma under colonialism’, in Freedom from fear and other writings, ed. Michael Aris (London: Penguin, 2010), p. 100.

9 ‘Burma, it was believed, would take its rightful place in the modern world […] the Burmese would achieve even higher levels of technological and economic achievement.’ Melford E. Spiro, Buddhism and society: A great tradition and its Burmese vicissitudes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 183.

10 Robert H. Taylor, The state in Myanmar (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p. 265.

11 Jordan Winfield, ‘Buddhism and the state in Burma: English-language discourses from 1823 to 1962’ (PhD diss., University of Melbourne, 2017), pp. 107, 179.

12 Renaud Egreteau and Larry Jagan, Soldiers and diplomacy in Burma: Understanding the foreign relations of the Burmese praetorian state (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013), p. 90.

13 John H. Badgley, ‘Which road for Burma?’, Challenge 11, 9 (1963): 26–9.

14 ‘Burma drops Soviet “gift” project half-way’, The Guardian (Burma), 26 Oct. 1959, p. 1.

15 Leszek Buszynski, Soviet foreign policy and Southeast Asia (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 2.

16 Frank N. Trager, ed., Marxism in Southeast Asia: A study of four countries (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1959), p. 299.

17 Area handbook for Burma (Washington, DC: US Govt. Printing, 1971), p. 200.

18 Jovan Čavoški, Arming nonalignment:Yugoslavia's relations with Burma and the Cold War in Asia (1950–1955), Wilson Center Working Paper no. 61, Cold War International History Project (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre, 2010).

19 Rajak, Svetozar, ‘No bargaining chips, no spheres of interest: The Yugoslav origins of Cold War non-alignment’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 16, 1 (2014): 172CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 Jacob Abadi, Israel's quest for recognition and acceptance in Asia (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 117–18.

21 Chi-shad Liang, Burma's foreign relations neutralism in theory and practice (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 192–3; Ruth F. Cernea, Almost Englishmen: Baghdadi Jews in British Burma (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2007), p. 123.

22 See for example, Heller, Daniel K., ‘Israeli aid and the “African woman”: The gendered politics of international development, 1958–73’, Jewish Social Studies, 25, 2 (2020): 49–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ayala Levin, ‘Exporting architectural national expertise: Arieh Sharon's Ife University Campus in West Nigeria’, in Nationalism and architecture, ed. Darren Deane and Sarah Butler (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 53–66; Levin, Ayala, ‘Haile Sellasie's imperial modernity: Expatriate architects and the shaping of Addis Ababa’, Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 75, 4 (2016): 447–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Feniger, Neta and Kallus, Rachel, ‘Israeli planning in the Shah's Iran: A forgotten episode’, Planning Perspectives, 30, 2 (2015): 231–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Kallus, Rachel, ‘The Crete Development Plan: A post-Second World War experience of transnational professional exchange’, Planning Perspectives, 30, 3 (2015): 339–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 Stanek, Łukasz, ‘Introduction: The Second World's architecture and planning in the Third World’, Journal of Architecture, 17, 3 (2012): 302CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26 As for predating activities, Jews from Burma were invited to join the World Jewish Congress (WJC) in 1947, and did so on 24 March 1949. Some individuals in Burma's Jewish community at that time felt the need to establish some kind of official Jewish presence in Burma (unlike other foreign nationals, the Jews did not have a foreign government to protect them). This indeed suggests the possibility that a request for an Israeli diplomatic presence may have been made at the WJC session in 1950. Soon, however, the issue became moot, as most of the Jews emigrated from Burma (Cernea, Almost Englishmen, pp. 105–6). The Jewish community in Burma had little to no influence on the Namsang project or on Burma–Israeli relations in the 1950s.

27 Correspondence from the PM's Secretary: d.o. letter no. 287CM54/7 (07.8.1954), in ‘Establishment of diplomatic relations between Burma and Israel’, p. 7, accession no. 98, 1952, box 5, MFA 15_3 (9), National Archive in Yangon.

28 ‘Establishment of diplomatic relations between Burma and Israel’, pp. 5–31, accession no. 98, 1952, box 5, MFA 15_3 (9), National Archive in Yangon; ‘Appointment of Mr. David Hacohen’, pp. 1–11, accession no. 121, 1953, box 6, MFA 15_3 (9), National Archive in Yangon.

29 As Ben-Gurion later recalled: ‘there was a big mission from Burma and it was received here with an enthusiasm that they did not find among Asiatic countries. By the African countries they were not received in such a way …. It made a tremendous impression on them that in Israel they were received with more friendliness than in any other country’. Excerpt from ‘Knesset minutes’, 31 Jan. 1962, p. 119, accession no. 527, box 55, 1961, MFA 15/3 (21), National Archive in Yangon.

30 Sharett wrote: ‘I was somewhat taken aback at the complex and highly specialised character of the tasks you thought we might be able to undertake on Burma's behalf.’ ‘Letter from U Nu to Sharett’, 7 Oct. 1954, ‘Correspondence from Sharett to U Nu’, 11 Nov. 1954, in ‘Establishment of diplomatic relations between Burma and Israel’, pp. 14–15, 30–32, accession no. 98, 1952, box 5, MFA 15_3 (9), National Archive in Yangon.

31 ‘Letter no. 287CM54/7’, in ‘Establishment of diplomatic relations between Burma and Israel’, pp. 8, 5–31, accession no. 98, 1952, box 5, MFA 15_3 (9), National Archive in Yangon. Extracts from ‘Cypher Telegram No. 155’, 26 Apr. 1953, Burmese Embassy, Washington; ‘Cypher No. 197’, 25 May 1953, Burmese Embassy, Washington; ‘Cypher No. 311’, 29 May 1953, Burmese Embassy, Washington; ‘Cypher No. 214’, 9 June 1953, Burmese Embassy, Washington; and ‘Cypher no. 394’, 2 July 1953, Burmese Embassy, Washington, all in: ‘Appointment of Mr. David Hacohen’, pp. 21–3, 29–31, accession no. 121, 1953, box 6, MFA 15_3 (9), National Archive in Yangon.

32 The first was the military mission sent in 1954: ‘Study and observation mission of the Defence Services to Israel’, pp. 2–7, accession no. 70, 1954, box 3, MFA 15_3 (31), National Archive in Yangon.

33 Burma exported mainly rice and other foodstuffs (beans, maize), as well as rubber, oil, metal ores, and silver, while Israel exported building materials, machinery, chemicals, textiles, rubber and leather goods, and other products. ‘Trade Agreement between Burma and Israel’, pp. 1–5, accession no. 13334, 1956, Printed archive/ministries 4/20 (23), National Archive in Yangon. Burma also provided Israel with rice (e.g., 10 tonnes in 1955): ‘Gift of 10 tons of rice to Israel’, pp. 1–9, accession no. 33, 1955, box 2, MFA 15_3 (27), National Archive in Yangon.

34 The first five experts arrived in 1954: ‘Recruitment of five industrial experts from Israel’, pp. 6–7, accession no. 40 (1954), box 3, MFA 15_3 (25), National Archive in Yangon. Burma requested more in 1955: ‘Cypher 415’, Foreign Office, Rangoon U.O.Np.25Q-CM55, in: ‘Sale of Burma's rice to Israel on barter basis’, p. 4, accession no. 191, 1955, box 14, MFA 15_3 (27), National Archive in Yangon. In 1961 there were 25 altogether: ‘Minutes of official talk between Hon'ble U Nu’, p. 19, accession no. 527, box 55, 1961, MFA 15/3 (21), National Archive in Yangon.

35 Israel was an important destination for the Tatmadaw's ‘shopping missions’ in 1950; the Tatmadaw drew on Israel's civil defence plan and the structure of its women's auxiliary force; Israel also served as a model for ‘two contradictory thrusts in reorganizing the Tatmadaw — one drawing on the guerrilla warfare skills acquired by army leaders in the wartime resistance, and the other emphasising the construction of coordinated standing formations capable of withstanding foreign aggression.’ Mary P. Callahan, Making enemies: War and state building in Burma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 176–7. Israel trained Burmese pilots and established a munitions factory in Burma (Abadi, Israel's quest for recognition, p. 119). ‘General Ne Win is believed anxious to have a first-hand look at Israeli armed forces and to see how a small country tries to digest the latest modern weapons and train large number of immigrants from underdeveloped countries in their use.’ Subject discussed by U Kyaw Nyein and the Israeli PM, ‘Discussion by U Kyaw Nyein and the Israel PM’, pp. 1–2, accession no. 99, 1959, box 9, Office of the PM 12_9, National Archive in Yangon.

36 Abadi, Israel's quest for recognition, p. 118.

37 He said he was ‘deeply impressed’ by it, and remarked that the Burmese soldiers called their project moshav, ‘Correspondence of Ben-Gurion to Cabinet, Cairo communique unpleasant surprise’, p. 20, accession no. 527, box 55, 1961, MFA 15/3 (21), National Archive in Yangon.

38 ‘Proposed visit of Mrs Golda Meir Israel FM to Burma’, pp. 11–13, accession no. 144, 1961, box 8, MFA 15_3 (31), National Archive in Yangon.

39 As the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv commented, U Nu was ‘Israel's lone champion in the Asian world’; ‘Correspondence of British Ambassador in Tel Aviv to Macmillan’, PRO FO/371, 164305, VR10379/3, 7 June 1955, quoted in: Abadi, Israel's quest for recognition, p. 120.

40 Correspondence of U Nu to Sharett, 24 June 1954, ‘Question of opening diplomatic mission of Israel in New Delhi’, pp. 1–7, accession no. 269, 1954, box 17, MFA 15_3 (21), National Archive in Yangon.

41 U Nu, Saturday's son: Memoirs of the former prime minister of Burma (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 275–7.

42 Abadi, Israel's quest for recognition, p. 118.

43 ‘Subject discussed by U Kyaw Nyein and the Israeli PM’, p. 1, ‘Discussion by U Kyaw Nyein and the Israel PM’, pp. 1–2, accession no. 99, 1959, box 9, Office of the PM 12_9, National Archive in Yangon.

44 For example, they rejected the Israeli proposal to establish a joint shipping line that would ply the Suez Canal under the Burmese flag, thus circumventing the Arab boycott on Israeli ships: ‘Proposed Burma Israel shipping line’ (pp. 2–12), accession no. 205, 1956, box 12, MFA 15_3(28), National Archive in Yangon; and vice versa: Egypt proposed to raise the status of the legations in Cairo and Rangoon to ambassadorial level, so Rangoon agreed, but in order not to endanger relations with Tel Aviv, it also raised the rank of Israel's legations (on 5 Dec. 1957): ‘Question of elevating status of Burmese and Israeli legations in Tel Aviv and Rangoon respectively’, pp. 1–17, accession no. 171, 1957, box 9, MFA 15_3 (9), National Archive in Yangon. Another example was Burma's refusal to participate in the military parade held to celebrate the tenth anniversary of Israel's foundation: ‘10th anniversary independence celebration of Israel including military parade in Jerusalem’, pp. 1–20, accession no. 281, 1958, box 15, MFA 15/3 (18), National Archive in Yangon.

45 ‘Israel representation on the Afro-Asian Conference at Cairo on 8th December 1958’, pp. 18–20, 26, accession no. 356, 1958, box 24, MFA 15/3 (21), National Archive in Yangon.

46 The most significant incident in Burma–Israel relations occurred in early 1962, when Israel reacted negatively to the U Nu–Nasser Cairo Declaration of January 1962; as this happened just after Ben-Gurion's return from Burma, he was, according to Burmese diplomats, ‘deeply wounded’ (‘Letter from Maung Maung to James Barrington’, 26 Jan. 1962) and ‘his immediate reaction was one of personal hurt’ (‘Letter from Maung Maung to James Barrington’, 11 Jan. 1962): ‘Israel reaction to U Nu–Nasser communique’, pp. 79, 86, accession no. 527, box 55, MFA 15/3 (21), National Archive in Yangon.

47 For example, the visiting premier (Ben-Gurion) was asked how the phenomenal success of socialist construction in Israel had come about: ‘Under your leadership, Israel, a barren desert land, had been transformed in the course of a few years into a highly advanced industrial country’. ‘Premier Ben-Gurion meets Burmese Socialists’, The Nation (Burma), 7 Dec. 1961, p. 1. U Nu commented: ‘My visit to Israel some six years ago left a deep impression on me. It was inspiring to see a modern nation springing out of the desert. It was impossible not to be stirred by the justifiable sense of achievement which permeated all the people’; ‘Israeli premier feted’, The Nation (Burma), 7 Dec. 1961, p. 1. To U Nu, Israel ‘was the quintessential example of the egalitarian social and economic order that he wished to establish in his country’ (Abadi, Israel's quest for recognition, p. 118). As former Israeli ambassador to Burma Ben Horin recalled, ‘To U Nu's mind, there was almost nothing Israel could not do’, Jerusalem Post, 16 Sept. 1988, quoted in ibid., p. 120.

48 At the time other missions were also in train. A small group of experts in vocational education was sent from Israel to Burma to study the problems in situ and form an opinion about the kind of assistance that Israeli technicians and specialists could provide in developing technical education in Burma. See: Final report on technical education in Burma prepared by Israel mission (Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Labour, 1955).

49 Zeev Weil, ME 949, Leo Baeck Institute Archives, New York, p. 6.

50 Prime minister's goodwill visit to Israel: A pictorial (Rangoon: Director of Information Government of the Union of Burma, 1955), p. 5.

51 Prime minister's goodwill visit to Israel.

52 Zeev Weil, ME 949, Leo Baeck Institute Archives New York, pp. 7–8.

53 The KMT was, if not the primary danger, at least one of the major threats to the newly independent Burma; according to Mary Callahan, the Tatmadaw generals’ response to this threat was to transform themselves from military leaders into state builders and take power, which they retained for decades. Callahan, Making enemies, pp. 5, 12, 17–18, 173–84.

54 The British divided Burma into the directly governed ‘Burma proper’ (mostly lowlands) and the indirectly administrated (at minimum cost and with little interference) Frontier or Hill Areas (mostly inhabited by ethnic minorities), where the grip of central government was weak; Taylor, The state in Myanmar, pp. 89–99. In Shan State, which was one of these excluded areas, this led to a ‘state of sleepy isolation’ and increased the power of the saophas. Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity (London: Zed, 1999), pp. 41–3.

55 Sai Aung Tun, A history of the Shan State: From its origins to 1962 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm, 2009).

56 Winfield, ‘Buddhism and the state in Burma’, p. 26.

57 ‘The socialist concept of ownership by and for the people seemed the right and only possible answer to Burma's problems.’ Kyaw Thet, ‘Continuity in Burma: The survival of historic forces’, Atlantic Monthly, ‘Burma’, special issue, Feb. 1958.

58 Among them Kodaw Hmaing, Soe, Than Thun, Ba Swe, U Nu, and Chit Hlaing.

59 U Ba Swe, The Burmese revolution (Rangoon: Information Department, Union of Burma, 1952), p. 7.

60 Emanuel Sarkisyanz, The Buddhist background of the Burmese revolution (Dordrecht: Springer, 1965), pp. 171–2.

61 Winston L. King, In hope of Nibbāna: The ethics of Theravada Buddhism (LaSalle, ILL: Open Court, 1964), pp. 231, 243.

62 Matthew J. Walton, ‘Politics in the moral universe: Burmese Buddhist political thought’ (PhD diss., University of Washington, Seattle, 2012), pp. 129–38.

63 Pyidawtha: The new Burma. A report from the Government of the People of the Union of Burma on our long-term programme for economic and social development (Rangoon: Economic and Social Board, Government of the Union of Burma, 1954), pp. 1–2.

64 Zeev Weil, ME 949, Leo Baeck Institute Archives, New York, p. 10.

65 Ibid., p. 13. The decision to choose Namsang must be seen against the background of the Tatmadaw's ‘land reclamation’ policy: the Burmese army wanted to take control of lands that were not generating revenue for the state, or from people considered its opponents, and reallocate them to its own soldiers; labelling the designated lands as ‘waste’ helped to achieve this purpose; for more about this ‘waste land’ policy, see Ferguson, Jane M., ‘The scramble for the Waste Lands: Tracking colonial legacies, counterinsurgency and international investment through the lens of land laws in Burma/Myanmar’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 35, 3 (2014): 299–307CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66 ‘Misrad ha-bitakhon: skira al Burma’ (no pagination), 6 Dec. 1957, 5569/16, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem; ‘4 mumkhim haklaim leBurma’, LeMerhav, 31 Jan. 1957, p. 3.

67 The Namsang resettlement project: A pioneering task of the defence series (Namsang: 2–3 Resettlement Unit, 1961), p. 3.

68 Aung Gyi was one of Ne Win's key ‘lieutenants’; in the 1950s he was the founder of the commercially successful DSI (Defence Service Institute) scheme, and he was also the co-architect of the 1958 coup d’état. He played a key role in the military caretaker government (as its top economist), only to lose his influence after the second coup of 1962 (which he defended as military spokesman); he resigned from the Revolutionary Council in 1963 in protest at the council's leftist policies. Later, in 1988, he became involved in the opposition movement (as the co-founder of the NLD), but lost the power struggle with Aung San Suu Kyi, and thereafter much of his political influence.

69 Tommy Clift was the Anglo-Shan commander-in-chief of the Burma Air Force and later a member of the Revolutionary Council and president of the Ex-Services Personnel Resettlement Board. He left the army after the council's policies shifted to the left, went abroad, and had a hand in U Nu's short-lived attempt to regain power in 1969.

70 James Barrington was an Anglo-Burmese diplomat, deputy foreign minister, and ambassador to the United States and United Nations in the 1950s; he was one of the architects of Burma's non-aligned foreign policy.

71 Abadi, Israel's quest for recognition, p. 122.

72 ‘Settlement of Namsang Area’, by A. Sprinzak (no pagination), 2030/3, Israel State Archives.

73 The political situation in Shan State was very complex in this period, with three overlapping administrations functioning at various points in the 1950s (and not cooperating effectively): the traditional form, under hereditary rulers, or saophas; the civilian Shan State government; and the military administration that came to power in the 1950–54 state of emergency. For more on the complex political situation in Shan State, see: Sai Aung Tun, A history of the Shan State, pp. 327–64. As one anonymous reviewer indicated, the people of Namsang in this period were under the semi-autonomous authority of the saophas of Mong Hsu and Mong Pan.

74 The Burmese press reported in a similar vein: ‘One of the aims of the Resettlement scheme was to improve the social conditions of the Shan cultivators … and to provide examples of successful co-operation between them and the retired Defence Services personnel.’ ‘83 more ex-servicemen resettled at Namsang’, The Nation (Burma), 27 Aug. 1962, p. 1.

75 Burmans (Bamars) are often accused of patronising ethnic minorities and of enjoying a privileged position in Burmese society; in this view Burman-ness is ‘a form of institutionalized dominance similar to Whiteness’. Walton, Matthew J., ‘Wages of Burman-ness: Ethnicity and Burman privilege in contemporary Myanmar’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 43, 1 (2013): 16CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

76 The Burmanisation — later Myanmarification — of Burma's ethnic minorities is a term frequently cited by minority groups (see e.g., Smith, Burma, pp. 34, 205), who claim that Rangoon/Naypyidaw wants to assimilate non-Burman territories and their inhabitants by means including their colonisation by Burmans. The term ‘Burmanisation’ is disputed, however, and the Burmans themselves refute these accusations.

77 The Guardian, a major pro-military Burmese newspaper, emphasised these aspects, see: ‘Land settlement’, The Guardian (Burma), 18 Nov. 1958, p. 4.

78 ‘Minutes of the meeting held at National Defence College on 21 Aug. 1959 at 1400 hours regarding the agricultural development of Namsang Area with Israeli assistance’ (no pagination), 2030/1, Israel State Archives.

79 ‘Settlement of Namsang Area’, by A. Sprinzak (no pagination), 2030/3, Israel State Archives. These recommendations were as follows:

1. It is essential to pass the responsibility for the farm on to the settlers themselves, and as soon as possible; 2. There should be formed Mechanized Operation Units to clear and prepare the land for cultivation and this at a suitable speed; 3. A thorough survey of the area should be carried out by the Land Use Bureau and topographic maps also be prepared; 4. To plan villages in groups of 3–5 with a common centre for them and these according to the ground and types of farming; 5. The villages should be based on the co-operative principles and these should be obligatory; 6. It is necessary to build up a suitable administration with proper sanction and freedom of action either in the centre or in Namsang; 7. It is essential to start building the first village to equip the settlers with everything needed. To pursue the land and give every family its plot. To assist in every way to make this an example village; 8. It is essential to start building the first village to equip the settlers with everything needed. To parcel the land and give every family its plot. To assist in every way to make this an exemplary village; 9. It is important to form a committee which will be empowered to approve the candidates for becoming members in a village; 10. The new village will use the same tools and equipment which are common in the country. Machinery will be coming into use organically with the development of farms future; 11. Special care should be given to the marketing and supply facilities. The promotion of co-operative spirit will depend much on the efficiency of marketing and supplies; 12. To prepare administrative staff to serve in the fields of administration, farm management, marketing and co-operation; 13. To start immediately to build the water supply system according to Mr. Dvir's report. In the first stage lifting water from Namsang stream, and in the second stage to bring the water by gravity from the spring on the road to Loilen; 14. To allot an area of 100–200 acres for continued experiments on various kinds of field crop, testing sowing dates, varieties, fertilizers and systems of cultivation and plant protection measures; 15. This area should become a centre for extension to the whole area including existing local farmers; 16. To take census of local farmers and to decide what amount of land should be alloted them. At the same time to explain to them the purpose of the project and what benefits they could have from it; 17. To build immediately a good school for the settlers children and a health centre; 18. Arrangements should be started for signing contracts with the settlers which all their responsibilities and rights will be set forth; 19. To start building roads from main roads to centres of villages; 20. To plan Namsang village as the centre town for the whole area with an estimated population of 5,000–8,000 inhabitants. To allow areas for industry, commerce, services and residential purposes; 21. The Israeli team proposed will consist of: 1. Head of team, 2. Agricultural adviser, 3–4. Planners (physical and agricultural), 5. Agricultural – Machinery engineer. In later stages of the development some more experts may be required.

80 For more on the kibbutz movement, see, for example: Ran Abramitzky, The mystery of the kibbutz: Egalitarian principles in a capitalist world (Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton, 2018).

81 Leopold Laufer, Israel and the developing countries: New approaches to cooperation (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1967); Shimeon Amir, Israel's development cooperation with Africa, Asia and Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1974). For a more critical approach see e.g., Mooreville, Anat, ‘Eyeing Africa: The politics of Israeli ocular expertise and international aid’, Jewish Social Studies, 21, 3 (2016): 31–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 ‘Minutes from the meeting held at National Defence College on 2nd Nov. 1959 at 1400 hours regarding the agricultural development of Namsang Area with Israeli assistance and also regarding training of Burmese Services Resettlement in Israel’ (no pagination), 2030/1, Israel State Archives.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 ‘Frontier admin. agreements to be signed between Union & State govts.’, The Guardian (Burma), 17 Dec. 1959, p. 1.

87 The administrative division of Burma was based on the 1947 Constitution (itself modelled on largely verbal agreements between ethnic minority leaders and the father of Burmese independence, Aung San, reached at the Second Panglong (Pinlon) Conference in 1947). The Constitution was a misleading document. On the one hand, it appeared to be federal in nature (without using the word), with its division of the country between ‘Burma proper’ and the ethnic regions; of the latter, Shan State had the most far-ranging powers, up to and including the right of secession. On the other, the Constitution laid the foundations for a centralised system of power in which the ethnic states had few legislative powers and little control over taxation or their own finances; thus the relationship between Shan State and Burma proper was similar to that of Scotland and England prior to 1999. See: The Constitution of the Union of Burma, 24 Sept. 1947, Articles 154–65, 201–6, Burma Library.org; Taylor, The state in Myanmar, p. 229.

88 ‘Second resettlement study group to Israel’ (no pagination), 28 Mar. 1960, 2030/1, Israel State Archives.

89 The gender aspect of the study groups was highlighted by the Burmese press: ‘Too often in our planning we tend to ignore the feminine angle or element but this time we hope that our women will like the Israeli idea and come back to fashion their own regarding the army settlements already in progress and those that are projected.’ ‘Land settlement’, The Guardian (Burma), 18 Nov. 1958, p. 4.

90 ‘“Derekh Burma” be-Ayelet ha-Shachar’, LeMerhav, 13 Feb. 1959, p. 7; ‘Klitat anshei Burma leshana’, Yoman Ayelet ha-Shachar 463, 19 Dec. 1958, p. 4.

91 ‘Klitat anshei Burma leshana’, Yoman Ayelet Ha-Shachar 463, 19 Dec. 1958, p. 4.

92 ‘Derekh ha-Burmanim ba-kibbutz’, Davar, 20 Feb. 1959, p. 19.

93 Ibid.

94 Interview with Shalom Israeli, Ayelet ha-Shachar, 4 Feb. 2019.

95 Ibid.

96 ‘Derekh ha-Burmanim ba-kibbutz’, Davar, 20 Feb. 1959, p. 20.

97 Interview with Shalom Israeli, Ayelet ha-Shachar, 4 Feb. 2019.

98 ‘Derekh ha-Burmanim ba-kibbutz’, Davar, 20 Feb. 1959, p. 20.

99 Interview with Shalom Israeli, Ayelet ha-Shachar, 4 Feb. 2019.

100 ‘Shaliahenu kotvim’, Yoman Ayelet ha-Shachar 505, 3 Mar. 1961, p. 12.

101 ‘Im tsat kvutsat ha-Burmaim’, Yoman Ayelet Ha-Shachar 483, 19 Feb. 1960, p. 3.

102 As Ward Keeler describes, ‘Hierarchical considerations inform all social interaction among Burmans’ (p. 4) and ‘hierarchical understandings pervade all social relations’ (p. 26) in Myanmar. Yet, he cautioned that hierarchy ‘should be understood as a system of exchanges’ (p. 10), within which people play constantly on the constraints and opportunities that any given situation presents them with, and ‘act with varying, but in the same cases considerable, degrees of autonomy’ (p. 26). W. Keeler, The traffic in hierarchy: Masculinity and its other in Buddhist Burma (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2017), pp. 2–26.

103 Maung Maung Gyi, The Burmese political values: The socio-political roots of authoritarianism (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 157–64.

104 ‘2nd resettlement study group to Israel’ (no pagination), 2030/1, Israel State Archives.

105 ‘Final report: Resettlement at Namsang’, p. 4, 1912/15, Israel State Archives.

106 ‘A short introduction into Namsang resettlement project’ (no pagination), 2030/5, Israel State Archives.

107 Ibid.

108 ‘Minutes of the meeting held at National Defence College on 25th Feb. 1960 at 1400 hours regarding the agricultural development of Namsang Area with Israeli assistance’ (no pagination), 2030/1, Israel State Archives.

109 The traditional paradigm in Burmese political thought (‘the argument of order’), derived from a fatalistic view of human nature as fundamentally flawed (any freedom given to people ends in chaos, anarchy, and moral trespass), and sees strong political authority as necessary for control and to enforce law, order, discipline, and consequently unity. Walton, ‘Politics in the moral universe’, pp. 18, 67, 81, 83, 107.

110 Yoman Ayelet ha-Shachar 500, 21 Sept. 1960, p. 22.

111 ‘Report to the Directorate of Resettlement Ministry of Defence on the work in Namsang resettlement project (Mar. 1960 – Feb. 1961)’ (no pagination), 2030/2, Israel State Archives.

112 The Namsang resettlement project (no pagination).

113 Anat Helman, Becoming Israeli: National ideals and everyday life in the 1950s (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2014).

114 Taylor, The state in Myanmar, p. 55.

115 Michael Aung-Thwin, ‘Hierarchy and order in pre-colonial Burma’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15, 2 (1984): 226–31.

116 Ibid.; Gustaaf Houtman, Mental culture in Burmese crisis politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (Tokyo: Tokyo University for Foreign Studies, 1999), p. 62.

117 Maung Maung, ‘Pyidawtha comes to Burma’, Far Eastern Survey 22, 9 (1953): 119.

118 Hugh Tinker, ‘Nu, the serene statesman’, Pacific Affairs 30, 2 (1957): 129.

119 U Thant, ‘Building a nation: Goals for the future’, in Burma, special issue, Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1958.

120 Hmawbi farm produced fowl and eggs on a commercial basis, while the Myitkyina settlement was designed to specialise in land clearance and cultivation: ‘Land settlement’, The Guardian (Burma), 18 Nov. 1958, p. 4. After initial enthusiasm, both projects failed to produce tangible results.

121 Maung Maung Gyi, Burmese political values, pp. 170–71.

122 Ben Gurion, during his talks with U Nu in 1961, mentioned that a ‘strong pioneering spirit’ was the key to turning inhospitable areas into acceptable living environments. This might have been understood as indirect criticism of the Burmese attitude: ‘Minutes of the official talks between the Hon'ble U Nu Prime Minister of the Union of Burma, and His Excellency Mr. David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, held at the official residence of the Prime Minister, 6 Dec. 1961’ (p. 20), accession no. 527, Box 55, 1961, MFA 15/3 (21), National Archive in Yangon. Ben-Gurion was even more frank during his public speeches: ‘if socialism is to work, the people must be taught to believe in the dignity of labour. Their standard of living must be raised in accordance with socialist principles. If a socialist party succeeds in doing these, it will enjoy the confidence of the people and will forever remain strong.’ According to Ben Gurion, the key to success is ‘to teach the people to believe in the dignity of labour. They must be made to love to work’. ‘Premier Ben-Gurion meets Burmese socialists. Tells them how to make socialism work and win the people's confidence’, The Nation (Burma), 7 Dec. 1961, p. 1.

123 For example, General Clift, the president of the resettlement board, encouraged the soldiers in the following manner: he ‘concluded by urging’ the ex-soldiers ‘not to cease to be patriotic because they [had] left the Defence Forces but to show the same enthusiasm for service to their country’. ‘83 more ex-servicemen resettled at Namsang’, The Nation (Burma), 27 Aug. 1962, p. 1.

124 Ibid.

125 ‘Notes of Agreement on Burmese/Israeli cooperation on Namsang project’ (no pagination), 2030/6, Israel State Archives.

126 Proposal for the establishment of the agricultural multi-purpose centre at Namsang (Shan States – Burma) (Rangoon: Government of Burma, 1962).

127 Emphasis ours. ‘Letter from Fritz (Peretz) Levinger to the Directorate of Resettlement’ (no pagination), Ministry of Defence, Namsang, 17 Dec. 1962, 2030/5, Israel State Archives. As Namsang was chosen as the site of the resettlement scheme for various policy reasons and not because it had the best farming conditions, agriculture there was more challenging and required a longer time to achieve a good income. Even in 1962 only 5 of the over 20 villages planned had been established, and the target number had been reduced to no more than 9. Only in that year did the team establish the best crops to plant in the area. The Israelis also claimed that the settlers’ income was too low, and also that not all of the people who were trained in Israel actually went to Namsang on their return; some were retained in administrative positions. See: ‘Final Report: Resettlement at Namsang’, 1962, 1912/15, Israel State Archives.

128 ‘17 member plan to study agriculture in Japan’, The Guardian (Burma), 16 Mar. 1963, pp. 1–2.

129 Michael W. Charney, A history of modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 120–25.

130 Abadi, Israel's quest for recognition, p. 126. Ne Win ‘said that he had decided to pursue his style of socialism and no longer wanted to cooperate with any country in the world. Moreover, he argued that he had been betrayed by the Israelis who, in his view, came to Burma for the sole purpose of profitmaking. He even went to the extent of accusing the Israelis of espionage’; ‘Correspondence of Lewin to Shimoni’, 15 Dec. 1963, Israel State Archives, 3392/36, quoted in ibid.

131 However, as Moshe Yegar recalled afterwards, ‘both embassies were kept open and continued to function under a low profile’. Joe Freeman, ‘In Israel's earliest days, the place its leaders felt compelled to visit was Burma’, Tablet, 29 May 2014, https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/174234/israel-and-burma (last accessed 7 Apr. 2019).

132 Thant Myint-U, The river of lost footsteps: A personal history of Burma (New York: Farrer, Straus & Giroux, 2006), p. 292.

133 For more information on the failure of highly modern development projects in a broader context, see: James Scott, Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

134 Maung Maung Gyi, Burmese political values, pp. 157–9.

135 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, Behind the Teak Curtain: Authoritarianism, agricultural policies and political legitimacy in rural Burma/Myanmar (London: Kegan Paul, 2004), pp. 60–65.

136 Thant Myint-U, The making of modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 75.

137 Taylor, The state in Myanmar, p. 256.

138 David Steinberg, A socialist country in Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), p. 67.

139 ‘A short introduction into Namsang Resettlement Project’ (no pagination), 2030/5, Israel State Archives.

140 Spiro, Buddhism and society, p. 183.

141 Winfield, ‘Buddhism and the state’, p. 191.