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³ Rabushka, Alvin and Shepsle, Kenneth, Politics in Plural Societies:A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), 67Google Scholar.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Horowitz (fn. 1), 234–35,259.

⁶ Ibid., 346.

⁷ Rothschild (fn. 1), 168.

⁸ Laitin (fn. 1), 248–50.

⁹ Bates, Robert, “Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa,” in Rothchild, Donald and Olorunsola, Victor, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 152Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Hardin, Russell, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 49–50Google Scholar.

¹¹ For example, see Bates (fn. 9), 153.

¹² Hardin (fn. 10), 76–77, 179; Hechter, Michael, “Dynamics of Secession,” Acta Sociologica 35 (1992), 275CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 280.

¹³ Hardin (fn. 10), 70.

¹⁴ Hechter (fn. 12), 276.

¹⁵ Ibid., 275.

¹⁶ See Kuper, Leo, “Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems,” in Kuper, Leo and Smith, M. G., eds., Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969)Google Scholar; and Smith, M. G., The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Geertz, Clifford, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” in Geertz, , The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973)Google Scholar. My understanding of cultural pluralism is shaped in large part by its presentation in Rabushka and Shepsle (fn. 3) and in Brass, Paul, Ethnicity and Nationalism (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage, 1991)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Huntington (fn. 2).

¹⁹ The strength of cultural identity may be expressed as a combination of several factors, including knowledge and use of the native language, religious belief, and adherence to national traditions and customs.

²⁰ Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication, 2d ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

²¹ For a discussion of this argument in the context of the effect of electoral systems on party systems regardless of preexisting social cleavages, see Cox, Gary W., Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² Martin, Terry D., “An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923–1938” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996)Google Scholar.

²³ Similar factors may have been at work in Yugoslavia during the 1980s. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

²⁴ This was based on the strongly primordialist view of ethnicity prevalent in Soviet social science.

²⁵ This finding does not hold true for majority ethnic groups, since the well-educated elites that belong to such groups are more likely to focus on national politics and the history of the entire state, rather than on the specific history of their ethnic group.

²⁶ The survey interviewed one thousand randomly selected respondents in each region, covering both urban and rural areas. Principal investigators included Timothy Colton of Harvard University, Jerry Hough of Duke University, Susan Lehmann of Columbia University, and Mikhail Guboglo of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

²⁷ For the sake of brevity, this survey is hereafter referred to as the Laitin/Hough survey. For more information on the survey and its results, see Laitin (fn. 1).

²⁸ These include intellectuals, students, migrants from rural areas, industrial workers, agricultural workers, and Muslims. I also include variables that measure the respondent's education level, religiosity, and age. For an explanation of how these variables were created, see Gorenburg, Dmitry, “Nationalism for the Masses: Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1999)Google Scholar, methodological appendix.

²⁹ Factor analysis was used to confirm that these indexes are in fact measuring a single underlying tendency. One factor was detected for the indexes of native-language education and the language-knowledge index. For the language-use index, in addition to the dominant factor that describes language knowledge, two additional factors were detected. These factors grouped the partners in the communication according to their status relative to the respondent. The second factor included elder relatives, while the third factor included conversations with nonrelatives. The factor loadings and other technical information, as well as the exact wording of the questions used to construct these indexes, may be found in the methodological appendix in Gorenburg (fn. 28).

³⁰ Other important factors that contribute to language use and fluency include the age of the respondent and growing up in a rural area. Education level and being a student are correlated negatively with these variables.

³¹ Iskhakov, Damir, “Neformalnye obedineniia v sovremennom Tatarskom obshchestve,” in Iskhakov, D. and Musina, R., eds., Sovremennye Natsionalnye Protsessy v Respublike Tatarstan (Kazan, 1992), 1:7–9Google Scholar.

³² Gibadullin, R. M., Tatarskoe Naselenie Naberezhnykh Chelnov v Tsifrakh Etnosotsiologii (Naberezhnye Chelny, 1993)Google Scholar.

³³ Iskhakov (fn. 31), 7–9.

³⁴ On the lack of support for Tatar nationalism among the rural administration, see Elise Giuliano, “Maintaining Russian Integrity: Nationalism and Social Transformation in Tatarstan” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D. C., 1997).

³⁵ Iskhakov (fn. 31), 7.

³⁶ Interview with Damir Iskhakov, November 1995. The relationship between the Tatarstan government and the nationalist movement is described in detail in Gorenburg (fn. 28).

³⁷ Gorenburg, Dmitry, “Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in Russia's Ethnic Republics,” Europe Asia Studies 53 (January 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.