1. Tien, Hung-mao, “Taiwan in transition: prospects for sociopolitical change”, The China Quarterly, No. 64 (12 1975), pp. 615–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Among western secondary sources for more recent overviews of Taiwan's domestic politics seeTien, Hung-mao, “Uncertain future: politics in Taiwan”, in Oxnam, Robert B. and Bush, Richard C. (eds.), China Briefing, 1980 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 87–97Google Scholar; and Winckler, Edwin A. “After the Chiangs: the coming political succession on Taiwan”, in Bush, Richard C. (ed.), China Briefing, 1982 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 103–122Google Scholar; The annual reviews I in the January issue of Asian Survey (most recently by Gerald McBeath, J. Bruce Jacobs, I John F. Copper and Parris Chang) are always useful. Coverage in the Far Eastern Economic Review is incisive; selections in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service are judicious. For Taiwan media sources see the excellent research note byJacobs, J. Bruce, “Taiwan's press: political communications link and research resource”, CQ, No. 68 (12 1976), pp. 778–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Among establishment publications the weekly Times Magazine (Shibao zazhi) is helpful; the most informative newspapers politically are the United Daily News, the China Times and the Independent Evening Post. Among the many recent political magazines, the various monthlies published by the moderate Taiwanese Opposition leader Kang Ninghsiang (Eighties, Asian and Current), and the weekly Progress published by the radical.; mainlander Opposition intellectual Lin Cheng-chieh are among the most intelligent. This article is based on periodic scanning of these media sources, periodic interviewing trips through Taiwan, and periodic analysis of election returns.

2. On the distinctive dynamics of authoritarian regimes see particularlyLinz, Juan J., “Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes”, in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W. (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Volume 3: Macropolitical Theory (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 175–411Google Scholar; and Perlmutter, Amos, Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis (New Haven: Yale, 1981)Google Scholar; On Taiwan as an authoritarian regime seeTai, Hung-chao, “The Kuomintang and modernization in Taiwan”, in Huntington, Samuel P. and Moore, Clement (eds.), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Societies: The Dynamics of Established One Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 406–36Google Scholar; and Winckler, Edwin A., “Roles linking state and society”, in Ahern, Emily Martin and Gates, Hill (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 50–86Google Scholar; The distinction between “hard” and “soft” authoritarian regimes made in this article largely follows that between “organicist-statist” and “pseudo-democratic” authoritarian regimes made byLinz, Juan in “Non-competitive elections in Europe”, in Hermet, Guy et al. (eds.), Elections Without Choice (New York: Wiley/Halstead, 1978), pp. 36–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar; As regards the role of the Nationalist Party it resembles the distinction between single-party situations and hegemonic party systems made bySartori, Giovanni in his Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976)Google Scholar; There is some generalizing literature on the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, for exampleRustow, Dankwart A., “Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (04 1970) pp. 337–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; However, there is little theorizing about the transition from “hard” to “soft” authoritarianism. Perhaps the most useful analogy to Taiwan is that of Spain inLinz, Juan H., “Spain and Portugal: critical choices”, in Landes, David S. (ed.), Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1977), pp. 237–96Google Scholar; Important attempts to grapple with the process of change of regime includeAlmond, Gabriel et al. (eds.), Crisis, Choice and Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973)Google Scholar; and Juan H. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibrium. Of course a transition from hard to soft authoritarianism may impede a transition to democracy rather than facilitate it.

3. Huntingdon, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)Google Scholar;

4. This is the expectation implied by the literature on the socio-economic prerequisites to democracy, of which the representative collection isCnudde, Charles F. and Neubauer, Deane E. (eds.), Empiricial Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham, 1969)Google Scholar;

5. Linz in Handbook and O'Donnel, Guillermo A., Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973)Google Scholar;

6. Schmitter, Philippe C., “Liberation by golpe: retrospective thoughts on the demise of authoritarian rule in Portugal”, in Bienen, Henry and Morell, David (eds.), Political Participation Under Military regimes (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976), pp. 86–114Google Scholar; and O'Donnel, Guillermo, “Tension in the bureaucratic state and the question of democracy”, in Collier, David (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 285–318Google Scholar;

7. These external-internal relationships are implicit in some of the literature on Taiwan but are explored explicitly by Richard Barrett, Bruce Cumings, Thomas Gold, Susan Greenhalgh, James Kurth, Denis Simon and myself in a forthcoming volume, Edwin A. Winckler and Susan M. Greenhalgh (eds.), Authoritarianism and Dependency in East Asia: Comparing Taiwan. On external economic dependency seeSpector, Michael and Tanzer, Andrew in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 12 1983, pp. 65–72Google Scholar;

8. See Susan Greenhalgh in this issue; Jacobs, J. Bruce, “A preliminary model of particularistic ties in Chinese political alliances”, CQ, No. 78 (06 1979), pp. 237–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and, more generally, the literature reflected inSchmidt, Steffen W. et al. (eds.), Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar;

9. A clear summary of Taiwan's constitutional structure, plus the text of the ROC constitution and amendments, is available in any edition of the annual China Yearbook (Taipei: China Publishing Company).

10. The discussion of sectors in this article is adapted and updated from Winckler in Briefing.

11. The presidential succession and government restaffing is well reported byJacobs, J. Bruce in “Taiwan 1978: economic successes, international uncertainties”, Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 1 (01 1979), pp. 21–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar;

12. On this period see particularly Chang, Parris, “Taiwan in 1982: diplomatic setback abroad and demand for reforms at home”, Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 1 (01 1983), pp. 38–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Parris Chang, “Taiwan in 1983: setting the stage for power transition”, ibid. pp. 122–26.

13. An exception, calling for a Taiwanese vice-president, was The Democrat translated in FBIS015 (23 January 1984), V6. On the choice of Lee seeBennet, Dirk in Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 03 1984, pp. 10–11Google Scholar; On Sun's illness seeTanzer, Andrew in Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 03 1984, pp. 16–17Google Scholar;

14. The secretary-general of the cabinet seems less important, evidently principally an aide to the premier. On President Chiang's key aides see the Times Magazine, 3–19 July 1983.

15. For the previous Central Standing Committee see Winckler in Briefing; on the new one see FBIS034 (17 February 1984), VI and FBIS036 (22 February 1984), VI–V2.

16. Interviews, Taiwan, various trips. I am extremely grateful to those who have discussed the tensions and co-ordination within these sectors with me, but they had perhaps best remain unnamed. The distinction between an “enlightened” and a “conservative” faction within the KMT is however standard, though nebulous.

17. Ibid.

18. The heads of both the external and internal security systems (Soong and Wang) have publicly affirmed their subordination to civilian authority. However, some interlocutors note that the security agencies are under such tight control that anyone contemplating a political move would not dare show his hand.

19. The most recent annual military meeting was noted in FBIS 019,27 January 1984, V2.

20. On Chao's, efforts see the Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, 6 02 1984Google Scholar;

21. Interviews. Interlocutors report Sun to be cautious but open-minded.

22. The best overview of political participation in developing countries remainsHuntington, Samuel P. and Nelson, Joan, No Easy Choice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar;

23. The relevant analytical rubric here is corporatism, particularly as formulated bySchmitter, Phillippe C. in, among other places, Corporate! Interest Representation and Public Policy-making in Portugal (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978)Google Scholar; emphasizing the pre-emptive and exclusionary function of such managed political incorporation. For an intelligent exchange on the applicability of corporatist models to the Nationalist regime in the Republican period seeGeisert, Bradley K., Eastman, Lloyd E. and Fewsmith, Joseph in Chinese Republican Studies Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 2 (02 1982CrossRefGoogle Scholar) and its successorRepublican China, Vol. 9, No. 2 (02 1984)Google Scholar; The thing about the current Nationalist regime on Taiwan is that it spends at least as much energy solving problems as excluding demands. Thus for example it denies that there is any conflict of class interest between capital and labour on Taiwan, but is attempting to manoeuvre a labour pension insurance bill through the National Assembly past capitalist resistance. See the Times Magazine, 26 June – 2 July 1983, p. 8.

24. For vivid accounts of such informal access seeGallin, Bernard and Gallin, Rita S., “Sociopolitical power and sworn brother groups in Chinese society: Taiwanese case”, in Fogelson, Raymond D. and Adams, Richard N. (eds.), The Anthropology of Power (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 89–97Google Scholar; andJacobs, J. Bruce, Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting (Canberra, Australia: Contemporary China Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1980)Google Scholar;

25. A vivid account of the awkwardness of these dilemmas in earlier periods isPlummer, Mark A., “Chiang Kai-shek and the National Assembly”, in Grow, Sidney D. (ed.), Studies on Asia, 1967 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 119–38Google Scholar;

26. Interviews, Taipei, various trips.

27. On the contraction phase see Kaplan, John, The Court Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants (Berkeley: Institute of Asian Studies, University of California, 1981)Google Scholar.

28. On the 1980 elections see Copper, John F., “Taiwan's recent elections: progress toward a democratic system”, Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 5 (10 1981), pp. 1029–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; On the livelier National Legislature see the Times Magazine, 7–13 August 1983), pp. 19–21.

29. On National Assembly proposals see ibid. pp. 17–18.

30. On support committees see the chronology in Forward Looking, 16 December 1984, pp. 57–61 (successor to Progress). On the December 1983 elections seeTanzer, Andrew in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 11 1983, pp. 27–28 and 15 December 1983, pp. 15–17Google Scholar;

31. For President Chiang's Constitution Day speech see FBIS240, 27 December 1983, V4–V. For criticism of this stand-patism see The Politician translated in FBIS036, 22 February 1984, V6–V7. The change in the rules for election to the Control Yuan provoked an Opposition filibuster and eventual boycott in the National Legislature: the Times Magazine, 3–9 July 1983, pp. 10–13. On the issue of legislative immunity see FBIS063, 30 March 1984, V1–V3. On Fei Hsi-p'ing's initiative to form a para-party see FBIS013, 19 January 1984, V4 and for its rejection by Lin Yang-kang see FBIS015, 23 January 1984, VI. On the continuing suppression of magazines see FBIS019, 27 January 1984, V4.

32. These points are the first five of the 10 adopted by the Opposition central support committee on 23 October 1983. The Central Election Commission's prevarications occurred during the campaign in late November.

33. Linz in Elections.

34. McGeevan, Patrick, “The Japanese electoral system”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4 (autumn 1964), pp. 418–29Google Scholar; and Curtis, Gerald, Election Campaigning, Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971)Google Scholar;

35. These observations are based on intensive analysis of community-level (xiang/zhen/qu) returns from the 1977, 1980, 1981 and 1983 elections. By “locality” here I mean a candidate's home community plus adjacent communities traditionally considered one political unit.

36. The “radicals” with whom I discussed this hoped for the entire 30% Non-KMT vote plus an additional 10% they believed to be latent Opposition support. The “moderates” recognized that 10% of the 30% would go to Independent candidates, leaving 20% for the Opposition, roughly the true figure.

37. The professor even came in first and the athlete last. The KMT applied the same strategy in Kaohsiung municipality with equally impressive results. Interviews in Taipei and Kaohsiung, January 1984.

38. Fox Butterfield, , “Taiwan: a new sense of confidence”, New York Times Magazine, 6 05 1984, from p. 106 (quote at p. 116)Google Scholar;