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Non-Invasive Testing, Non-Invasive Counseling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Rachel Rebouché
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Extract

A regulatory moment for prenatal health care is here. An increasing amount of legislative attention has concentrated on the decisions pregnant women make after prenatal testing. The impetus for this legislation is a new non-invasive prenatal genetic test (NIPT). From the beginning of pregnancy, cell-free fetal DNA travels across the placental lining into the mother’s bloodstream, increasing in quantity as the pregnancy progresses. Laboratories can now analyze that DNA for chromosomal abnormalities and for fetal sex at 10 weeks of gestation. NIPT, which relies on a sample of the pregnant woman’s blood, is painless, occurs early in pregnancy, and is available for clinical and commercial use. In 2013, major health insurance plans began to cover NIPT for certain populations of women, such as women over 35 years old. And private companies have started marketing prenatal testing kits directly to consumers, who return a blood sample from the prospective mother to a company laboratory.

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Symposium
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Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , Summer 2015 , pp. 228 - 240
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Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2015

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