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Henry Allison on Kant’s First Analogy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 August 2021

Gregg Osborne
Gregg Osborne*
Affiliation:
Washington and Jefferson College
*
Email: gosborne@washjeff.edu
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Abstract

Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s First Analogy is among the most intriguing in the literature. Its virtues are considerable, but no previous discussion has done full justice to them. Nor has any previous discussion systematically explored the most important challenges to which it seems subject. This paper does both. Early sections provide a more thorough exegesis than is otherwise available and provide stronger textual backing than does Allison himself. Later sections turn to problems, most of which have not been raised by others. These problems, while serious, do not necessarily rule out the interpretation of Allison.

Keywords

objective changesubjective changesubstratumalterationrelatively persistentabsolutely persistentsubstanceAndrew Ward

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Type
Article
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 5 - 22
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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