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Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Stephanie C. Hofmann
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence. E-mail: sch35@cornell.edu

Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union's (EU) European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) both occupy the policy space of crisis management. This overlap has two effects. First, overlap has generated “chessboard politics” shaping member state strategies. Second, institutional overlap has generated a number of feedback effects. The prior existence of NATO shaped the conceptualization and organization of ESDP at its creation, and the existence of two alternative security institutions continues to influence the ways that the institutions evolve—how each institution defines security interests and how member states adjust the mandate of each institution to address changes in the security environment. Because both institutions are intergovernmentally organized and consensus-based, the actions and decisions of both institutions reflect the agreements of members. Chessboard politics and feedback effects are consequently interrelated—states strategize to affect outcomes in one venue or another, and decisions in one institution can affect decisions and behaviors in the other institution.

Information

Type
Symposium
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2009

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