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Arbitration and Mediation: an Economic Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Paola Manzini  and
Marco Mariotti
Paola Manzini
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, U.K. (tel: 020-78825083; fax: 020-89833580; e-mail: p.manzini@qmul.ac.uk, ) and IZA (Institute for Labour Economics), Bonn. Manzini gratefully acknowledges financial support from ESRC grant R000223438.
Marco Mariotti
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, U.K. (tel: 01784-443145; fax: 01784-439534; e-mail: marco.mariotti@rhul.ac.uk, ).
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Abstract

This paper deals with the effects that intermediation has on strategic behaviour in negotiations. To this end, we use the tools of game theory to analyse how different institutional settings can provide specific strategic incentives and thereby condition the outcome of negotiations. We concentrate on some very recent contributions, which have addressed gaps in this literature and stress the economic intuition behind some predicted behaviours.

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Type
Articles
Information
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , September 2002 , pp. 629 - 648
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2002

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