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22 - Low Levels of Wisdom

Foolishness

from Part VI - Wisdom and Other Psychological Constructs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 March 2019

By
Balazs Aczel
Edited by
Robert J. Sternberg  and
Judith Glück
Robert J. Sternberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Judith Glück
Affiliation:
Universität Klagenfurt, Austria
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Summary

Why do we sometimes act foolishly? An intuitive answer to this question could be that people who act foolishly are not smart. However, as this chapter illustrates, intelligence, rationality, and wisdom are not interchangeable concepts. Foolishness can be approached from two distinct directions: An action can be regarded as foolish either if it deviates from normative models, such as logic or probability principles, or, plainly, if it seems foolish in people’s eyes. Following a thorough discussion of these approaches, we conclude that the eradication of humanity’s self-destruction requires finding methods for educating wisdom as well as a more comprehensive exploration of the origins of foolishness in our own lives.
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Wisdom , pp. 483 - 499
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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