There are three broad types of hedonism in the philosophical literature. Psychological hedonism is a thesis about human motivation. It claims that humans are exclusively driven by the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain (usually, their own). This is an empirical thesis: a claim about how humans are. The other two types of hedonism are normative: they are concerned with what is good or valuable. Axiological hedonism is a thesis about the nature of the good in general. It claims that pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good (i.e. good for its own sake, rather than as a means to other goods). As one of its most famous defenders, Jeremy Bentham, wrote in 1789: “Now, pleasure is in itself a good: nay, even setting aside immunity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil; and, indeed, without exception, the only evil.” Prudential hedonism, by contrast, is a thesis about the nature of individual welfare. It claims that well-being consists in the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. The best life for an individual, as far as her own self-interest is concerned, is the one that has the greatest balance of pleasure over pain. It is possible to be a prudential hedonist without being an axiological hedonist, since one might claim that, while welfare is constituted by pleasure, things other than welfare – say, freedom, beauty or friendship – are intrinsically good.