The problem of adaptation in war represents one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined problems that military institutions confront. As Michael Howard has suggested, military organizations inevitably get the next war wrong, mostly for reasons that lie beyond their control. Consequently, one of the foremost attributes of military effectiveness must lie in the ability of armies, navies, or air forces to recognize and adapt to the actual conditions of combat, as well as to the new tactical, operational, and strategic, not to mention political, challenges that war inevitably throws up. This observation has proven increasingly true throughout the course of the twentieth century, in small wars as well as major conflicts, and there is every reason to believe it will continue to be true in the twenty-first century.

This work begins by examining what it and its case studies mean by adaptation. In Clausewitzian terms, war is a contest, a complex, interactive duel between two opponents. It is a phenomenon of indeterminate length, which presents the opportunity for the contestants to adapt to their enemy's strategy, operations, and tactical approach. But because it is interactive, both sides have the potential to adapt to the conflict at every level, from the tactical to the strategic. Thus, the problems posed by the battle space do not remain constant; in fact, more often than not, they change with startling rapidity. Moreover, war in the past two centuries has seen an increasing pace of adaptation, as military organizations confront not only the problems posed by their adaptive opponent but also the reality that technology is changing and advancing.