Over the course of the past century and a half, adaptation in one form or another has been a characteristic of successful military institutions and human societies under the pressures of war. Yet, before the onslaught of technological change that began in the early nineteenth century, military adaptation proceeded at what appears a snail's pace to the modern observer. It was not until the Industrial Revolution that adaptation became a crucial factor in the effectiveness of military institutions in the conduct of war. But military innovation and adaptation have always conferred advantages on military organizations, even before the Industrial Revolution.

Nevertheless, the Industrial Revolution stepped up the pace of change, and over the course of the past 150 years, that pace has steadily accelerated. In the modern period, when machines and technology have become crucial enablers for those who do the fighting, the concepts and innovations of peacetime invariably get much of the next war wrong. Two factors are significant here: first, how well one estimates the impact of new technologies on the battlefield, and second, how well one closes the gap between the initial estimates and assumptions and what turns out to be reality. The first factor has proven particularly difficult in the twentieth century, because multiple technologies and tactical conceptions have come into play simultaneously, while multiple actors are adapting at the same time. Military organizations have had to estimate not only the impact of technology but also the synergy of multiple technologies as well as how their opponents will utilize them.