Part I introduced an account of epistemic normativity and defended it by arguing against some alternatives. Parts II and III continue to defend the account, now by showing how it allows progress on a variety of problems in epistemology. Part II considers “problems for everyone” – perennial problems that any theory of knowledge must say something about. Part III turns to “problems for reliabilism” in particular.

Two perennial problems in epistemology concern the nature and value of knowledge. We want to know both what knowledge is and why knowledge is valuable. As Jonathan Kvanvig has recently argued, the two questions are not independent: a good account of what knowledge is ought also to explain why knowledge is valuable. The present chapter focuses on the nature question. The next chapter turns to the value question.

KNOWLEDGE AS ACHIEVEMENT

I have been arguing that knowledge is a kind of success from ability, intending this as a thesis about the nature of epistemic normativity. I now want to suggest that this same idea gives us a framework for understanding what knowledge is. In short,

The term “because” is here intended to mark a causal explanation. The idea is that, in cases of knowledge, the fact that S has a true belief is explained by the fact that S believes from ability.