Key text

Donald Davidson, ‘Truth and Meaning’, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 17–36.

Introduction

The meaning of sentences depends upon the meaning of their parts. This basic truth about language must be at the heart of any philosophy of language. In the analytic tradition, it guides the project of semantics, which attempts to provide a systematic theoretical explanation of precisely how the meaning of sentences depends on the meaning of their parts. We've seen this issue shaping all of our discussions so far. What does a definite description contribute to sentences of which it can form part? Is it an object referred to, together with the way in which it is given (as Frege thought), or does it, in context, assert the unique existence of something which satisfies some condition (as Russell proposed)? A parallel question arises for proper names: do they work in sentences in the way that definite descriptions do (whatever that is), or do they do something quite different? Again, should we give a descriptive account of what natural-kind terms contribute to the meaning of sentences involving them, or should they be regarded as directly referential? And the whole discussion of propositional-attitude constructions, from Frege himself onwards, is shaped by the difficulty of explaining what the words in the ‘that’-clauses of such constructions are contributing to the sentences which report propositional attitudes, given that they seem to be subject to peculiarly strict restrictions on substitution.

Key text

Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).

Introduction

We've seen the difficulty of explaining what it is for linguistic expressions to have meaning. But what if it could be shown that there's no fact of that matter at all about what our words mean? This dramatic sceptical claim was presented by Saul Kripke, in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. This work had an immediate effect, in two ways. First, it presented a striking challenge to everyone who believed that words really mean something, and provoked a minor industry of work designed to avoid the scepticism which it proposed. And, secondly, because Kripke claimed to derive his sceptical arguments from some sections of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, it led to a renewed interest in Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

In fact, it's probably better not to stress the links with Wittgenstein too heavily. Kripke himself is quite modest about the status of his work as an interpretation of Wittgenstein: he claims to be doing no more than present ‘that set of problems and arguments which I personally have gotten out of reading Wittgenstein’. And it's now quite widely agreed that, in certain crucial respects at least, Kripke misrepresents Wittgenstein. Nor is the scepticism presented here one which Kripke himself endorses: what we have is, in Kripke's words, just ‘Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him’.