Introduction

Raymond Boudon (1934–2013) developed a theory of values and normative beliefs that makes his sociological work a substantial contribution to debates—both theoretical and applied—on axiology. Raymond Boudon's Le Juste et le vrai and closely related writings, under focus here, have offered a comprehensive theory in the field. The author's axiology is rooted in the Weberian legacy of a general contrast between value-based rationality and goal-oriented rationality. The way in which this legacy has borne fruit in Boudon's work reflects a wide-ranging investigation of the scope and limits of so-called instrumental rationality and consequence-based explanation, as well as in-depth reflections about ethical inquiry as an object for social sciences. In contrast with the methodological choices in important sectors of individualistic social science (including the vast majority of contributions to so-called orthodox economics), rationality and morality appear to be closely associated in Boudon's thought and a basic reason for this is their affinity with the structure of deliberation and action.

As a result, it seems appropriate to handle Boudon's axiology and his views about human action together. Rationality and morality, in Boudon's approach, are connected with each other for reasons which are directly relevant to the scientific, explanatory approach to individual and social behavior. This thematic, which has gradually come to the forefront in Boudon's writings, has allowed him to articulate science and values in a very interesting way, which offers resources for ongoing debates about value-neutrality, the value of science, and the importance of human values in human endeavors (including social science and philosophy).

The theory of action and the theory of values actually come into contact with each other in the Boudonian corpus, and the resulting theoretical richness calls for methodological attention. To be sure, the way this conjunction proves fruitful in Boudon's research exhibits a degree of complexity. In particular, how do the reasons for action testify to our commitment to values and how do they relate, consequently, to the explanation of value-based action? The sociologist's appeal to substantial moral values is ubiquitous, especially in the systematic theory which is put forward in Boudon's great book, Le Juste et le vrai, and this suggests a solidarity of reasoning, commitment, and explanation.