This chapter begins by summarising our three moral philosophies.

Consequentialism is concerned primarily with acts and judges them according to their effects in promoting some ‘pre-moral’ property such as happiness or preferences. We do not necessarily have to assess each and every individual action, since we can formulate and apply rules likely to produce beneficial results, but acts are the ultimate reference point for consequentialism. And although we should not treat consequentialists as synonymous with utilitarians – the latter recommend the maximisation of utility whereas the former may be less strident about the meaning of utility and whether its maximisation must always outweigh other considerations – there are obvious synergies between the two.

The attractiveness of consequentialism lies in its intuitive appeal: how natural it is to examine and assess acts in terms of their demonstrated outcomes or to weigh possible courses of action according to their anticipated effects. Furthermore, in proposing that it may sometimes be better to perform acts that are beneficial over time, even if they seem objectionable in the short term, consequentialists may demonstrate a better grasp than others of the messiness, ambivalence and practicalities thrown up by moral dilemmas.

That said, there are important objections (notwithstanding that consequentialists have counter-arguments to them, as seen in Chapter Two):

• • Consequentialism eliminates good intentions from ethical questions. Kant adds the complaint that consequentialism is too capricious for, as circumstances change, acts that create benefits on Monday may not do so on Tuesday; for Kant, this is no basis for a moral system.

• • Consequentialism disrespects the specificities of individuals, perhaps by ignoring the ‘separateness of persons’ (allowing human integrity to be subsumed within a crude calculus of aggregates) or by requiring us to be selfless saints who must always weigh every consequence and act accordingly.

• • How can consequences really be measured? The simpler the property to be promoted, the more it crowds out other aspects of human wellbeing. If our aim is to increase pleasure, what about those activities that are meaningful but not necessarily pleasurable? But if we expand our conception of wellbeing, for example, to encompass freedom and voice, as Sen advocates, we are left with the difficulty of knowing when and how these can be evaluated and enhanced.

When consequentialists have made specific interventions into the field of applied ethics, it has been to challenge the acts/omissions and intending/foreseeing distinctions.