The way of address has led to a λόγος capable of going down to the things themselves and articulating them according to the way they show themselves. This way to the things themselves is itself rooted already in a kind of perceptive response that grows out of the most rudimentary encounters between living things and the things with which they live. Such encounters involve a logic of cooperation between the powers of the soul and the nature of things. Things express themselves according to a λόγος capable of awakening those natural capacities of living beings by which they first become alive to things. The site of this awakening activity Aristotle calls τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, perceiving. If we attend carefully to what this middle-voiced infinitive says, it will not be possible to think the activity of perceiving in purely passive terms as the mere reception of sensations. Rather, as Heidegger puts it, “With αἴσθησις [Aristotle] thinks the ‘apprehending’ [Vernehmen] of beings in the natural way, a hearing that is outstanding in that the senses involved thereby are those with which it mediates access.” Apprehending in this natural sense involves a kind of cooperative mediation between the perceiving and perceived.