We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
This chapter examines what truth conditions for predicative assertions Aristotle is committed to.
Section 1 addresses a preliminary issue: Aristotle's conception of universals. Universals are neither concepts nor linguistic expressions: rather, universals are objects whose nature is neither mental nor linguistic. A universal is an object which is predicated of many things, an individual is an object which is not predicated of many things.
Sections 2–4 concentrate on the truth conditions for singular and quantified predicative assertions (evidence is mainly provided by passages from de Interpretatione). Section 2 addresses the discussion of truth and falsehood in de Interpretatione 1, where Aristotle alludes to the theory of Metaphysics Ε 4: in an affirmative (negative) predicative belief one object is joined with (separated from) one object. The bulk of section 2 is taken up by a discussion of two objections that could be raised against connecting de Interpretatione 1 with Metaphysics Ε 4. Section 3 addresses Aristotle's theory of assertions. Not every sentence is true or false (prayers are neither), and every sentence that is true or false is an assertion (the converse fails). Every affirmative predicative assertion asserts something ‘about’ something, every negative predicative assertion asserts something ‘away from’ something. The operation of asserting-about (asserting-away-from) performed by an affirmative (negative) predicative assertion is the linguistic counterpart of the operation of joining (separating) performed in an affirmative (negative) predicative belief. In both cases the operations are performed on objects (not on linguistic expressions or on thoughts).
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.
