Book contents
- As War Ends
- As War Ends
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Complexity of the Organizational Design for Implementation of a Peace Accord
- 2 Violence, Grassroots Pressure, and Civil War Peace Processes
- 3 Land, Violence, and the Colombian Peace Process
- 4 Determinants of State Strength and Capacity
- 5 The Threat of Organized Crime in Post-Conflict Colombia
- 6 Violence after Peace
- 7 Two Emblematic Peacebuilding Initiatives in Antioquia
- 8 From Counterinsurgency to Peacebuilding
- 9 Transitional Justice in the Colombian Final Accord
- 10 The Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition
- 11 Una Tierra Inexplorada
- 12 Leading the Public to Peace
- 13 Securing the Peace and Promoting Human Rights in Post-Accord Colombia
- 14 Achieving an Unpopular Balance
- 15 Countering Violent Extremism through Narrative Intervention
- 16 Geographies of Truth in the Colombian Transitional Justice Process
- 17 Conclusion
- Index
- References
8 - From Counterinsurgency to Peacebuilding
Addressing Barriers to Lasting Peace in Colombia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2019
Book contents
- As War Ends
- As War Ends
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Complexity of the Organizational Design for Implementation of a Peace Accord
- 2 Violence, Grassroots Pressure, and Civil War Peace Processes
- 3 Land, Violence, and the Colombian Peace Process
- 4 Determinants of State Strength and Capacity
- 5 The Threat of Organized Crime in Post-Conflict Colombia
- 6 Violence after Peace
- 7 Two Emblematic Peacebuilding Initiatives in Antioquia
- 8 From Counterinsurgency to Peacebuilding
- 9 Transitional Justice in the Colombian Final Accord
- 10 The Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition
- 11 Una Tierra Inexplorada
- 12 Leading the Public to Peace
- 13 Securing the Peace and Promoting Human Rights in Post-Accord Colombia
- 14 Achieving an Unpopular Balance
- 15 Countering Violent Extremism through Narrative Intervention
- 16 Geographies of Truth in the Colombian Transitional Justice Process
- 17 Conclusion
- Index
- References
Summary
The conclusion of the peace agreement in Colombia with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in 2016, the country’s largest rebel group, provides a new opportunity for lasting peace. Yet as we know from previous long-running civil conflicts, new armed actors mobilize and security concerns are likely to persist even after major actors put down their weapons. In this chapter, we critically examine the counterinsurgency campaign that was a factor in bringing about the opportunity for a negotiated peace. We also examine the ongoing barriers to peace and security, including corruption, victimization, and armed actor territorial control. We then describe and contrast the distinct approaches of two different subnational USAID peacebuilding programs designed to support the government’s plan for peace.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- As War EndsWhat Colombia Can Tell Us About the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional Justice, pp. 186 - 206Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
References
Albertus, Michael, and Kaplan, Oliver. (2013). “Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy: Evidence from Colombia.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57 (2), 198–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barnett, Michael, and Zürcher, Christoph. (2009). “The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Intervention Reinforces Weak Statehood,” in Paris, Roland, and Sisk, Timothy D. (eds.) 23–52. The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Post-War Peace Operations. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Bennett, D. Scott. (2008). “Governments, Civilians, and the Evolution of Insurgency: Modeling the Early Dynamics of Insurgencies.” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 11 (4), 7.Google Scholar
Berman, Eli, Shapiro, Jacob, and Felter, Joseph. (2011). “Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq.” Journal of Political Economy 119, 766–819.Google Scholar
Bohannan, Charles T. R. (1960). “Report of the Colombian Survey Team, 1959–60.” Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 11, File#Part-I, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.Google Scholar
Böhnke, Jan Rasmus and Zürcher, Christoph. (2013). “Aid, Minds and Hearts: The Impact of Aid in Conflict Zones.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 30 (5), 411–432.Google Scholar
Crost, Benjamin, Felter, Joseph, and Johnston, Patrick. (2014). “Aid under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict.” The American Economic Review 104 (6), 1833–1856.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Delgado, Jorge E. (2015). “Counterinsurgency and the Limits of State-Building: An Analysis of Colombia’s Policy of Territorial Consolidation, 2006–2012.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26 (3), 408–428.Google Scholar
El Tiempo. (2013). “Colombia, condenada por la operación Génesis.” December 27, 2013. www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13320695.Google Scholar
Findley, Michael G., and Young, Joseph K. (2007). “Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize an Insurgency.” Civil Wars 9 (4), 378–401.Google Scholar
Findley, Michael, Kaplan, Oliver, Ponce de Leon, Alejandro, and Young, Joseph. (2016). “USAID Regional Governance Activity (RGA) in Colombia, 2015–2019: Baseline Report.” July 25, 2016.Google Scholar
Fox, Jonathan A. (2015). “Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say? Author Links Open Overlay Panel.” World Development 72(August), 346–361.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Galula, David. (1965). Counter-Insurgency Warfare Theory and Practice. Second Printing edition. Westport, CT: Praeger.Google Scholar
Hendrix, Cullen S. (2010). “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (3), 273–285.Google Scholar
Holmes, Jennifer S., Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Curtin, Kevin M. (2010). Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia. Austin, TX; Chesham: University of Texas Press.Google Scholar
Human Rights Watch. (2015). “Colombia: Top Brass Linked to Extrajudicial Executions.” June 24, 2015.Google Scholar
Isacson, Adam. (2009). “Lessons from America’s Other Counterinsurgency.” Foreign Policy, December 16, 2009.Google Scholar
Isaacson, Adam. (2012). “Consolidating ‘Consolidation’?” Washington Office on Latin America, December 2012.Google Scholar
Kaplan, Oliver. (2017a). “Explaining State Territorial Consolidation in Post-Conflict: The Macarena Region of Colombia.” SSRN Working Paper.Google Scholar
Kaplan, Oliver. (2017b) Resisting War: How Communities Protect Themselves. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Laurienti, Jerry M. (2007). The U.S. Military and Human Rights Promotion: Lessons from Latin America. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.Google Scholar
Leal Buitrago, Francisco. (2006). “La Política de Seguridad Democrática 2002–2005.” Análisis Político 19 (57), 3–30.Google Scholar
López Hernández, Claudia, (ed.) (2010). Y refundaron la patria? De como mafiosos y politicos reconfiguraron el Estado colombiano. Bogota: Random House Mondadori S. A. Barcelona, Espana, Debate.Google Scholar
Marks, Thomas A. (2007). “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006) vs FARC.” Military Review (87) 2, 56–96.Google Scholar
Mercado, David Alejandro. (2017). “La otra cara de la comuna 13 tras 15 años de la operación Orión.” El Tiempo, October 17, 2017.Google Scholar
Mejía, Daniel, Uribe, María José, and Ibáñez, Ana María. (2011). “An Evaluation of the Macarena Integral Consolidation Program (PCIM).” Department of Economics, Universidad de los Andes, Documentos Cede working paper 2011–13, March 2011.Google Scholar
National Security Archive. (2005). “Paramilitaries as Proxies: Declassified Evidence on the Colombian Army’s Anti-Guerrilla ‘Allies.’” Electronic Briefing Book No. 166, October 16, 2005.Google Scholar
Neuman, William. (2015). “Push for Colombians to Stop Farming Coca Falls Short.” The New York Times, June 2, 2015.Google Scholar
Olken, Benjamin A. (2009). “Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality.” Journal of Public Economics 93 (7), 950–964.Google Scholar
Oportunidad Estratégica. (2008). “Lineamientos Básicos para el Plan Integral de Consolidación en la Región de la Macarena,” Second draft of Initial Report, January 2008.Google Scholar
Padgett, Tim. (2008). “Colombia’s Stunning Hostage Rescue.” Time, July 2, 2008. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1819862,00.html.Google Scholar
Palacios, Marco. (2006). Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875–2002. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books.Google Scholar
Pareja, M., and Johana, Deicy. (2017). “Operación Orión: 15 años de impunidad.” El Tiempo, October 17, 2017. www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/operacion-orion-15-anos-de-impunidad-141518.Google Scholar
Semana. (2010). “Así fue la operación ‘Sodoma’ que dio muerte a ‘Jojoy’.” September 23, 2010. www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/asi-operacion-sodoma-dio-muerte-jojoy/122357-3.Google Scholar
Sewall, Sarah et al. (2007). The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Spencer, David, (ed.) (2011). Colombia’s Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982–2010. Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University.Google Scholar
Steele, Abbey, and Shapiro, Jacob N. (2017). “Subcontracting State-Building.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 28 (4–5), 887–905.Google Scholar
Trinquier, Roger. (1964). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Translated from the French by Daniel Lee). London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press.Google Scholar
USAID. (2009). “Principles of Consolidation of State Presence Working Paper,” (PCIM Lessons Learned) May 29, 2009.Google Scholar
USAID. (2011). “USAID/OTI’s Initial Governance Response Program in Colombia: A Final Evaluation,” April 2011.Google Scholar
“USAID Colombia Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014–2018: A Path to Peace” June 13, 2014. Accessible here: www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1862/USAID%20Colombia%20CDCS.pdf.Google Scholar
VerdadAbierta.com. (2013). “Estado no protegió a comunidades durante Operación Génesis.” December 28, 2013. www.verdadabierta.com/politica-ilegal/el-estado-y-los-paras/5078-estado-no-protegio-a-comunidades-durante-operacion-genesis.Google Scholar
Wilson, Scott. (2002). “New Security Ends Solitude in Colombia’s Small Towns.” The Washington Post, August 25, 2002.Google Scholar
WOLA, Minga, Indepaz, Center for International Policy. (2012). “Waiting for Consolidation: Monitoring Colombia’s U.S.-aided counterinsurgency and development program,” February 2012.Google Scholar
Wood, Reed M., and Sullivan, Christopher. (2015). “Doing Harm by Doing Good? The Negative Externalities of Humanitarian Aid Provision during Civil Conflict.” The Journal of Politics 77 (3), 736–748.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, Joseph K. (2013). “Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War.” Political Research Quarterly 66 (3), 516–532.Google Scholar
Zürcher, Christoph. (2012). “Conflict, State Fragility and Aid Effectiveness: Insights from Afghanistan.” Conflict, Security & Development 12 (5), 461–480.Google Scholar
- 1
- Cited by