The Middle East area of operations

Following the events in New York, Washington DC and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, Australia readily agreed to support the US-led efforts to oust Al Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan. Prime Minister Howard committed Australian forces, from all three services, to operations in the Middle East that ended up being for a longer period than either world war of the twentieth century. But this time they did so while avoiding the politically contentious issues of conscription and heavy casualties by making niche and calibrated force contributions and by utilising only a professional, all-volunteer force.

Operations in the Middle East provided continuities and discontinuities with what was envisaged for the defence of Australia. The rubric that had been central to Australia’s defence strategy since the withdrawal from Vietnam essentially was superseded by one that synthesised ‘forward defence’ and ‘defence of Australia’. That synthesis reflected the changes driven by the events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath. For instance, through the establishment of bare bases across the north of Australia, Fleet Base West in Western Australia and the increased Army presence in the north, the objectives of the 1987 White Paper were accomplished. This left scope for a reconciliation with the contrasting priorities of ‘defence of Australia’ and ‘forward defence’. Arguably, the East Timor experience both reinforced the utility of the defence of Australia model (with northern bases and infrastructure critical for the lodgement in East Timor) and stressed the need for a strategic repositioning, with more of a ‘forward defence’ mindset. The facilities established at Darwin were instrumental in the success of the INTERFET operation, yet the limited ability to project and sustain a force away from Australian shores (or from the sea, around the coast of Australia itself) exposed a significant capability shortfall that would be addressed in the years that followed.