8 - Commitment Tactics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2009
Summary
Introduction
In many bargaining situations the players often take actions prior to and/or during the negotiation process that partially commit them to some strategically chosen bargaining positions. Such commitments are partial in that they are revocable, but revoking a partial commitment can be costly. The following two extracts from Schelling (1960) illustrate this ‘commitment’ tactic.
it has not been uncommon for union officials to stir up excitement and determination on the part of the membership during or prior to a wage negotiation. If the union is going to insist on $2 and expects the management to counter with $1.60, an effort is made to persuade the membership not only that the management could pay $2 but even perhaps that the negotiators themselves are incompetent if they fail to obtain close to $2. The purpose … is to make clear to the management that the negotiators could not accept less than $2 even if they wished to because they no longer control the members or because they would lose their own positions if they tried. In other words, the negotiators reduce the scope of their own authority and confront the management with the threat of a strike that the union itself cannot avert, even though it was the union's own action that eliminated its power to prevent strike.
Schelling (1960, p. 27)When national representatives go to international negotiations knowing that there is a wide range of potential agreement within which the outcome will depend on bargaining, they seem often to create a bargaining position by public statements, statements calculated to arouse a public opinion that permits no concessions to be made.
Schelling (1960, p. 28)- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Bargaining Theory with Applications , pp. 211 - 250Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1999