Three Ways of Conceiving of Beliefs

Having sketched a theory of the nature of belief in the broadest outline, let us begin detailed investigation by asking under what general category belief falls. I think that there exist in our philosophical tradition three different answers to this question, not always explicitly spelled out. First, there is the view that beliefs are conscious occurrences in the believer's mind. Second, that beliefs are dispositions of the believer. Third, that beliefs are states of the believer's mind. In this section these three views are set out.

Beliefs as Conscious Occurrences. The classical instance of such a theory is Hume's account of belief (Treatise, Book I, Part III, Section 7) as a vivid or lively idea associated with a present impression. The ‘association with a present impression’ will only fit those inductively acquired beliefs concerning particular matters of fact which Hume is especially interested in at that point of the argument of the Treatise. Hence we may take his view of belief in general to be that A's believing that p is equivalent to A's having present to consciousness a vivid or lively idea of p.

Such a view, it is notorious, fails to do justice to the way we talk and think about belief. For it is perfectly intelligible to attribute a belief to somebody although there is no relevant vivid idea in his consciousness. We can, for instance, intelligibly attribute a current belief that the earth is round to a man who is sleeping dreamlessly or is unconscious.