Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2019
Not long after the Cold War, Aaron Friedberg, a prominent American representative of the realist outlook on international security, argued that a “new multipolar sub-system” was beginning to emerge in East Asia after the Cold War, making that region “ripe for rivalry”. Among other impediments to regional stability, he argued that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was no more than a “loose collection of the region's less powerful states” with no real legacy of cultural identity or institutional collaboration. Friedberg concluded that, unlike in Europe, the type of institutionalism ASEAN designed to mitigate Asian tensions comprised “a very thin gruel indeed”. This relatively dour outlook was contested at the time, not only within ASEAN but also by those who credited that organization as representing a more promising trend in Asian stability and order-building.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) convened its inaugural meeting in July 1994 as an extension of the ten ASEAN members’ annual dialogue with ten external powers, including those pan-regional “great powers” nominally recognized as shaping Asia's balance of power: the United States (U.S.), the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and India.
ASEAN's initiation of the ARF constituted an effort to diversify rather than completely negate the U.S. postwar bilateral alliance network. The latter had long dominated Asia-Pacific security politics but Washington was gradually realizing the value of supporting new multilateral security initiatives as an effective supplement to its bilateral alliances. The ARF embodied, soon after it was created, an effort to impose a distinct ‘Asia-Pacific Way’ as the preferred avenue for pursuing overall regional-order building, as Amitav Acharya noted. He further observed that Southeast Asia's cultivation of pan-Asian regionalist discourses in the 1950s — with their emphasis on sovereign inviolability and their rejection of formal NATO-like regional collective defence arrangements — was a uniquely Southeast Asian sub-regional pathway for shaping Asian security politics. Northeast Asia — constrained by great power geopolitics — could not replicate this approach. Over time, and for their own diverse reasons, the region's great powers gradually came to accept the principle of “ASEAN centrality” for underpinning Southeast Asian security.
More than twenty years after the ARF's founding, the ASEAN centrality approach as the best means for pursuing regional order-building is being seriously questioned. Realist critics have reiterated Friedberg's original assertion that growing strategic competition emanating from an increasingly multipolar Asia-Pacific security environment and especially
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