Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Map 1 The United Nations Partition Plan, November 1947
- Map 2 Arab settlements abandoned in 1948–9
- Map 3 Jewish settlements established in 1948–9
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction to the revised edition
- 1 Background: a brief history
- 2 The idea of ‘transfer’ in Zionist thinking before 1948
- 3 The first wave: the Arab exodus, December 1947 – March 1948
- 4 The second wave: the mass exodus, April–June 1948
- 5 Deciding against a return of the refugees, April–December 1948
- 6 Blocking a return
- 7 The third wave: the Ten Days (9–18 July) and the second truce (18 July–15 October)
- 8 The fourth wave: the battles and exodus of October–November 1948
- 9 Clearing the borders: expulsions and population transfers, November 1948–1950
- 10 Solving the refugee problem, December 1948 – September 1949
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1
- Appendix 2
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
2 - The idea of ‘transfer’ in Zionist thinking before 1948
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Map 1 The United Nations Partition Plan, November 1947
- Map 2 Arab settlements abandoned in 1948–9
- Map 3 Jewish settlements established in 1948–9
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction to the revised edition
- 1 Background: a brief history
- 2 The idea of ‘transfer’ in Zionist thinking before 1948
- 3 The first wave: the Arab exodus, December 1947 – March 1948
- 4 The second wave: the mass exodus, April–June 1948
- 5 Deciding against a return of the refugees, April–December 1948
- 6 Blocking a return
- 7 The third wave: the Ten Days (9–18 July) and the second truce (18 July–15 October)
- 8 The fourth wave: the battles and exodus of October–November 1948
- 9 Clearing the borders: expulsions and population transfers, November 1948–1950
- 10 Solving the refugee problem, December 1948 – September 1949
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1
- Appendix 2
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
In July 1948, about midway in the first Arab–Israeli war, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernst Bevin, wrote that ‘on a long term view … there may be something to be said for an exchange of populations between the areas assigned to the Arabs and the Jews respectively.’ A few days later, he expatiated:
It might be argued that the flight of large numbers of Arabs from the territory under Jewish administration had simplified the task of arriving at a stable settlement in Palestine since some transfers of population seems [sic] to be an essential condition for such a settlement.
But he then went on to argue that as there were only a handful of Jews living in the territory earmarked for Arab sovereignty in Palestine, there was no ‘basis for an equitable exchange of population’ and therefore Britain should pursue with the United Nations Mediator the possibility of a return of the displaced Palestinian Arabs to their homes. By this time, 400,000–500,000 Arabs (and less than five thousand Jews) had been displaced in the fighting.
But the logic propelling Bevin's thinking, before he pulled on the reins, was highly persuasive: The transfer of the large Arab minority out of the areas of the Jewish state (as of the minuscule Jewish minority out of the Arab-designated areas) would solve an otherwise basic, insurmountable minority problem that had the potential to subvert any peace settlement.
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- Information
- The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited , pp. 39 - 64Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003