Professional social science has traditionally played the part of a protagonist in the expansion of American national government. Academics have been advocates of national administrative development in theory, and they have attached themselves to institution builders in practice. During the past decade, however, self-confident advocacy gave way to uncertainty and despair. The 1970s brought a set of governing problems that challenged the foundations of our politics and our institutional arrangements. As new directions in public policy appeared imperative, we were compelled to ask whether the government could be turned around or whether it had grown beyond control.

The answers offered little room for optimism. We were told that the burden on the modern presidency had become more than the office could bear, that the opportunities for effective leadership were few and fleeting. We were told that the resilience of Congress meant the eclipse of central direction and coordination in the affairs of state. We were told that the courts had lost all sense of their proper role, that our parties were impotent as instruments of government, that a headless bureaucracy had taken center stage in governmental operations, leaving constitutional authorities to jockey around it for positions of advantage.

As the structure of the modern American state clouded the future, it suggested new questions to ask about the past. Were there any parallels in American history to this situation? Had an established structure of political and institutional power ever before appeared so out of step with governing demands? Had the state itself ever before come under such severe attack as the greatest obstacle to effective government? If so, what happened then? How did it happen?