In this chapter I provide a constructive account of F.A. Hayek's views on justice. Hayek does not have a thoroughly developed and persuasive theory of justice. (Who does?) Nevertheless, I hope to show that Hayek has interesting and illuminating things to say about justice - especially about the justification of the rules of just conduct - and that his views about justice play a more central role in his evolved teaching than has generally been recognized. The rules of just conduct are essentially the fundamental norms compliance with which generates peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial coordination in large-scale pluralistic societies in which (almost) every individual comes into contact with and interacts with many individuals who are unlike himself in circumstances, knowledge, skills, preferences, and personal codes of value. Although the particular articulation of these norms will vary with time and place, they are essentially general prohibitions against trespass on persons and their liberty and property and against violations of persons' contractual rights. I shall maintain that Hayek rejects anything that can appropriately be called a utilitarian vindication of these norms and proposes an alternative teleological (but non-utilitarian) justification for rules of just conduct. I do not claim that everything that Hayek says about justice and the rules of just conduct fits into the specific account that I shall offer.
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