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28 results in The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science

Page 1 of 2

  • 5 - Action

  • from Part II - Aspects of cognition
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter surveys some recent philosophical and empirical work on the nature and structure of action, on conscious agency, and on our knowledge of actions. By reuniting the causal approach with the rational approach, the causalists opened the way for a naturalistic stance in action theory and thus for an integration of philosophical and scientific enquiries. Many philosophers introduce a conception of intentions as distinctive, sui generis, mental states. Intentions are responsible for triggering or initiating the intended action (initiating function) and for guiding its course until completion. Dual-intention theories provide a partial answer to the problem of causal deviance. The chapter concentrates on the functional architecture of motor cognition, introducing some of the theoretical concepts, models, and hypotheses that play a central role in current thinking in the motor domain and are of particular relevance for philosophical theorizing on action.

  • 11 - Consciousness

  • from Part II - Aspects of cognition
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    William James famously held that we consciously experience all and only those stimuli that we attend to. A theoretical and only mildly philosophical question is that of state/event consciousness. Higher-order theorists (HOT) resist the perceptual model, and maintain that merely having a thought about the first-order state will suffice for consciousness, provided that the thought arose from the state itself without benefit of (person-level) inference. This chapter discusses some philosophical issues. Sensory qualities ("qualia" in the strict sense) are the first-order qualitative features of which we are aware in sensory experience: colors, pitches, smells, textures. The second problem is the intrinsic perspectivalness, point-of-view-iness, and/or first-personishness of experience, as discussed by K. Gunderson, T. Nagel, and others. The third problem is the existence of funny facts and/or special phenomenal knowledge. The last problem is the explanatory gap called to our attention by J. Levine.

  • 9 - Language

  • from Part II - Aspects of cognition
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    The phrase "the Representational Theory of Mind" (RTM) is used in two different but related ways. To understand the difference, one must distinguish two levels at which human beings can be described. The first is personal and belongs to common sense or folk psychology. The second level, in contrast, is subpersonal and scientific. Cognitive scientists and philosophers of cognitive science have offered various characterizations. This chapter begins with the author's own view, based on C.S. Peirce's general theory of representation, and then uses that as a basis of comparison to other views. Cognitive scientists, who conceptualize the mind/brain as, or as substantially like, a computer, take the representation-bearers of mental representations to be computational structures or states. Peirce hypothesized two broad kinds of ground for representation: similarity and causation. Mental representations play multiple roles in cognitive science explanations, which themselves come in many kinds.

  • 1 - History and core themes

  • from Part I - Foundations
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter provides empirical and theoretical understanding of cognition. Today localizationism dominates neuroscience, ranging from single cell recording to functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI), while anti-localizationism has a new home in dynamical systems modeling. Cognitive science encompasses both. It is sometimes said that the cognitive revolution stemmed from seizing on a new technology, the digital computer, as a metaphor for the mind. Artificial neural network represents a counterpoint to discrete computation. Symbolic architectures share a commitment to representations whose elements are symbols and operations on those representations that typically involve moving, copying, deleting, comparing, or replacing symbols. The chapter highlights just two trends: the expansion of inquiry down into the brain (cognitive neuroscience) and out into the body and world (embedded and extended cognition). The expansion outward has been more diverse, but the transitional figure clearly is James J. Gibson.

  • 13 - Evolutionary psychology

  • from Part III - Research programs
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter provides a brief introduction to the modern science of memory and presents some significant issues in the field. The contributions of Hermann Ebbinghaus, Frederick Bartlett, and Brenda Milner reveals important insights into how memory works, and the chapter draws upon each approach in characterizing the functional organization of human memory. One of the most significant questions in memory research has been whether there is a fundamental difference between the retention of information across short delays versus long delays. Working memory (WM) model proposes a separation between short-term storage (or maintenance) and the manipulation of information in the service of task goals. Successful memory performance depends not only on how information is encoded, but also on interactions between encoding and retrieval processes. Forgetting can occur even for information that was adequately processed at encoding. Consolidation theory and interference theory are the most popular accounts of forgetting.

  • 2 - The representational theory of mind

  • from Part I - Foundations
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    The phrase "the Representational Theory of Mind" (RTM) is used in two different but related ways. To understand the difference, one must distinguish two levels at which human beings can be described. The first is personal and belongs to common sense or folk psychology. The second level, in contrast, is subpersonal and scientific. Cognitive scientists and philosophers of cognitive science have offered various characterizations. This chapter begins with the author's own view, based on C.S. Peirce's general theory of representation, and then uses that as a basis of comparison to other views. Cognitive scientists, who conceptualize the mind/brain as, or as substantially like, a computer, take the representation-bearers of mental representations to be computational structures or states. Peirce hypothesized two broad kinds of ground for representation: similarity and causation. Mental representations play multiple roles in cognitive science explanations, which themselves come in many kinds.

  • 12 - Cognitive neuroscience

  • from Part III - Research programs
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter surveys some recent philosophical and empirical work on the nature and structure of action, on conscious agency, and on our knowledge of actions. By reuniting the causal approach with the rational approach, the causalists opened the way for a naturalistic stance in action theory and thus for an integration of philosophical and scientific enquiries. Many philosophers introduce a conception of intentions as distinctive, sui generis, mental states. Intentions are responsible for triggering or initiating the intended action (initiating function) and for guiding its course until completion. Dual-intention theories provide a partial answer to the problem of causal deviance. The chapter concentrates on the functional architecture of motor cognition, introducing some of the theoretical concepts, models, and hypotheses that play a central role in current thinking in the motor domain and are of particular relevance for philosophical theorizing on action.

  • 3 - Cognitive architectures

  • from Part I - Foundations
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter reviews the two main current approaches to cognitive architecture: rule-based systems and connectionism. Both kinds of architecture assume the central hypothesis of cognitive science that thinking consists of the application of computational procedures to mental representations, but they propose very different kinds of representations and procedures. Both rule-based and connectionist architectures have had many successes in explaining important psychological phenomena concerning problem solving, learning, language use, and other kinds of thinking. Given their large and only partially overlapping range of explanatory applications, it seems unlikely that either of the two approaches to cognitive architecture will come to dominate cognitive science. The chapter suggests a reconciliation of the two approaches by means of theoretical neuroscience. Unified understanding of how the brain can perform both serial problem solving using rules and parallel constraint satisfaction using distributed representations will be a major triumph of cognitive science.

  • 6 - Human learning and memory

  • from Part II - Aspects of cognition
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter provides a brief introduction to the modern science of memory and presents some significant issues in the field. The contributions of Hermann Ebbinghaus, Frederick Bartlett, and Brenda Milner reveals important insights into how memory works, and the chapter draws upon each approach in characterizing the functional organization of human memory. One of the most significant questions in memory research has been whether there is a fundamental difference between the retention of information across short delays versus long delays. Working memory (WM) model proposes a separation between short-term storage (or maintenance) and the manipulation of information in the service of task goals. Successful memory performance depends not only on how information is encoded, but also on interactions between encoding and retrieval processes. Forgetting can occur even for information that was adequately processed at encoding. Consolidation theory and interference theory are the most popular accounts of forgetting.

Page 1 of 2