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28 results in The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science

Page 2 of 2

  • 7 - Reasoning and decision making

  • from Part II - Aspects of cognition
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter introduces some recent developments in the areas of human reasoning and decision making. Regarding decision making, the chapter focuses on decision-under-risk, using problems which are explicitly described in linguistic or symbolic terms. Human common-sense reasoning is far more sophisticated than any current artificial intelligence models can capture; yet people's performance on, for example, simple conditional inference, while perhaps explicable in probabilistic terms, is by no means effortless and noise-free. It may be that human reasoning and decision making function best in the context of highly adapted cognitive processes such as basic learning, deploying world knowledge, or perceptuomotor control. Indeed, what is striking about human cognition is the ability to handle, even to a limited extent, reasoning and decision making in novel, hypothetical, verbally stated scenarios, for which our past experience and evolutionary history may have provided us with only minimal preparation.

  • 15 - Animal cognition

  • from Part III - Research programs
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter reviews basic findings of the psychology of concepts that are the basis for two very different strands of research that investigate concepts, one focusing on formal aspects of categories and studying artificial category learning, the other focusing on the content of concepts and how learning and judgment interact with prior knowledge. Then it discusses formal models of category learning, including D.L. Medin and M.M. Schaffer's context model (CM). The formal models of category learning are turning to mixtures of different processes, with the hope that they can predict when one form of learning (rule testing, prototype extraction, exemplar learning) is preferred. Transitioning toward the second strand, the chapter discusses how higher-level knowledge influences the category learning task, suggesting that a broader approach may be required. Finally, the chapter moves completely to the second strand and reviews work on conceptual development, essentialism, and knowledge effects.

  • 4 - Perception

  • from Part II - Aspects of cognition
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    Perception drives discussion in philosophy and the cognitive sciences because it forms our most intimate sort of acquaintance with the world. This chapter introduces the traditional philosophical problem of perception concerning whether our naive sense of perceptual awareness survives arguments from illusion and hallucination. It discusses empirically motivated theoretical issues about perception. The mainstream of cognitive science understands perception as an information-processing problem. J.J. Gibson suggests that unconscious inferences are unnecessary for vision since information concerning features that matter to the creature is present in the pattern of light that reaches the eye, or the ambient optical array. D. Marr's innovation is the framework he proposes for understanding perception in computational terms. The chapter recognizes movement-involving or motor-based constraints in the solution of the information-processing problem. It explains the proper role of phenomenology, and the limits of appeals to phenomenology in theorizing about perception.

  • 14 - Embodied, embedded, and extended cognition

  • from Part III - Research programs
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter introduces some recent developments in the areas of human reasoning and decision making. Regarding decision making, the chapter focuses on decision-under-risk, using problems which are explicitly described in linguistic or symbolic terms. Human common-sense reasoning is far more sophisticated than any current artificial intelligence models can capture; yet people's performance on, for example, simple conditional inference, while perhaps explicable in probabilistic terms, is by no means effortless and noise-free. It may be that human reasoning and decision making function best in the context of highly adapted cognitive processes such as basic learning, deploying world knowledge, or perceptuomotor control. Indeed, what is striking about human cognition is the ability to handle, even to a limited extent, reasoning and decision making in novel, hypothetical, verbally stated scenarios, for which our past experience and evolutionary history may have provided us with only minimal preparation.

  • Glossary

  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter integrates linguistic theory with more general concerns of cognitive science. In the context of cognitive science, language is best thought of as a cognitive system within an individual's brain that relates certain aspects of thought to acoustic signals. In order to appreciate the sophistication of the child's achievement in acquiring language, it is useful to examine all the structure associated with a very simple fragment of English such as the phrase "those purple cows". A major line of approach to linguistic combinatoriality, embracing a wide range of theories, is specifically built around the combinatorial properties of linguistic structure. The regular rules of grammar, like words, idioms, and meaningful constructions, are pieces of structure stored in long-term memory. A debate of over twenty years' standing concerns the distinction between regular and irregular morphological forms in language. Most experimental work on sentence processing concerns speech perception.

  • 8 - Concepts

  • from Part II - Aspects of cognition
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter provides empirical and theoretical understanding of cognition. Today localizationism dominates neuroscience, ranging from single cell recording to functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI), while anti-localizationism has a new home in dynamical systems modeling. Cognitive science encompasses both. It is sometimes said that the cognitive revolution stemmed from seizing on a new technology, the digital computer, as a metaphor for the mind. Artificial neural network represents a counterpoint to discrete computation. Symbolic architectures share a commitment to representations whose elements are symbols and operations on those representations that typically involve moving, copying, deleting, comparing, or replacing symbols. The chapter highlights just two trends: the expansion of inquiry down into the brain (cognitive neuroscience) and out into the body and world (embedded and extended cognition). The expansion outward has been more diverse, but the transitional figure clearly is James J. Gibson.

  • 10 - Emotion

  • from Part II - Aspects of cognition
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
    Published online:
    05 August 2012
    Print publication:
    19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter reviews the two main current approaches to cognitive architecture: rule-based systems and connectionism. Both kinds of architecture assume the central hypothesis of cognitive science that thinking consists of the application of computational procedures to mental representations, but they propose very different kinds of representations and procedures. Both rule-based and connectionist architectures have had many successes in explaining important psychological phenomena concerning problem solving, learning, language use, and other kinds of thinking. Given their large and only partially overlapping range of explanatory applications, it seems unlikely that either of the two approaches to cognitive architecture will come to dominate cognitive science. The chapter suggests a reconciliation of the two approaches by means of theoretical neuroscience. Unified understanding of how the brain can perform both serial problem solving using rules and parallel constraint satisfaction using distributed representations will be a major triumph of cognitive science.

Page 2 of 2