Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-5b777bbd6c-w9n4q Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-06-24T12:08:23.967Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

19 - The Experimental Jurisprudence of Persistence through Time

from Part II - Introductions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2025

Kevin Tobia
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
Get access

Summary

Legal rights, obligations, and liabilities bind together entities, including people, real and moveable property, and abstract objects, across time. Determining whether these rights, obligations, and liabilities exist at any particular time therefore requires the law to embed within it a theory of persistence – that is, a theory of how entities persist over time. The philosophical and psychological literature has identified multiple different theories of how objects persist over time, some of which are identity relations and some of which are not. Research in experimental jurisprudence has shown both that ordinary people’s judgments about the law often match the content of the law itself and that ordinary people’s judgments appear sensitive to multiple different persistence relations. These findings provide reason to think that the law, to the extent it reflects the judgments of ordinary people, also reflects multiple different theories of persistence – contrary to recent arguments that legal rights depend solely on numerical identity.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Bartels, D. Kvaran T., & Nichols, S. (2013). Selfless giving. Cognition, 129, 392–403.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bartels, D., & Rips, L. (2010). Psychological connectedness and intertemporal choice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139, 49–69.Google ScholarPubMed
Bartels, D., & Urminsky, O. (2011). On intertemporal selfishness: How the perceived instability of identity underlies impatient consumption. Journal of Consumer Research, 38, 182–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blok, S., Newman, G., Behr, J., & Rips, L. J. (2001). Inferences about personal identity. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 23, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/15t6g47nGoogle Scholar
Blok, S. V., Newman, G., & Rips, L. J. (2005). Individuals and their concepts. In Ahn, W. K., Goldstone, R. L., Love, B. C., Markman, A. B., & Wolff, P. (Eds.), Categorization inside and outside the laboratory: Essays in honor of Douglas L. Medin (pp. 127–149). American Psychological Association.Google Scholar
Breyer, S. (1988). The federal sentencing guidelines and the key compromises upon which they rest. Hofstra Law Review, 17, 1–50.Google Scholar
De Freitas, J., Tobia, K., Newman, G. E., & Knobe, J. (2014). The good ship Theseus: The effect of valence on object identity judgments. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 36, 2103–2108.Google Scholar
De Freitas, J., Tobia, K. P., Newman, G. E., & Knobe, J. (2017). Normative judgments and individual essence. Cognitive Science, 41, 382–402.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Denver, M., Pickett, J. T., & Bushway, S. D. (2017). The language of stigmatization and the mark of violence: Experimental evidence on the social construction and use of criminal record stigma. Criminology, 55, 664–690.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diamantis, M. E. (2019). Limiting identity in criminal law. Boston College Law Review, 60, 2011–2098.Google Scholar
Diamantis, M. (2022). Corporate identity. In Tobia, K. (Ed.), Experimental philosophy of identity and the self (pp. 203–216). Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
Dunlea, J. P., & Heiphetz, L. (2020). Children’s and adults’ understanding of punishment and the criminal justice system. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 87, 103913.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finlay, M., & Starmans, C. (2022). Not the same same: Distinguishing between similarity and identity in judgments of change. Cognition, 218, 104953. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104953CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Frederick, S. (2003). Time preference and personal identity. In Loewenstein, G., Read, D., & Baumeister, R. (Eds.), Time and decision (pp. 89–113). Russell Sage Foundation.Google Scholar
Heiphetz, L., Strohminger, N., Gelman, S. A., & Young, L. L. (2018). Who am I? The role of moral beliefs in children’s and adults’ understanding of identity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 78, 210–219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heiphetz, L., Strohminger, N., & Young, L. L. (2017). The role of moral beliefs, memories, and preferences in representations of identity. Cognitive Science, 41(3), 744–767. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12354CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kadish, S. H. (1962). Some observations on the use of criminal sanctions in enforcing economic regulations. University of Chicago Law Review, 30, 423–449.Google Scholar
Locke, J. (1689). An enquiry concerning human understanding. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Mott, C. (2018). Statutes of limitations and personal identity. In Lombrozo, T., Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (Eds.), Oxford studies in experimental philosophy: Volume II (pp. 243–269). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Mott, C., & Solomon, L. H. (in prep.) The self and extended punishment. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Newman, G. E., Bartels, D. M., & Smith, R. K. (2014). Are artworks more like people than artifacts? Individual concepts and their extensions. Topics in Cognitive Science, 6, 647–662.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Nichols, S., & Bruno, M. (2010). Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study. Philosophical Psychology, 23, 293–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, E. T. (Spring 2021). Personal identity. In Zalta, Edward N. (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Philosophy Department, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personalGoogle Scholar
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Protzko, J., Tobia, K., Strohminger, N., & Schooler, J. (2022). Do obligations follow the mind or body?, PsyArXiv, https://psyarxiv.com/m5a6g/download?format=pdfGoogle Scholar
Quoidbach, J., Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2013). The end of history illusion. Science, 339, 96–98.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rips, L. J., Blok, S., & Newman, G. (2006). Tracing the identity of objects. Psychological Review, 113, 1–30.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rose, D., Schaffer, J., & Tobia, K. (2020). Folk teleology drives persistence judgments. Synthese, 197, 5491–5509.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schechtman, M. (2014). Staying alive. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, D., & Tobia, K. (2022). Personal identity. In Vargas, Manuel, & Doris, John M. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of moral psychology (pp. 543–563). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Starmans, C., & Bloom, P. (2018a). Nothing personal: What psychologists get wrong about identity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22, 566–568.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Starmans, C., & Bloom, P. (2018b). If you become evil, do you die? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22, 740–741.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2014). The essential moral self. Cognition, 131, 151–179.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2015). Neurodegeneration and identity. Psychological Science, 26, 1469–1479.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tierney, H., Howard, C., Kumar, V., Kvaran, T., & Nichols, S. (2014). How many of us are there. In Sytsma, J. (Ed.), Advances in experimental philosophy of mind (pp. 181–202). Bloomsbury Publishing.Google Scholar
Tobia, K. P. (2015). Personal identity and the Phineas Gage effect. Analysis, 75, 396–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yaffe, G. (2010). Attempts. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×