Book contents
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Analytic Philosophy
- Section One Language, Mind, Epistemology
- Section Two Logic, Metaphysics, Science
- Section Three Analytic Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy
- 16 The Revival of Virtue Ethics
- 17 Kantian Ethics
- 18 Consequentialism and Its Critics
- 19 The Rediscovery of Metanormativity
- 20 Constitutivism
- 21 John Rawls’s Political Liberalism
- 22 The Twilight of the Liberal Social Contract
- 23 Feminist Philosophy and Real Politics
- Section Four Analytic Aesthetics and Philosophy of Religion
- Part II Continental Philosophy
- Part III Bridge Builders, Border Crossers, Synthesizers, and Comparative Philosophy
- Part IV Epilogue: On the Philosophy of the History of Philosophy
- References
- Index
20 - Constitutivism
from Section Three - Analytic Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 November 2019
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Analytic Philosophy
- Section One Language, Mind, Epistemology
- Section Two Logic, Metaphysics, Science
- Section Three Analytic Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy
- 16 The Revival of Virtue Ethics
- 17 Kantian Ethics
- 18 Consequentialism and Its Critics
- 19 The Rediscovery of Metanormativity
- 20 Constitutivism
- 21 John Rawls’s Political Liberalism
- 22 The Twilight of the Liberal Social Contract
- 23 Feminist Philosophy and Real Politics
- Section Four Analytic Aesthetics and Philosophy of Religion
- Part II Continental Philosophy
- Part III Bridge Builders, Border Crossers, Synthesizers, and Comparative Philosophy
- Part IV Epilogue: On the Philosophy of the History of Philosophy
- References
- Index
Summary
Constitutivism is the view that we can justify fundamental normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims merely in virtue of acting.1 Constitutivists aspire to show that action has structural features – constitutive aims, principles, or standards – that are present in each instance of action and that generate substantive normative conclusions. In showing that the authority of fundamental normative claims is sourced in our own actions, constitutivists hope to avoid familiar objections to justificatory projects in ethics.
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- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015 , pp. 275 - 286Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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