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Volume II of The Cambridge History of the Cold War examines the developments that made the Cold War a long-lasting international system during the 1960s and 1970s. A team of leading scholars explains how the Cold War seemed to stabilize after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and how this sense of increased stability evolved into the détente era of the early 1970s. The authors outline how conflicts in the Third World, as well as the interests and ideologies of the superpowers, eroded the détente process. They delve into the social and economic roots of the conflict, illuminate processes of integration and disintegration, analyze the arms race and explore the roles of intelligence, culture and national identities. Discussing the newest findings on US and Soviet foreign policy and examining crises inside and outside of Europe, this authoritative volume will define Cold War studies for years to come.


Review of the set:'There has never been a Cold War history like it; everything about it is monumental … In total, the volumes represent a successful interconnected attempt at describing the Cold War in full.'

Jost Dülffer Source: H-Soz-u-Kult

Review of the set:'The Cambridge History of the Cold War (CHCW) marks a coming of age for Cold War studies. This multi-volume compilation provides a synthesis of the 'New Cold War History'. It is a signal moment in the evolution of the field.'

Mike Sewell Source: H-Diplo

Review of the set:'… if (I) could recommend just three books to a reader with no prior knowledge of the Cold War - the average undergraduate, say - it would likely be this series. The breadth and depth of coverage, in disciplinary and geographical terms, is unparalleled.'

David Milne Source: H-Diplo

'The geographic span of the book is particularly impressive, covering many regions and countries, including those not traditionally integrated into the narrative … In this way, the authors combine the thematic-chronological approach with a regional context, significantly expanding our concept of the Cold War and its impact on countries and peoples.'

Ilya Gaiduk Source: H-Diplo

'… this fine volume brings together leading scholars in the field to present in clear and perceptive chapters the latest knowledge and the current state of debate on the Cold War. There is no better place to begin to understand this conflict.'

Michael Hopkins Source: H-Diplo

'… a sophisticated and lucid history of the Cold War during its second phase…'

Sandra Scanlon Source: H-Diplo

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  • 1 - Grand strategies in the Cold War
    pp 1-21
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    Grand strategies for fighting wars, if by "grand strategy" one understands the calculated use of available means in the pursuit of desired ends, have probably been around almost as long. Before there can be a grand strategy there must be a need for one: a conflict that goes beyond the normal disputes of international relations, for which diplomacy is the remedy. Stalin's strategy had several objectives, one of which was to continue the acceleration of history his predecessor Vladimir Ilich Lenin had begun. Roosevelt had a grand strategy: it was to do everything possible to save Britain, defeat Germany, and contain Japan. Therein lay the makings of a grand strategic stalemate, like the one that perpetuated the Peloponnesian War. The Cold War shifted now to strategies for breaking this stalemate. The confrontation had been sufficiently alarming that Soviet and American leaders agreed tacitly not to use nuclear weapons again to try to break the Cold War stalemate.
  • 2 - Identity and the Cold War
    pp 22-43
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    This chapter examines how Soviet and American national identities shaped and were shaped by the Cold War. Soviet and American identities had some major similarities or parallelisms, but they heightened rather than dampened the conflict. The American identity was much less self-conscious than the Soviet self-image. The lack of American awareness gave a certain flexibility to policy and a resilience to its sense of self. If identities can be shaped by conflict, perhaps one of the root causes of conflict is the need of one or both sides to establish and maintain an identity, which is difficult to do in a relaxed international system. Both Soviet identity and its response to the Third World changed more than the American. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization was built on a less rigid view of the role of class and class conflict, just as the earlier perception of great threat from the capitalists made it seem dangerous to permit domestic relaxation.
  • 3 - Economic aspects of the Cold War, 1962–1975
    pp 44-64
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    US objectives during the Cold War were to prevent Soviet attacks on the United States and its allies and to prevent the spread of Communism as a political and economic system to other countries, whether by force or by threat, subversion, persuasion, or bribery. This chapter discusses developments in the world economy and highlights the comparative economic performance between Communist countries and what was called the "free world". The 1960s was a decade of high global economic growth, perhaps the highest decadal growth in history. US growth was interrupted by recessions, declines in total production, in 1960-61, 1970-71, and 1975. President Kennedy was convinced that US policy toward the USSR, and toward the world, must be based on a robust US economy. The use of economic sanctions was an ongoing feature of US foreign economic policy. In the context of the Cold War, specific sanctions were used against North Korea, China, Cuba, and North Vietnam.
  • 4 - The Cuban missile crisis
    pp 65-87
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    The Cuban missile crisis involved a single discrete set of circumstances. It stemmed from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev's secret dispatch of nuclear missiles to Fidel Castro's revolutionary Cuba and US president John F. Kennedy's determination to reverse that deployment. In Cold War history, the crisis culminated a decade-and-a-half of superpower jousting and groping toward tacit "rules of the game". Most US officials presumed Khrushchev's decision stemmed from a desire to redress Soviet nuclear inferiority, which Washington had trumpeted the previous fall to deflate his truculence on Berlin. The crisis had important consequences for the subsequent course of the Cold War and nuclear-arms race, and for the fates of its principal figures. Kennedy's success in compelling Khrushchev to pull out the missiles struck most Americans as a glorious victory. The waning of superpower tensions fostered speculation that Kennedy and Khrushchev, had they lasted in power longer, might have ended the Cold War altogether.
  • 5 - Nuclear competition in an era of stalemate, 1963–1975
    pp 88-111
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    During the years after the Cuban missile crisis, both superpowers treaded more warily to avoid direct confrontations, but traditional Cold War concerns kept them expanding their nuclear arsenals. While the leaders of the superpowers recognized that nuclear weapons were militarily unusable, except in the most extreme circumstances, they nevertheless wanted them for deterrence and for diplomatic leverage. The National Security Council's Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC) report, stated that neither the U.S. nor the USSR can emerge from a full nuclear exchange without suffering very severe damage and high casualties, that is, a condition of nuclear stalemate will prevail. U.S. presidents wanted to avoid nuclear war but nevertheless agreed that a robust nuclear posture, that is, a large nuclear arsenal backed by elaborate war plans, was the deeply implicit threat that Washington needed in order to play a central role in shaping world affairs. As a central front in the Cold War, Europe became a focal point for superpower nuclear rivalries.
  • 6 - US foreign policy from Kennedy to Johnson
    pp 112-133
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    Like their predecessor Dwight D. Eisenhower, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson adhered to the major tenets of post-World War II US foreign policy. Long-term changes that probably would have occurred in the absence of the East-West struggle were interpreted by Kennedy and Johnson as Cold War phenomena. Kennedy and Johnson feared "Red China" as particularly dangerous because it seemed to be in a highly ideological, "Stalinist" phase. The new president argued that American freedom packed such transforming power that the 1776 revolution remained the touchstone for all peoples. Kennedy feared that Khrushchev's tactics could slice away pieces of the Third World. He determined not to lose but rather to win the Cold War. The split on detente highlights Kennedy's mixed legacy to Johnson. Kennedy's crises gave Johnson breathing space. As leaders, Kennedy and Khrushchev were both highly competitive while entertaining exaggerated hopes and fears.
  • 7 - Soviet foreign policy, 1962–1975
    pp 134-157
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    This chapter discusses covers two distinct periods of Soviet foreign policy, such as 1962 to 1964, and 1964 to 1975. The first period consists of Nikita Khrushchev's last three years in power. The second period covers the first eleven of Leonid Brezhnev's. The detente achieved by Brezhnev and company stabilized Cold War competition in Europe while braking the arms race and expanding East-West ties. When the XXIInd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party convened on October 17, 1961, Khrushchev seemed at the height of his powers. He delivered two long reports, taking a total of ten hours, on the general state of the Union, and on the new party program. Brezhnev was concerned about peace and stability in Europe. For him and other Soviet leaders, the blood of Soviet soldiers sanctified the postwar European borders that they were determined to preserve.
  • 8 - France, “Gaullism,” and the Cold War
    pp 158-178
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    The importance of France's role in the Cold War is often overlooked when compared with that of both the two superpowers and the other major West European countries. The term "Gaullism" captures the overwhelming influence of Charles de Gaulle and his legacy on France and its international role throughout the period. France's entry into the East-West conflict in the immediate aftermath of World War II was characterized by more hesitation and second thoughts than was the case for the other major Western powers. Beginning in the early 1950s, the policies of the Fourth Republic were characterized by a growing sense of frustration. This reflected a widening gap between the country's ambitions and its limited economic, political, and military means. De Gaulle's foremost ambition was to reestablish France's "rank". This implied the restoration of internal stability and international credibility, which gave him and his successors a robust instrument to assert French influence in international politics.
  • 9 - European integration and the Cold War
    pp 179-197
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    European integration and the Cold War were separate but intertwined. Chronologically, the two share the same formative decades, although the basic idea of uniting the separate states of Europe into a single political and economic entity long predates the East-West conflict. The significant evidence showing that the Cold War influenced European integration relates to the role played by the United States in supporting European unity. Both the European institutions, and all of those in favour of greater European unity, would derive substantial benefits from having so powerful an external sponsor. Rehabilitating Germany was the policy priority for the first postwar chancellor, but he was acutely aware of the need to do this without reawakening the fears of the French in particular. French policies confirm the interplay between the East-West conflict and integration, during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The interconnection between European integration and the Cold War emerges from British European policy, during the years up until 1960.
  • 10 - Détente in Europe, 1962–1975
    pp 198-218
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    This chapter argues that European detente was, first and foremost, a European project. While there is no denying the significance of the United States and the Soviet Union in the shaping of Europe's fortunes in the 1960s and 1970s, detente began in Europe. In 1961, the issue of divided Berlin and the persistent brain drain of young East Germans to the West ultimately resulted in the erection of the Cold War's most grotesque symbol, the Berlin Wall. De Gaulle ruled France for over a decade after 1958, during which time he attempted to raise his country into a new position of prominence in Europe. The CSCE was perhaps the most high-profile expression of the fact that the Cold War had moved to an entirely new stage. The CSCE was of major long-term significance: it signaled the emergence of human security as an important and recognized aspect of international relations.
  • 11 - Eastern Europe: Stalinism to Solidarity
    pp 219-237
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    Suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 19561 gave Eastern Europe a harsh reminder of the ground rules operating within the Soviet bloc. In 1963, Czechoslovakia became the first country in postwar Eastern Europe to record negative growth. The Five-Year Plan was abandoned. Faced with the collapse of its economic policies, an outspoken Czech economist, Professor Ota Sik, proposed far-reaching reforms. Czechoslovakian state sovereignty had to take second place to the 'sacred duty' of acting on behalf of socialist solidarity. The invasion also marked a watershed within Eastern Europe. It exposed the hopelessness of attempts since Stalin to revive the Communist Party, planned economy and Marxism from above. In the autumn of 1968, the Czechoslovak reform movement assumed a mass character. In an 'Appeal to Society', KOR declared that 'solidarity and mutual aid' were the only means for social self-defence against the arbitrary actions of the authorities.
  • 12 - The Cold War and the transformation of the Mediterranean, 1960–1975
    pp 238-257
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    The convergence of Mediterranean history with the global dynamics of the Cold War inspires the consideration of the longue duree. In the early 1960s, two developments shaped events in the Mediterranean: the Cuban missile crisis and the erosion of the Europeans' position in North Africa. The policies of the French president, Charles de Gaulle, had a great impact on the region. The American reaction to de Gaulle's decision reflected Washington's alarm at the political and military changes in the Mediterranean region. By late 1974, it seemed as if Portugal was heading toward political chaos, with the Portuguese Communist Party as the best-organized political force. In 1960-1975, there was no direct confrontation in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Moscow and Washington began to cooperate on broader disarmament issues and they negotiated a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as well as a series of other agreements.
  • 13 - The Cold War in the Third World, 1963–1975
    pp 258-280
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    For the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China, the Cold War was a fundamentally ideological conflict, a struggle over the direction of global history and the definition of modernity itself. Cold War interventions in the Third World would become more lethal over time. In the early 1960s, the major Cold War adversaries approached the postcolonial world with striking ambitions. As several scholars have argued, the beginnings of superpower detente also made increased Cold War conflict in the Third World more, not less, likely. America's growing frustration in Vietnam contributed to the rise of detente, and Nixon and Henry Kissinger hoped that a diplomatic engagement with the Soviets might persuade them to hold their North Vietnamese allies in check. Worried about the damage to American credibility done by defeat in Vietnam, Kissinger hoped that an easy win in Angola might repair the domestic Cold War consensus and restore US prestige abroad.
  • 14 - The Indochina wars and the Cold War, 1945–1975
    pp 281-304
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    The struggle for Indochina after 1945 occupies a central place in the international history of the twentieth century. The First Indochina War was simultaneously a colonial conflict and a Cold War confrontation. By 1953, American planners were in fact far more committed to the French war effort than the French were. It was Dwight Eisenhower who famously used the metaphor of falling dominoes at a press conference on April 7, 1954, as French forces faced the prospect of a major military defeat at Dien Bien Phu in northwest Tonkin. By the start of 1961, the Second Indochina War was underway. The American forces fought well, and their entry into the conflict in 1965, together with the aerial bombardment of enemy areas, helped stave off a South Vietnamese defeat. In that sense, Americanization achieved its most immediate and basic objective. Outside Indochina, the dominoes did not fall, and it remains to assess the conception of Indochina as a Cold War battleground.
  • 15 - The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez crisis to Camp David Accords
    pp 305-326
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    The Cold War saw deepening Soviet-American rivalry in the Middle East from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s. Since the United States was preoccupied during the early years of the Cold War with crises in Europe and Asia, the Harry S. Truman administration expected Britain to promote and protect Western interests in the Middle East. Bolstered by Soviet military and economic aid, on July 26 Nasser announced that Egypt was expropriating the Anglo-French company that operated the Suez Canal and would use the tolls to finance the Aswan Dam. Eager to break the deadlock in the Middle East and sustain detente with the Soviet Union, the Carter administration proposed to convene a peace conference at Geneva, where Washington and Moscow could sit down with their regional clients to hammer out a comprehensive settlement. After bilateral Israeli-Egyptian conversations reached an impasse in the spring of 1978, Carter invited Sadat and Begin to a summit meeting at Camp David in September.
  • 16 - Cuba and the Cold War, 1959–1980
    pp 327-348
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    During the Cold War, extra-continental military interventions were the preserve of the two superpowers, a few West European countries, and Cuba. This chapter focuses on the regions, such as Latin America and Africa, of the world where Cuba's actions had an important impact. By 1964, the guerrillas in Latin America had suffered a string of setbacks, and Cuban support for them had become a source of discord with the Soviet Union. Cuba's interest in sub-Saharan Africa quickened in late 1964. This was the moment of the great illusion when the Cubans, and many others, believed that revolution beckoned in Africa. Whereas Cuba's support for armed struggle in Latin America in the 1960s provoked the wrath of the United States and angered Moscow, Cuba's activities in Africa drew much less heat. History, geography, culture, and language made Latin America the Cubans' natural habitat, the place closest to Castro's and his followers' hearts, the first place where they tried to spread revolution.
  • 17 - The Sino-Soviet split
    pp 349-372
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    By 1962, the once robust Sino-Soviet alliance had cracked up, revealing serious conflicts beneath the facade of Communist solidarity. This split was a remarkable development in a Cold War context. If Khrushchev had anyone to blame for the "cold current", he could well blame himself, although he was too narrow-minded ever to admit that he had played a significant role in the decline of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Khrushchev had angered Mao Zedong with his inconsiderate proposition to build a joint submarine flotilla and a military radio station on China's soil. Fidel Castro's visit to the Soviet Union, gave Khrushchev the opportunity to polish his revolutionary credentials. After his confrontation with Liu Shaoqi over the direction of the Socialist Education Movement, Mao began to prepare the ground for a showdown with his perceived enemies in China. There was a clear anti-Soviet angle to the Cultural Revolution, since Mao made an explicit connection between Soviet "capitalist restoration" and Chinese revisionism.
  • 18 - Détente in the Nixon–Ford years, 1969–1976
    pp 373-394
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    M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger started detente as a recognition of the relative decline of US power and the growth of multipolarity. They responded to European desires for improved economic relations and reduced political tensions with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Nixon and Kissinger developed a close personal relationship that profoundly affected the way in which they conducted their foreign policy. As Nixon and Kissinger prepared for the late-May summit in Moscow, they agreed to steer clear of discussions of human rights. As public interest in Watergate intensified, General Secretary Brezhnev came to the United States for another summit meeting with Nixon from June 16 to June 24, 1973. Detente did not die with the end of Nixon's presidency, but it was encountering stiffer opposition. Vice President Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon and vowed to continue the foreign policies lain down by Nixon and Kissinger.
  • 19 - Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War
    pp 395-416
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    This chapter explores the history of efforts to come to terms with the puzzles and tradeoffs involved in confronting nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War. The most intriguing feature of non-proliferation was that it became a shared goal of two bitter Cold War enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union. The early days of the Cold War, neither US nor Soviet officials pursued non-proliferation efforts with any vigour. Prospects for effective global nuclear non-proliferation policies improved in the early 1960s. The Soviet Union and the United States had to overcome significant barriers before they could negotiate a nuclear non-proliferation policy, and they moved slowly at first, building upon earlier international efforts. By the mid-1960s, the goal of non-proliferation at times made the Soviets and Americans less ideological rivals than realistic partners in what often appeared to be a concert or condominium to manage the most important military question in world politics.
  • 20 - Intelligence in the Cold War
    pp 417-437
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    Cold War intelligence was not usually as exciting as the career of James Bond. Like all forms of information, the impact of intelligence is more often gradual than dramatic, though it does from time to time suddenly produce such spectacular revelations as the Soviet acquisition of the plans of the first US atomic bomb or the Soviet construction of missile sites in Cuba in 1962. The amnesiac approach to the role of signals intelligence has distorted understanding of the Cold War in significant ways. Intelligence operations served, in different ways, both to stabilise and to destabilise the Cold War. Perhaps the most important stabilising factor was the development of Imagery intelligence. The intelligence operations that did most to embitter, rather than to stabilise, the Cold War involved the use of 'covert action'. The greatest success of Soviet bloc intelligence operations in the West during the Cold War was probably in the field of scientific and technological intelligence.
  • 21 - Reading, viewing, and tuning in to the Cold War
    pp 438-459
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    For many years the historiography of Cold War culture was dominated by two rather parochial cliches. The first held that studying the Cold War and culture meant discussing the impact of the McCarthy-era purges on cultural production in the United States. The second that it meant the study of films or literature with explicit Cold War content. By 1962, the world had become used to the cultural manifestations of the clash between East and West. It could be said that Stalin founded two global propaganda machines, as the US government's Cold War propaganda structure was created in direct response to the scale of Soviet activity. US international propaganda flourished during World War II with institutions like Voice of America radio and the Office of War Information. While nuclear culture argued for peace and restraint, stories of espionage and paranoia shaped the logic of the Cold War conflict and mobilized populations to support their secret states.
  • 22 - Counter-cultures: the rebellions against the Cold War order, 1965–1975
    pp 460-481
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    An international counter-culture developed in response to dissatisfaction with the dominant culture of the Cold War. On the model of Friedan's writing, it gave voice to criticisms of the basic social assumptions connected to the politics of the era. In his analysis of the Old Regime on the eve of the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville predicted the counter-culture of the 1960s and 1970s. The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed escalating violence in many societies. Nearly everywhere, established authorities found themselves under siege. National leaders could not travel within large sections of their own countries, for fear of embarrassing protests and personal attacks. If leaders promising to "pay any price" and build Communism dominated the early 1960s, figures pledged to "law and order" shaped the early 1970s. Scholars of detente generally point to the importance of near-nuclear parity and a general balance of power in bringing the United States and the Soviet Union to embrace more stable relations.
  • 23 - The structure of great power politics, 1963–1975
    pp 482-502
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    John F. Kennedy's most basic goal as president of the United States was to reach a political understanding with the Soviet Union. As for the Europeans, they by no means welcomed the new Kennedy policy with open arms. During the Cold War, Western Europe lived in the shadow of Soviet military power and the NATO countries obviously had to be concerned with the military balance on the continent. The Soviets would obviously not be upset if the countries there had to live more in the shadow of Soviet power, if the Europeans, that is, had to be more sensitive to Soviet wishes, more accommodating politically, militarily, and economically. The Soviet economy seemed to be gradually running out of steam, being dragged to stagnation and decline by some inexorable underlying process. The detente policy was thus something of a charade. Kissinger and Nixon had not set out to build a global structure of peace based on cooperation with the USSR.
  • 24 - The Cold War and the social and economic history of the twentieth century
    pp 503-524
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    The Cold War was a conflict between differing theories of how to organize economies and societies at the various stages of industrial development. Ideologies and belief systems helped define the Cold War's front lines. However, social conflict also largely determined its course and outcome. It was no accident that Marxism found much resonance with workers and that, with the expansion of industrial capitalism and mass politics in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a Marxist movement sought to eliminate the capitalist system through revolutionary battle. Nikita Khrushchev, however, took the impressive growth rates in Eastern European industrial production as confirmation that the Soviet system was superior to the Western one. Khrushchev's optimism seemed all the more justified given that the crisis of the European liberal system in the 1930s and 1940s had eventually resulted in the loss of the colonies that had added to the strength of the great powers during the height of imperialism.
  • Bibliographical essay
    pp 525-570
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    This bibliography presents a list of reference materials that are related to the economic, social, cultural, religious, technological, and geopolitical factors, which shaped the policies that ended the Cold War. The literature on the sources of American identity is large and contested. The role of the period before the American Revolution is stressed by Bernard Bailyn in his The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. For roughly a decade following the crisis, most accounts, by or based on information from government officials, celebrated JFK's "crisis management" and toughness dealing with his Kremlin adversary, and tended to emphasize the nuclear balance as both causing the crisis and ordaining its resolution. The best history of Khrushchev's foreign policy, based on sources from Russian archives, is Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary. A broad account of France's postwar foreign policy can be found in Frederic Bozo, La Politique etrangere de la France depuis 1945.

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Consuelo Cruz , Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World-Making in the Tropics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Nigel Gould-Davies , “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 1 (1999).

Robert Jervis , “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?Journal of Cold War Studies, 3 (2001).

Mark Kramer , “Ideology and the Cold War,” Review of International Studies, 25 (1999).

John Mueller , “What Was the Cold War About? Evidence from Its Ending,” Political Science Quarterly, 119 (20042005).

John Soares , Jr., “Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights: Jimmy Carter Confronts the Left in Central America, 1979–1981,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 8 (2006).

Alexander Wendt , Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999),

Angus Maddison The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: Organization for Economic Development, 2001).

Robert McNamara , “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,” Foreign Affairs, 62, 1 (Fall 1983).

Christoph Bluth , “The Warsaw Pact and Military Security in Central Europe During the Cold War,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17 (2004).

Christoph Bluth , Britain Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).), The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1946).

William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball , “Nixon’s Secret Nuclear Alert: Vietnam War Diplomacy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October 1969,” Cold War History, 3 (January 2003).

Lawrence Freedman , “The CIA and the Soviet Threat: The Politicization of Estimates,” Intelligence and National Security (1997).

Francis J. Gavin , “The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s,” International History Review, 23 (December 2001).

Victor Gobarev , “The Early Development of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense System,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 14 (June 2001)

Helga Haftendorn , NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967 (New York: Oxford University, 1996).

Robert J. McMahon , “Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History, 15 (1991).to President Johnson, “NATO Strategy and Force Structure,” September 21, 1966,

Graham Spinardi , From Polaris to Trident: The Development of Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Nina Tannenwald , The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Frank Costigliola , “The Failed Design: Kennedy, de Gaulle, and the Struggle for Europe,” Diplomatic History, 8 (1984).

Robert Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Michael J. Hogan , ‘Paths to Plenty: Marshall Planners and the Debate over European Integration, 1947–1948’, Pacific Historical Review, 53, 3 (1984).

Alan Milward , The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51 (London: Methuen, 1984).

Gunnar Skogmar , The United States and the Nuclear Dimension of European Integration (New York: Palgrave, 2004).

Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Grifith , “Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe,” Foreign Affairs, 39 (July 1961)

Jussi M. Hanhimäki , The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Jussi M. Hanhimäki The First Line of Defense or a Springboard for Disintegration: European Neutrals in American Foreign and Security Policy, 1945–1961,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 7, 2 (July 1996).

Jussi M. Hanhimäki , ‘“They Can Write it in Swahili’: Kissinger, the Soviets, and the Helsinki Accords, 1973–1975,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 1, 1, (Spring 2003).

Ian Jackson , Economic Cold War: America, Britain and East-West Trade, 1948–1963 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001)

Lundestad , “‘Empire’ by Invitation? United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal of Peace Research, 23, 3 (1986).

Tony Smith , “A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, 24, 4 (Fall 2000).

H. G. Skilling , Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan, 1989).

I. Ginor , “Under the Yellow Arab Helmet Gleamed Blue Russian Eyes,” Cold War History, 3 (2002).

D. Hopwood , Egypt: Politics and Society. 1945–1981 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982) ff.

B. Jelavich , History of the Balkans, 2 vols. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), vol. II, The Twentieth Century.

Roy Allison , The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

David C. Engerman , “The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, 28 (2004).

Nigel Gould-Davies , ‘The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 27 (2003):.

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