Book contents
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgement
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- Part I Monetary Economics and Policy
- Part II Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy
- Part III Foreign Exchanges and International Architecture
- Part IV The Millennium Challenges of Central Banks
- Index
- References
1 - Introduction and Overview
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2018
Book contents
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgement
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- Part I Monetary Economics and Policy
- Part II Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy
- Part III Foreign Exchanges and International Architecture
- Part IV The Millennium Challenges of Central Banks
- Index
- References
Summary
This volume tells the story of The Changing Fortunes of Central Banks from powerful, narrow-targeted, monetary institutions to expanded institutions with multiple tasks and uncertain outcomes. During this journey, the central banks gained hard-fought independence in the 1990s, which they are about to lose, at least partly, under a broader monetary and financial stability mandate. When governments must provide a fiscal backstop to the financial system, they also want to have a say. The chapter starts with twelve key contributions from the life of a central banker, Charles Goodhart. These contributions span monetary history and economics, financial stability and supervision, international central banking and foreign exchange.
Next, this chapter introduces the volume Changing Fortunes of Central Banking and gives an integrated overview of the various chapters. The main conclusion is that a ‘full’ central bank is responsible for both monetary and financial stability, which are inextricably linked. On the monetary side, several authors argue for the return of money in our models. On the financial side, the design and use of macro-models should include financial frictions or financial intermediaries. Finally, financial stability models should go beyond exogenous shocks and allow for endogenous feedback loops.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking , pp. 1 - 18Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018
References
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