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6 - Emissions trading: the enthusiastic adoption of an ‘alien’ instrument?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2011

By
Harro Van Asselt
Edited by
Andrew Jordan ,
Dave Huitema ,
Harro van Asselt ,
Tim Rayner  and
Frans Berkhout
Harro Van Asselt
Affiliation:
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Andrew Jordan
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia
Dave Huitema
Affiliation:
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
Harro van Asselt
Affiliation:
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
Tim Rayner
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia
Frans Berkhout
Affiliation:
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
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Summary

Introduction

This chapter focuses on what has arguably become the linchpin of EU climate policy, namely emissions trading. In January 2005, the EU adopted a ‘cap-and-trade’ emissions trading system (ETS), through which a certain emission cap was set and a fixed number of emission allowances distributed among the various Member States. Remarkably, despite encountering some significant problems (see Chapter 3), European governors have not lost faith in this instrument, even though it was originally ‘imported’ from the USA. On the contrary, even more now depends on its performance – not least the EU's credibility in international climate politics – than when it was first adopted. The system is .undeniably innovative. Prior to 2005, only a few countries had experimented with emissions trading and no one had ever attempted to employ it at a supranational level. Consequently, the EU's struggle to make this ‘alien’ instrument (Sbragia 2000: 296) work in the manner outlined in economic textbooks could provide lessons for those seeking to implement emissions trading at a global level (Delbeke 2006).

In theory, emissions trading offers a more cost-effective means to achieve a given environmental target than regulation. In practice, however, the ultimate design and implementation of all policy instruments depends on the interaction between political factors, including the actors involved and their interests, as well as the prevailing system of governance (Bressers and Huitema 1999).

Information

Type
Chapter
Information
Climate Change Policy in the European Union
Confronting the Dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation?
 , pp. 125 - 144
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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