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  • Cited by 2
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    This chapter has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Munger, Michael C. 2018. Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a “political Coase Theorem”. Public Choice,

    Keech, William R. and Munger, Michael C. 2015. The anatomy of government failure. Public Choice, Vol. 164, Issue. 1-2, p. 1.

  • Print publication year: 2014
  • Online publication date: July 2014

5 - Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky Coercion, Coasian Bargaining, and the State

from Part II - Voluntary and Coercive Transactions in Welfare Analysis
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Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance
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