Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 31
  • Print publication year: 2005
  • Online publication date: February 2010

2 - Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers

Summary

Introduction

One of the major challenges facing neuroscience today is to provide an explanatory framework that accounts for both the subjectivity and neurobiology of consciousness. Although neuroscientists have supplied neural models of various aspects of consciousness, and have uncovered evidence about the neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs), there nonetheless remains an ‘explanatory gap’ in our understanding of how to relate neurobiological and phenomenological features of consciousness. This explanatory gap is conceptual, epistemological, and methodological:

An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (ⅰ) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ⅱ) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (ⅲ) are neurobiologically realized.

The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanandum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness or meta-awareness to first-order experience (e.g., whether second-order attention to first-order experience inevitably affects the intentional content and/or phenomenal character of first-order experience).

The need for first-person data also raises methodological issues (e.g., whether subjects should be naïve or phenomenologically trained).

Neurophenomenology is a neuroscientific research program whose aim is to make progress on these issues associated with the explanatory gap. In this chapter we give an overview of the neurophenomenological approach to the study of consciousness.

Related content

Powered by UNSILO
References
Austin, J. 1998. Zen and the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Baars, B. J. 2002. The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 47–52
Bitbol, M. 2002. Science as if situation mattered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 181–224
Blake, R. 2001. A primer on binocular rivalry, including current controversies. Brain and Mind 2: 5–38
Blake, R., and Logothetis, N. 2002. Visual competition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3: 1–11
Block, N. 1997. On a confusion about a function of consciousness. In Block, N., Flanagan, O., and Güzeldere, G. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, pp. 375–416. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/A Bradford Book
Block, N. 2001. Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness. Cognition 79: 197–219
Botero, J.-J. 1999. The immediately given as ground and background. In Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B., and Roy, J.-M. (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, pp. 440–463. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
Burge, T. 1997. Two kinds of consciousness. In Block, N., Flanagan, O., and Güzeldere, G. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, pp. 427–434. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/A Bradford Book
Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press
Chalmers, D. J. 1997. Availability: The cognitive basis of experience? In Block, N., Flanagan, O., and Güzeldere, G. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, pp. 421–424. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/A Bradford Book
Chalmers, D. J. 2000. What is a neural correlate of consciousness? In Metzinger, T. (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness, pp. 18–39. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Church, J. 1997. Fallacies or analyses? In Block, N., Flanagan, O., and Güzeldere, G. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, pp. 425–426. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/A Bradford Book
Churchland, P. S. 1986. Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/A Bradford Book
Churchland, P. S. 2002. Brainwise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/A Bradford Book
Cosmelli, D. 2004. Des montagnes et des vallées: Perception consciente et structure dynamique de l'intégration cérebrale chez l'être humain dans l'expérience de rivalité binoculaire. Doctoral thesis. Paris: Ecole Polytechnique
Cosmelli, D., David, O., Lachaux, J.-P., Martinerie, J., Garnero, L., Renault, B., and Varela, F. J. 2004. Waves of consciousness: Ongoing cortical patterns during binocular rivalry. Neuroimage 23: 128–140
Crick, F., and Koch, C. 1998. Consciousness and neuroscience. Cerebral Cortex 8: 97–107
Crick, F., and Koch, C. 2003. A framework for consciousness. Nature Neuroscience 6: 119–126
Damasio, A. R. 1990. Synchronous activation in multiple cortical regions: A mechanism for recall. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2: 287–297
Damasio, A. R. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace
David, O., Cosmelli, D., and Friston, K. J. 2004. Evaluation of a different measures of functional connectivity using a neural mass model. Neuroimage 21: 659–673
David, O., Cosmelli, D., Hasboun, D., and Garnero, L. 2003. A multitrial analysis for revealing significant corticocortical networks in magentoencaphalography and electroencephalography. Neuroimage 20: 186–201
David, O., Cosmelli, D., Lachaux, J.-P., Baillet, S., Garnero, L., and Martinerie, J. 2003. A theoretical and experimental introduction to the non-invasive study of large-scale neural phase-synchronization in human beings (invited paper). International Journal of Computational Cognition (http://www.YangSky.com/yangijcc.htm) 1: 53–77
David, O., Garnero, L., Cosmelli, D., and Varela, F. J. 2002. Estimation of neural dynamics from MEG/EEG cortical current density maps: Application to the reconstruction of large-scale cortical synchrony. IEEE Transactions on Biomedical Engineering 49: 975–987
Davidson, R. J., Kabat-Zinn, J., Schumacher, J., Rosenkranz, M., Muller, D., Santorelli, S. F., Urbanowski, F., Harrington, A., Bonus, K., and Sheridan, J. F. 2003. Alterations in brain and immune function produced by mindfulness meditation. Psychosomatic Medicine 65: 564–570
Dehaene, S., and Naccache, L. 2001. Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition 79: 1–37
Dennett, D. C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown
Dennett, D. C. 1997. The path not taken. In Block, N., Flanagan, O., and Güzeldere, G. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, pp. 417–420. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/A Bradford Book
Dennett, D. C. 2001. Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition 79: 221–237
Dennett, D. C., and Kinsbourne, D. C. 1992. Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15: 183–247
Depraz, N. 1999. The phenomenological reduction as praxis. In Varela, F. J. and Shear, J. (eds.), The View from Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness, pp. 95–110. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic
Depraz, N., and Cosmelli, D. 2004. Empathy and openness: Practices of intersubjectivity at the core of the science of consciousness. In Thompson, E. (ed.), The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Calgary: University of Alberta Press
Depraz, N., Varela, F. J., and Vermersch, P. 2000. The gesture of awareness: An account of its structural dynamics. In Velmans, M. (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness, pp. 121–136. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Press
Depraz, N., Varela, F. J., and Vermersch, P. 2003. On Becoming Aware. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Press
Derryberry, D., and Tucker, D. M. 1994. Motivating the focus of attention. In Niedenthal, P. M. and Kitayama, S. (eds.), The Heart's Eye: Emotional Influences in Perception and Attention, pp. 167–196. New York: Academic Press
Dreyfus, H. 1991. Being-In-The-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Dreyfus, H. 2002. Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 367–383
Dreyfus, H., and Dreyfus, S. 1982. Mind over Machine. New York: Free Press
Ellis, R. 2001. Implications of inattentional blindness for ‘enactive’ theories of consciousness. Brain and Mind 2: 297–322
Engel, A., and Singer, W. 2001. Temporal binding and the neural correlates of sensory awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5: 16–25
Engel, A. K., Fries, P., and Singer, W. 2001. Dynamic predictions: Oscillations and synchrony in top-down processing. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2: 704–716
Epstein, M. 1996. Thoughts Without a Thinker. New York: Basic Books
Foreman, R. K. C. (ed.). 1990. The Problem of Pure Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press
Freeman, W. J. 1999a. How Brains Make up Their Minds. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Freeman, W. 1999b. Consciousness, intentionality, and causality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6: 143–172
Freeman, W. J. 2000. Emotion is essential to all intentional behaviors. In Lewis, M. and Granic, I. (eds.), Emotion, Development, and Self-Organization, pp. 209–235. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Fries, P., Reynolds, J. H., Rorie, A. E., and Desimone, R. 2001. Modulation of oscillatory neuronal synchronization by selective visual attention. Science 291: 1560–1563
Friston, K. J. 2000a. The labile brain. I. Neuronal transients and nonlinear coupling. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B 355: 215–236
Friston, K. J. 2000b. The labile brain. II. Transients, complexity, and selection. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B 355: 237–252
Frith, C. 2002. How can we share experiences? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 374
Gallagher, S. 1986. Lived body and environment. Research in Phenomenology 16: 139–170
Gendlin, E. T. 1981. Focusing. New York: Bantam
Gupta, B. 1998. The Disinterested Witness. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
Gurwitsch, A. 1964. The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh, PA: Dusquesne University Press
Hanna, R., and Thompson, E. 2004. Neurophenomenology and the spontaneity of consciousness. In Thompson, E. (ed.), The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Calgary: University of Alberta Press
Heidegger, M. 1996. Being and Time. Trans. J. Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press
Hobson, J. A. 1999. Consciousness. New York: W. H. Freeman
Hurlbert, R. T., and Heavey, C. L. 2001. Telling what we know: Describing inner experience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5: 400–403
Hurley, S. L., and Noë, A. 2003. Neural plasticity and consciousness. Biology and Philosophy 18: 131–168
Husserl, E. 2001. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic. Trans. A. J. Steinbock. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Jack, A. I., and Roepstorff, A. 2002. Introspection and cognitive brain mapping: From stimulus-response to script-report. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 333–339
Jack, A. I., and Roepstorff, A. (eds.). 2003. Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science. Volume 1. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic
Jack, A. I., and Shallice, T. 2001. Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition 79: 161–196
Jonas, H. 1966. The Phenomenon of Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Kabat-Zinn, J. 1990. Full Catastrophe Living: Using the Wisdom of Your Body and Mind to Face Stress, Pain, and Illness. New York: Dell
Kahana, M. J., Seelig, D., and Madsen, J. R. 2001. Theta returns. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 11: 739–744
Kanwisher, N. 2001. Neural events and perceptual awareness. Cognition 79: 89–113
Kelso, J. A. S. 1995. Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Köhler, W. 1947. Gestalt Psychology. New York: Liveright
Kriegel, U. 2003. Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33: 103–132
Kuhn, T. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Lachaux, J.-P., Chavez, M., and Lutz, A. 2003. A simple measure of correlation across time, frequency and space between continuous brain signals. Journal of Neuroscience Methods 123: 175–188
Lachaux, J.-P., Rodriguez, E., Martinerie, J., and Varela, F. J. 1999. Measuring phase synchrony in brain signals. Human Brain Mapping 8: 194–208
Lambie, J. A., and Marcel, A. J. 2002. Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: A theoretical framework. Psychological Review 109: 219–259
Van Quyen, M. 2003. Disentangling the dynamic core: A research program for neurodynamics at the large scale. Biological Research 36: 67–88
Van Quyen, M., and Petitmengin, C. 2002. Neuronal dynamics and conscious experience: An example of reciprocal causation before epileptic seizures. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 169–180
Lewis, M. D. 2000. Emotional self-organization at three time scales. In Lewis, M. D. and Granic, I. (eds.), Emotion, Development, and Self-Organization: Dynamic Systems Approaches to Emotional Development, pp. 37–69. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press
Lewis, M. D. In press. Bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic systems modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Llinas, R., Ribary, U., Contreras, D., and Pedroarena, C. 1998. The neuronal basis for consciousness. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B 353: 1801–1818
Lutz, A. 2002. Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: A first empirical case study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 133–167
Lutz, A., and Thompson, E. 2003. Neurophenomenology: Integrating subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10: 31–52
Lutz, A., Lachaux, J.-P., Martinerie, J., and Varela, F. J. 2002. Guiding the study of brain dynamics by using first-person data: Synchrony patterns correlate with ongoing conscious states during a simple visual task. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA. 99: 1586–1591
Maturana, H. R. 1969. The neurophysiology of cognition. In Garvin, P. (ed.), Cognition: A Multiple View. New York: Spartan Books
Maturana, H. R. 1970. Biology of cognition. In Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J., Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, pp. 2–58. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 43. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Maturana, H. R., and Varela, F J. 1980. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 42. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. C. Smith. London: Routledge Press
Metzinger, T. (ed.). 2000. Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Moran, D. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. London: Routledge Press
Moustakas, C. 1994. Phenomenological Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications
Nagel, T. 1979. What is it like to be a bat? In Nagel, T., Mortal Questions, pp. 165–180. New York: Cambridge University Press
Noë, A., and Thompson, E. 2004a. Are there neural correlates of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11: 3–28
Noë, A., and Thompson, E. 2004b. Sorting out the neural basis of consciousness: Authors' reply to commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11: 87–98
Ohl, F. W., Scheich, H., and Freeman, W. J. 2001. Change in pattern of ongoing cortical activity with auditory category learning. Nature 412: 733–736
O'Keefe, J., and Burgess, N. 1999. Theta activity, virtual navigation and the human hippocampus. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11: 403–406
O'Regan, J. K., and Noë, A. 2001. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 939–1031
Panksepp, J. 1998a. Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press
Panksepp, J. 1998b. The periconscious substrates of consciousness: Affective states and the evolutionary origins of self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5: 566–582
Parvizi, J., and Damasio, A. 2001. Consciousness and the brainstem. Cognition 79: 135–159
Pessoa, L., Thompson, E., and Noë, A. 1998. Finding out about filling-in: A guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21: 723–802
Petitmengin, C. 2001. L'expérience intuitive. Paris: L'Harmattan
Petitmengin-Peugeot, C. 1999. The intuitive experience. In Varela, F. J. and Shear, J. (eds.), The View from Within, pp. 43–78. Thorveton, UK: Imprint Academic
Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B., and Roy, J.-M. (eds.). 1999. Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
Price, D., and Barrell, J. 1980. An experiential approach with quantitative methods: A research paradigm. Journal of Humanistic Psychology 20: 75–95
Price, D., Barrell, J., and Rainville, P. 2002. Integrating experiential-phenomenological methods and neuroscience to study neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11: 593–608
Rees, G., Krieman, G., and Koch, C. 2002. Neural correlates of consciousness in humans. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3: 261–270
Rodriguez, E., George, N., Lachaux, J. P., Martinerie, J., Renault, B., and Varela, F. J. 1999. Perception's shadow: Long-distance synchronization of human brain activity. Nature 397: 430–433
Rosenthal, D. M. 1997. A theory of consciousness. In Block, N. et al. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, pp. 729–753. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Roy, J.-M. 2004. Phenomenological claims and the myth of the given. In E. Thompson (ed.), The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume
Roy, J.-M., Petitot, J., Pachoud, B., and Varela, F. J. 1999. Beyond the gap: An introduction to naturalizing phenomenology. In Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B., and Roy, J.-M. (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology, pp. 1–80. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
Rudrauf, D., Lutz, A., Cosmelli, D., Lachaux, J.-P., and Van Quyen, M. 2003. From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. Biological Research 36: 27–66
Sarnthein, J., Petsche, H., Rappelsberger, P., Shaw, G. L., and Stein, A. 1998. Synchronization between prefrontal and posterior association cortex during human working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 95: 7092–7096
Sartre, J.-P. 1956. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library
Schiff, S. J., So, P., Chang, T., Burke, R. E., and Sauer, T. 1996. Detecting dynamical interdependence and generalized synchrony through mutual prediction in a neural ensemble. Physical Review E 54: 6706–6724
Schooler, J. W. 2002. Re-representing consciousness: Dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 339–344
Searle, J. S. 1983. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press
Searle, J. 2000. Consciousness. Annual Review of Neuroscience 23: 557–578
Searle, J. 2004. Comments on Noë & Thompson ‘Are there NCCs?’Journal of Consciousness Studies 11: 79–82
Sellars, W. 1956. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. In Feigl, H. and Scriven, M. (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Volume 1. The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, pp. 253–329. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
Singer, W. 1999. Neuronal synchrony: A versatile code for the definition of relations? Neuron 24: 49–65
Steinbock, A. J. 1999. Saturated intentionality. In Welton, Donn (ed.), The Body, pp. 178–199. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Thompson, E. 2001. Empathy and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8: 1–32
Thompson, E. (ed.). 2004. The Problem of Consciousness. New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Calgary: University of Alberta Press
Thompson, E. Forthcoming. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Thompson, E., and Varela, F. J. 2001. Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5: 418–425
Thompson, E., and Zahavi, D. In press. Contemporary Continental perspectives: Phenomenology. In Zelazo, P. D. and Moscovitsch, M. (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Consciousness. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Thompson, E., Noë, A., and Pessoa, L. 1999. Perceptual completion: A case study in phenomenology and cognitive science. In Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B., and Roy, J.-M. (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, pp. 161–195. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
Thompson, E., Palacios, A., and Varela, F. J. 1992. Ways of coloring: Comparative color vision as a case study for cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15: 1–74. Reprinted in Alva Noë and Evan Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind: Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002
Tononi, G., and Edelman, G. M. 1998. Consciousness and complexity. Science 282: 1846–1851
VanRullen, R., and Koch, C. 2003. Is perception discrete or continuous? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7: 207–213
Varela, F. J. 1979. Principles of Biological Autonomy. New York: Elsevier North Holland
Varela, F. J. 1991. Organism: A meshwork of selfless selves. In Tauber, A. (ed.), Organism and the Origin of Self, pp. 79–107. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Varela, F. J. 1995. Resonant cell assemblies: A new approach to cognitive functions and neuronal synchrony. Biological Research 28: 81–95
Varela, F. J. 1996. Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy to the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 330–350
Varela, F. J. 1997a. Patterns of life: Intertwining identity and cognition. Brain and Cognition 34: 72–87
Varela, F. J. 1997b. The naturalization of phenomenology as the transcendence of nature. Alter 5: 355–381
Varela, F. J. 1999. The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time consciousness. In Petitot, J. et al. (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology, pp. 266–314. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
Varela, F. J., and Bourgine, P. (eds.). 1991. Toward a Practice of Autonomous Systems: Proceedings of the First European Conference on Artificial Life. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Varela, F. J., and Shear, J. 1999a. First-person accounts: Why, what, and how. In Varela, F. J. and Shear, J. (eds.), The View from Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness, pp. 1–14. Thorveton, UK: Imprint Academic
Varela, F. J., and Shear, J. (eds.). 1999b. The View from Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic
Varela, F. J., and Thompson, E. 2003. Neural synchrony and the unity of mind: A neurophenomenological perspective. In Cleeremans, A. (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration and Dissociation, pp. 266–287. New York: Oxford University Press
Varela, F. J., Lachaux, J.-P., Rodriguez, E., and Martinerie, J. 2001. The brainweb: Phase synchronization and large-scale integration. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2: 229–239
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Stein, A., and Sarnthein, J. 2000. Different frequencies for different scales of cortical intergration: From local gamma to long range alpha/theta synchronization. International Journal of Psychophysiology 38: 301–313
Stein, A., Chiang, C., and König, P. 2000. Top-down processing mediated by interareal synchronization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 97: 14748–14753
Wallace, A. 1998. The Bridge of Quiescence: Experiencing Tibetan Buddhist Meditation. La Salle, IL: Open Court
Wallace, A. 1999. The Buddhist tradition of shamatha: Methods for refining and examining consciousness. In Varela, F. J. and Shear, J. (eds.), The View from Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness, pp. 175–188. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic
Watt, D. F. 1999. Emotion and consciousness: Implications of affective neuroscience for extended reticular thalamic activating system theories of consciousness. Electronic publication of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. Available at: http://server.philvt.edu/assc/watt/default.htm
Wider, K. V. 1997. The Bodily Basis of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
Williams, P. 1998. The Reflexive Nature of Awareness. London: Curzon Press
Zahavi, D. 1999. Self-Awareness and Alterity. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
Zahavi, D. 2002. First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytic philosophy and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 7–26
Zahavi, D. 2003. Husserl's Phenomenology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
Zahavi, D. 2004. Intentionality and phenomenality: A phenomenological take on the hard problem. In Thompson, E. (ed.), The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Calgary: University of Alberta Press
Zahavi, D., and Parnas, J. 1998. Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5: 687–705