In the early 1980s Peter Briggs was one of the driving forces in drawing up the ambitious requirements for the new submarines, but from 1985 his postings took him away from the project, and in the 1990s away from submarines altogether as he held a succession of senior positions, concluding with appointment as head of the strategic command division in 1997. In mid-1999 he was among the contenders to replace Don Chalmers as chief of the navy. When he was passed over as chief he began planning his retirement, but put this on hold when he was asked to take charge of the submarine project with the task of ‘achieving a fully operational and sustainable submarine capability as quickly as possible’. He ‘came into the job with nothing to lose, a problem to solve and a nicely defined period to do it in’ and felt that this ‘suited my personality of quick answers and no prisoners between here and there’.

John Moore believed that the project had been strangled by committees, with nobody accepting responsibility, and he wanted one person to take charge, with wide powers and reporting directly to the minister. Consequently Peter Briggs was given power to cut through red tape, let contracts without going through the committee system and direct resources as he thought best. He wrote his own terms of reference and ‘whatever I wanted I got’.