This book evaluates and defines the contribution made by the Australian Army’s combat intelligence services in supporting the force commander during operations in the Cold War (1945–1975). Its primary focus is on the Australian Intelligence Corps, with a secondary emphasis on the intelligence teams and staff attached to the infantry battalions and on the headquarters of deployed army formations. It focuses on the roles, organisation, administration, training, doctrine and performance of the army’s tactical intelligence in the field to achieve this. It also explores the ability of intelligence systems to mature, adapt to technological change, and work within a coalition force. It also examines some of the more prevalent myths and criticisms of battlefield intelligence services during service in South Vietnam. It argues and explains why the various intelligence teams and systems were imperfect. Their members made mistakes, and, at times, their prejudices and biases unduly influenced their analysis. They were also generally understaffed, poorly prepared, trained and equipped for their duties. However, this study shows how they proved resilient, adaptable and capable of providing a high level of support to the force commander, whether the commanding officers of the Australian battalions in Korea, Malaya or Borneo or the task force commanders in South Vietnam.