Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-skm99 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-28T16:08:08.417Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Appendix A - Game Theory Tools

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 August 2023

Ana Espinola-Arredondo
Affiliation:
Washington State University
Felix Muñoz-Garcia
Affiliation:
Washington State University
Get access

Summary

We next provide a list of basic tools on game theory that are recurrently used throughout this book. For a more detailed presentation, see Tadelis (2013) and Muñoz-Garcia and Toro-Gonzalez (2019).

BACKGROUND

Consider a setting with N ≥ 2 players (e.g., firms exploiting a CPR), each choosing a strategy sifrom a set of available strategies Si(known as the “strategy set”). In a CPR context, strategy sirepresents the tons of fish that fisherman iappropriates out of the range of feasible appropriation levels. For instance, if it is technologically impossible to appropriate more than 10 tons of fish, the strategy set would be the real numbers between 0 and 10, i.e., Si= [0, 10]. Similarly, let sjrepresent player j 's strategy,where j_= i , from his strategy set Sj ,which may differ from player i ’s, Si , if each firm has access to different technologies; otherwise, Si= Sj= S. For compactness, we often use (si,si)to denote a strategy profile where player ichooses siwhile his rivals select si , defined as

Finally, we assume that players are rational,meaning that they seek to maximize their payoff function, and that this is common knowledge. In a two-player game, this entails that player 1 tries to maximize his payoff, that player 2 knows that player 1 seeks to maximize his payoff, that player 1 knows that player 2 knows that he seeks tomaximize his payoff…and, so on, ad infinitum. Intuitively, this will help each player put himself in his rival's shoes, anticipating the actions that his rival chooses. For compactness, we refer to this assumption as “common knowledge of rationality.”

The following subsections present different solution concepts that seek to predict how players behave (e.g., which specific appropriation levels they choose) by relying on different behavioral assumptions.

STRICTLY DOMINATED STRATEGIES

In this first solution concept, rather than focusing on which specific strategies each player chooses to maximize his payoff, we seek to delete those strategies that a rational player would never select.

Type
Chapter
Information
Common Pool Resources
Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information
, pp. 118 - 129
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×