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  3. Computational and Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences
  • Cited by 84
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      July 2009
      August 2005
      ISBN:
      9780511510588
      9780521853620
      9780521619134
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510588
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.425kg, 220 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.308kg, 220 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Research Methods in Politics, Politics and International Relations, Research Methods In Politics
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    Subjects:
    Research Methods in Politics, Politics and International Relations, Research Methods In Politics
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    Book description

    Mathematical models in the social sciences have become increasingly sophisticated and widespread in the last decade. This period has also seen many critiques, most lamenting the sacrifices incurred in pursuit of mathematical rigor. If, as critics argue, our ability to understand the world has not improved during the mathematization of the social sciences, we might want to adopt a different paradigm. This book examines the three main fields of mathematical modeling - game theory, statistics, and computational methods - and proposes a new framework for modeling. Unlike previous treatments which view each field separately, the treatment provides a framework that spans and incorporates the different methodological approaches. The goal is to arrive at a new vision of modeling that allows researchers to solve more complex problems in the social sciences. Additionally, a special emphasis is placed upon the role of computational modeling in the social sciences.

    Reviews

    ' … we have in this slim volume, full of good ideas, deep insights and practical advice for how to do sound methodological work and how not to do it. Given these strengths, this book should earn a cultish following among graduate students who possess a methodological bent.'

    Source: Public Choice

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    Contents

    Contents
    References
    References
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